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FOREWORD
This report was prepared by the Martin Marietta Corporation
under Contract NAS8-25067, "Study of Space Station Propulsion
System Resupply and Repair," for the George C. Marshall Space
Flight Center of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
The work was administered under the Technical Direction of the
Engineering Division, of the George C. Marshall Space Flight
Center with Mr. Keith Coates as Technical Monitor.
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ABSTRACT
This report describes the effort accomplished under Contract
NAS8-25067 to determine the feasibility and practicability of pro-
viding a resupply and repair capability for a Space Station bipro-
pellant propulsion system. The program encompassed a study of
inflight maintenance, orbital resupply, reliability, fault iso-
lation and detection, logistics, and safety.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The primary purpose of this study was to determine if it is
feasible to resupply and repair a Space Station bipropellant pro-
pulsion system. The output of the effort was more far reaching,
however; the aim was to determine how to maintain the integrity
of a propulsion system for ten years, to identify the elements of
design and technology required to accomplish this task, and to
establish the optimum methods of orbital resupply and repair.
NASA is presently planning a large space base for the 1980
time frame that will maintain 50 to 100 men in earth orbit. The
space base will have an operational life of at least ten years.
A 12-man Space Station will be launched in the mid 1970's that
will become a modular portion of the space base. The realization
of a ten-year mission in space dictates a new approach to pro-
pulsion system design. In previous and current space efforts ,
the subsystem reliability was satisfied by component redundancy
and rigorous component testing. This approach was practical be-
cause of the relatively short mission durations. For very long
missions, critical subsystems must be designed so that the crew
can resupply and repair the system to maintain its original integ-
rity. This study attempts to define feasible concepts and propose
possible means for practical accomplishment of these design goals.
— —The -objectives ^of—this study_were_accomplished_in_ four^phases :
1) A task to conceive the various approaches applicable
to resupply and repair;
2) An evaluation and definition of the concepts;
3) Detailed definition and analysis of the preferred ap-
proaches ; and
4) Conceptual design.
This final report describes the work performed in each major
subject area, together with all findings, data, and conclusions.
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II. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
This chapter summarizes the more significant findings and con-
clusions derived from this study; and are categorized under the
basic technology headings that comprise the remainder of this
final report. Only the main points of the study are extracted;
the details and supporting data will be found in the body of the
report.
While the baseline subsystem investigated in this study was
a bipropellant auxiliary propulsion system (APS) for the Space
Station, it became evident throughout the study that a large por-
tion of the concepts, findings, and conclusions are equally adapt-
able to other mechanical and fluid subsystems on the Space Sta-
tion.
1. Inflight Maintenance
This study has concluded that inflight maintenance (IFM) is
not only feasible for the Space Station, but an absolute require-
ment to develop a system that will achieve a ten-year life. Pro-
pulsion systems to date have not had missions of sufficient dura-
tion to warrant inflight maintenance. In the past, the develop-
ment of propulsion system design has placed very little, if any,
emphasis on the requirement for inflight maintenance. All of the
emphasis was generally placed on performance and reliability. For
missions of short duration, the reliability requirements were
largely achieved by the judicious use of redundancy. The relia-
bility studies in this program have concluded that redundancy is
not sufficient by itself, and that incorporation of an inflight
maintenance capability will improve the ten year system reliabili-
ty by 0.297. Thus, resupply of commodities and the capability to
repair a system are necessary to meet a ten-year mission.
It was determined that the optimum level of repair for the
Space Station APS is to remove and replace at the component/module
level; and, for most failures, to return the failed component to
earth for disposition. However, the capability must exist, in the
Space Station General Purpose Laboratory, to make simple repairs
when necessary and critical to system operation. A component/
module can be defined as a series of components, grouped by com-
modity, and designed into a single module so that any single com-
ponent on the module can be removed by itself, or the entire
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module can be removed from the system. Engine replacement should
be at the module level (i.e., three to four engines per module).
It would be feasible, however, to remove and replace individual
engine assemblies in the General Purpose Laboratory.
The factors that determine the maintenance concept for a sys-
tem are: performance constraints; mission duration and scheduled
events; resupply interval; crew size, time, and skill; fault de-
tection and isolation techniques; weight and volume penalties;
functional design constraints; and component life and failure
rate. It was concluded that the specific results of an inflight
maintenance analysis can only be applied to an individual subsys-
tem. Although similarities exist between systems, and some con-
cepts are adaptable to all subsystems, it was found that no gen-
eralities can be drawn for the optimum level of repair. For ex-
ample, a Mars mission that is payload-limited may require highly
trained crew members and repair at the piece part level.
Every component or subassembly in the system must be repara-
ble at the lowest level specified, regardless of the probability
of failure or predicted maintenance time per year. As a minimum
this must include means to detect and isolate the failure, isola-
tion valves and provisions for fluid removal, spares, procedures,
and crew training. -
It has been determined that all APS inflight maintenance can
be performed from within the Space Station and no EVA will be re-
quired. The propulsion system can be mounted in an internal ar-
rangement, rather than a pod mount on the vehicle exterior skin.
The propellant tanks should be housed in compartments, both
for damage control and to prevent any propellant leakage into the
Space Station. In addition, hypergolic propellant storage tanks
must be physically separated. The compartments should be normally
vented to space vacuum with the capability of being pressurized
for subsystem repair functions. The propellant transfer lines
running from the storage compartment to the engines must also be
enclosed in an enclosure vented to vacuum. These design consider-
ations are necessary to prevent propellant leakage or spillage
into the Space Station from a single failure mode.
Toxic propellant vapors in the spacecraft are one of the great-
est potential hazards in the maintenance of a propulsion system,
although proper design and safety procedures will preclude the
hazard. Less than 1 mm of liquid monomethylhydrazine will raise
the- toxicity level in the Space Station to the' maximum acceptable
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concentration, however the-vaporization rate for this-fuelis such
that sufficient time is available to take corrective action.' Fluid
, removal and decontamination is an absolute requirement-'before any
maintenance,operation on the APS propellant subsystem.' One of the
most critical and pacing technology items identified in this study
was the development of an effective fluid removal and decontamina-
tion tool. As a backup safety precaution, the segment housing-1 the
.propellant system must be isolated from the Space-Station and crew
members- will be required to wear flexible protective clothing' ,
("splash suits") when'opening up a propellant system. The'design
of the-Catalytic burner in the Space Station-environmental-control
system should consider the requirement to remove propellant con-
taminants in the event of a propellant spill. '• • - >- '
If leakage is directed away from the spacecraf t-'interior, Lex-
ternal leakage criteria for the nitrogen and propellant systems
need not be as stringent as they have been on past-programs. It
was concluded that the leakage criteria for each fitting could be
relaxed to. an equivalent of 1 x 10~6 cc/sec of nitrogen, with~a
permissible inflight degradation to 1 x 10-l+ cc/sec (bubbletight).
; Mechanical fluid connectors are recommended over-other "'types of
joints such as brazed,or welded joints. Fittings designed for
inflight assembly .and .disassembly have been identified as a future
technology requirement. Specific requirements-for such'a fitting
are identified in this report. " - ~ "
" Propellant vapors'or massive spills to the exterior of.the
spacecraft are not tolerable because of contamination to the>ex-
periments, solar arrays, and optical and thermal surfaces;- >For '
these propellants, a vapor exclusion device such as a cold1trap-
must be inserted in the vacuum vent line to freeze "out the pro-
pellant vapors prior to venting to the exterior of the spacecraft.
r -,
2. Orbital Resupply - ' '• - ^  _,-. ,
It is. concluded that orbital .resupply of the APS commodities
can,be accomplished with established techniques and equipment.
Pressurant can be resupplied most efficiently by modular re-
placement of the storage vessels. Safe and efficient installation
of the pressurant spheres can be assured by providing manually iso-
lation valves and quick disconnects of conventional design. Safe
handling of the resupply assembly can be assured by a straight-
forward packaging design to avoid mechanical damage during trans-
portation. Because of the relatively small size and mass of the
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required package, transportation can be quickly and efficiently
provided by an individual crew member. If required, larger pack-
ages can be efficiently handled by more than oneicrew member using
auxiliary handling equipment. Modular replacement was selected
over simple expansion of a high-pressure gas source mainly because
of the excessive residuals that result from the latter method.
Because of these inherent residuals, which are compounded by the
thermodynamics of. the expansion and compression processes, modular
replacement is recommended for gaseous resupply regardless of the
quantities involved. Because of added system complexity, power
requirements and/or integration problems,, more sophisticated pres-
surization -techniques such as cryogenic storage, recompression of
ullage, or volatile liquid pressurants are not warranted for the
pressurant quantities required by the baseline APS - approximately
14 Ib of nitrogen per resupply interval.
< For the baseline propellant quantities — 500 Ib per resupply
— the optimum method of propellant resupply is by pressurized
transfer through fluid distribution lines. The recommended en-
ergy source for propellant transfer is a conventional, 250 to 50
psi, blowdown press.urization subsystem. - Pumped transfer is judged
to be unsuitable because of power requirements and added system
complexity. This is particularly true for the relatively low op-
erating pressures required for propellant transfer, essentially
vapor pressure plus flow losses. Ullage may be satisfactorily
controlled by a capillary screen or by any of several positive ex-
pulsion devices. In view of the requirement for refurbishment of
logistics vehicle systems, the transverse collapsing metal bladder
is considered to be the most suitable expulsion device for this
application, primarily because of its potential for low cost ex-
pendable use, -thus greatly reducing.refurbishment problems.
Modular replacement of the propellant storage tanks was re-
jected primarily because of the requirement for excessive crew
involvement, the additional crew hazards involved, and because
of the decontamination requirements. The recommended system for
the integrated APS consumables requirement is schematically il-
lustrated in Fig. VI-2 (Chapter VI). This system employs the
recommended methods of resupply discussed above. In addition, it
provides 'for recovery of contaminated propellants from the Space
Station by use of the logistics vehicle supply tanks as receivers
for waste propellant.
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Based solely on minimum weight and associated cost per payload
pound, three months was found to be the optimum resupply interval
for the recommended system. A six-month resupply interval is rec-
ommended, however, when considering other factors such as crew
involvement, the shuttle schedules on the crew/cargo modules, sys-
tem checkout and activation, ground crew time, refurbishment costs,
and additional safety hazards.
An alternative mode for resupply of the total consumables re-
quirement of the Space Station would be a supply module, or "parked
pantry." This would include consumables for the environmental con-
trol and life support systems as well as the APS. Use of the mod-
ular approach will significantly reduce the requirement for inflight
maintenance and/or development of long-life components; since major
portions of the operating systems are part of the replaceable module
rather than the Space Station itself.
Refurbishment of the shuttle subsystems will become a signifi-
cant factor in program costs and shuttle turnaround time. Achiev-
ing a low cost logistics capability will also require rapid and
economic inspection, refurbishment, and reuse of the APS resupply
system. In most instances this can be achieved to a large extent
by simply recognizing the importance of these factors when select-
ing components for the resupply system.
3. Maintainability
The average unscheduled maintenance time for the APS is pre-
dicted to be 74 minutes per year. The engine solenoid valves are
the most unreliable components in the system, and thus require the
most maintenance time — 31 minutes per year average. Actually
the complete engine module will be replaced regardless of the
failure within the module. Therefore, the average time required
to correct random failures in the engine module is estimated to be
50.5 minutes per year.
It was determined that a preventive maintenance philosophy was
required to maintain the system integrity for ten years. The sched-
uled replacement interval (3 years) was governed by the age life
or calendar life of the component, rather than cyclic life.
It has been established that high reliability valves are now
capable of a three- to five-year calendar life depending on seal
material and valve type. Cyclic lives in excess of one million
cycles can be obtained upon specification. The total predicted
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replacement time for scheduled maintenance of the APS is 194 hr in
ten years and is a direct function of component life. When con-
sidering all.of the subsystems in the Space Station, the time re-
quired for scheduled maintenance could involve a large portion of
the mission. -Future technology development for-the Space Station
must consider.the development of long life components to improve
total component life and thus decrease the total commitment for
scheduled maintenance.
. The recommended minimum onboard spares for the APS consist of
-one complete engine module, two three-way solenoid valves, and
one nitrogen regulator. This recommendation assumes•the capa-
bility .of a three-month resupply interval for spares.
I
It was determined that the baseline engines (22-lb thrust)
were not satisfactory for the spin-despin functions because the en-
gine burn life would be exceeded before the first 75 days of the
mission. Consequently, higher thrust engines would be more appro-
priate for the spin/despin function.
4. Reliability
An attitude .propulsion system can be designed that will meet
the ten-year mission requirements. The system developed during
this study has a predicted ten-year reliability of 0.969 as com-
pared to 0.416 for the original baseline system. This degree
of reliability can be achieved by: (1) adding isolation valves
and fittings to provide an inflight maintenance capability;
(2) redundancy of all operational components with the exception
of the propellant tanks; (3) by a configuration that allows resup- ~
ply and„repair to one-half of the system while the other, half is
in operation;-(4) adding isolation valves on the propellant tanks.
The-largest .increment of reliability was achieved by providing an
inflight maintenance capability.
Redundancy is required for all critical functions on the' Space
Station, particularly where very short reaction times are required.
The control moment.gyros have been designated as the primary atti-
tude control system for the Space Station. The propulsion system
studied in this program could be considered to be a primary system
for Space Station maneuvering.
The recommended ten-year APS configuration (Fig. II-l) described
in this study was accomplished without an overall increase in the
baseline hardware. In fact, the system had an overall reduction
of two nitrogen spheres, four filters, and 40 transducers.
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5. Fault Detection and Isolation
A systems analysis-was conducted as part of this study to deter-
mine the extent, of the instrumentation*and associated logic required
to perform fault detection and isolation on the APS. .The two Space
Station guidelines .used as a basis for the study were:
1) The Space Station will have an onboard checkout system
(OCS) for fault isolation and detection; <
2) The Space Station operation will be largely autonomous
from ground station control.
This study,concluded that the onboard checkout system is com-
pletely adaptable to fault isolation of the APS without incurring
any additional instrumentation. Further, it was concluded that
fault isolation must correspond to the lowest level of repair
planned, and that manual fault isolation without the^ benefit of
a 'computerized checkout system would be a very time-consuming proc-
ess requiring a .highly trained crew. It was determined that the
five checkout and fault isolation tests required for the APS were
minimal in relation to the other subsystem requirements on the
Space Station., .
It is important1 that the overall instrumentation requirements
for the Space Station be integrated both for optimization and com-
monality of data. A large decrease in instrumentation"requirements
can be expected as an outcome of an optimization analysis. This
study concluded that the Onboard Checkout System could be used for
APS fault detection and isolation without incurring any more in-
strumentation than that-normally required for a manned mission.
Fifty transducers were "required for the APS, as integrated with
the Onboard Checkout System.
For the APS it was determined that no more instrumentation
was required for component level repair than for module level re-
pair, although the software logic was increased-substantially.
В. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. NASA Emphasis on Inflight Maintenance
In order to meet the mission requirements of the.Space Station,
NASA must recognize that inflight maintenance is a companion tech-
nology to the design of subsystems, and that strong emphasis is
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required by NASA early in the program. NASA must not only place
requirements on the various Space Station contractors, but must
also specify integrated criteria and an overall plan.
Without an integrated plan and subsequent control by NASA, the
benefits to be gained from inflight maintenance and commonality
will not be realized. It is recommended that NASA place strong
emphasis on inflight maintenance early in the Space Station pro-
gram with continued strong direction throughout the program.
2. System Integration for Inflight Maintenance
It has become apparent in this study that one central organiza-
tion or integrator is required to effectively coordinate inflight
maintenance for the multitude of systems and associated contrac-
tors that will become a part of the Space Station. A central
systems group is required to standardize design criteria, to demand
commonality, and to implement a standard plan for fault isolation,
crew training, procedures, logistics, and design.
It is recommended that one central organization be established
early in the Space Station definition program to define, implement,,
and coordinate the inflight maintenance program for the Space Sta-
tion.
3. Future Technology Requirements
One of the objectives of this study was to identify those areas
of future technology investigation and/or development required for
the Space Station.
Eleven specific areas of future technology are listed below
and described in detail in Chapter X. It is recommended that fur-
ther effort be continued in these specific areas .-
1) Inflight maintenance experiment;
2) Fluid removal and decontamination;
3) Waste fluid disposal,
4) Component design for maintainability;
5) Fluid fittings design and test;
6) Tube repair techniques;
7) Long life test program;
8) Shuttle resupply system refurbishment;
9) Leak prevention and repair;
10) Fault detection and isolation;
11) Flex hose development.
MCR-70-150 IH-1
III. BASELINE CONFIGURATION AND GUIDELINES
The type of system and baseline considered for the study is
described in this chapter. The baseline requirements can greatly
influence the results of a study on resupply and repair. For ex-
ample, size and complexity of the system greatly affects the con-
clusions on the resupply mode and repair techniques. The type of
propellants also determine the safety considerations. One of the
largest pacing factors in a study such as this is the mission dur-
ation. This influences the complete evaluation; including redun-
dancy configurations, reliability, maintainability estimates,
spares requirements, repair techniques, and resupply. The follow-
ing two sections describe the baseline used during the study, and
the Space Station guidelines that were a part of the Space Station
Phase В study.
A. STUDY BASELINE AND GUIDELINES
This program was directed toward a study of resupply and re-
pair for a hypergolic bipropellant auxiliary propulsion system
(APS) on an earth-orbital Space Station. The data shown in Table
III-l is the original baseline system data and served as a point
of departure for the study. Figure III-l shows a schematic of the
APS baseline.
After the contract was initiated, the decision was made that
the Space Station guidelines should take precedence over the ini-
tial study baseline where there was a conflict in requirements
that would affect the study effort or results. The intent of this
study was to follow the Space Station Phase В study as closely as
possible so that the study results would be relevant and useful
to the Space Station. This study is considered to be a supporting
study to the Space Station.
III-2
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Table 111-1 Baseline System Description
System Configuration: Orbital Workshop APS [Workshop Attitude
Control System (WACS)]
Propel 1 ants: Nitrogen Tetroxide, Monomethylhydrazine
Pressurant: Helium or Gaseous Nitrogen
Propel!ant Capacity: 860 Ib @ 1.62 mixture ratio
Pressurant Capacity: 30 Ib of GN2
Operating Pressure:
Pressurant (Max)
(Norn)
Propel 1 ant (Max)
(Norn):
3200 psi
3200 to 350 psi
300 psi
220 psi
Thruster Size: 20- to 100-lb Thrust (Radiation Cooled)
Tube Joining Technique: Primarily an All-Brazed System
Service Connectors: Capped Quick Disconnect
Propel!ant Tanks: Metal Bellows Type
Orbital Environment: Pressure and Temperature for a Nominal
200-n-mi Orbital Altitude
Total Impulse: 1 x Ю6 Ib-sec
Max Number of Component Replacements: Five
Operational Life: 5 years
III-4 MCR-70-150
Table III-2 shows the average impulse requirements defined
in the McDonnell Douglas Phase В Space Station Design Reference.
Model (DRM). These requirements were used throughout the majority
of the study. This table defines a low-thrust system (Resistojet)
and a high-thrust system. The high-thrust' impulse consists of two
distinct requirements, one for maneuvering and the other for the
spin/despin operation. The spin/despin and gravity gradient is
used one time for the partial gravity experiment and requires a
large amount of impulse within a short .time frame. With a "one-
shot" system, used early in the mission, it was not anticipated
that resupply or repair will be required for this system. One of
the original guidelines in the study was that no system larger
than the baseline should be considered. Therefore, the system
that received the majority of the study ef for t was a system used
for attitude control and maneuvering functions, which amounts to
a propellant usage of approximately 1000 Ib per year.
The largest perturbation between the baseline and the Space
Station guidelines was a change in the baseline to a ten-year
mission instead of 'five years. The'mission revision changed the
impulse requirements, maximum number of component replacements,
and total number of resupply intervals. The propellant require-
men,ts (per year) was revised slightly upward (860 to 1000 Ib) to
be in accordance ,with the Space Station requirements. ,
The following basic guidelines were formulated as part of this
study:
1) The primary objective is to determine the feasibility
and practicability of providing a resupply and repair
capability for an earth-orbital Space Station bipro-
pellant propulsion system;
2) It shall be an objective to identify those propulsion
areas that would require further immediate technology
investigation and/or development to meet the opera-
tional date of 1975;
3) The study will use a WAGS as a baseline and will be
restricted to a WACS-size module until additional in-
put is received from the Space Station studies;
4) Where the study guidelines tend to conflict with cur-
rent Space Station study guidelines and such conflict
affects the subject study e f for t or results, the Space
Station study guidelines should take precedence;
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5) It will be assumed that Space Station attitude can be
maintained by another attitude control system such as
control moment gyros (CMGs), while repair functions are
being performed on the APS;
6) The propulsion system design is not constrained to a
pod-type mount on the vehicle skin;
7) The study will.be limited to the mechanical portion of
the system and associated instrumentation. The elec-
trical control circuitry shall not be defined;
8) The thermal requirements shall be considered, but de-
! tailed thermal analysis will not be undertaken;
9) Repair or resupply concepts should minimize the re-
quirement for EVA;
10) The only requirement for the auxiliary propulsion sys-
tem is in orbit, not during boost;
11), Establish the resupply/repair requirements imposed on
the logistics craft rather than optimizing the type
and size of the craft;
12) All hardware that is replaced must be collected and
placed inside the logistics craft for return to earth;
13) Assume no continuous ground monitoring of the attitude
control system.
В. .SPACE STATION GUIDELINES .AND CONSTRAINTS
Space Station guidelines and constraints pertinent to this
study are presented in this section. They were extracted from the
Space Station Phase В Statement of'Work, dated 28 April1 1969.
1.. Space Station
Space Station is defined as a completely self-contained module
including all systems and provisions for supporting a 12-man crew
and "a multidisciplinary experiments and applications program in
low earth orbit. To obtain a high degree of program flexibility,
the station design shall accommodate separately launched modules
-for crew expansion, new subsystems, and 'new payloads. Further-
"more, ^he Space Station shall'be designed to serve, with minimum
in-orbit modification, as a module or prototype module for a space
base that will be assembled in orbit at a later date.
MCR-70-150 щ-7
The Space Station guidelines and constraints are:
1) It shall be designed to have a minimum operational
life of ten years with resupply; ' *
2) Space" Station will include both artificial-g and zero-g
operations; ,
3) The Space Station module shall be cylindrical with a
maximum diameter of 33 ft; '
4) The Station will be divided into separate pressure com-
partments so that any single compartment can be iso-
lated in case it is damaged or rendered untenable;
5) The Space Station shall incorporate at least five
docking ports. Each port shall provide a clear"opeh-
-ing at least 5 ft in diameter for cargo transfer'; i
6) " The Space Station shall be capable 'of independent oper-
ation with a full crew of 12 for periods up to six ..
months following the initial resupply mission;
7) Stabilization and control subsystems shall be designed
so the Space Station is stabilized by control moment
gyros during .both zero- and artificial-gravity opera-
tions. Reaction controls will be used for attitude
control^and orbitkeeping;
8) The basic subsystems will be designed for a long life,
and__for_ease_ of repair, and .replacement- in-flight;- - *
9) , As.equipment becomes obsolete, it will be replaced with
new and better equipment and areas of -a given module
,will be converted or remodeled after the original func-
tions have been served;
10) The floors shall-be normal to the radius'of rotation
- . and the furnishings shall be in an upright position
in the launch configuration and during artificial-grav-
ity assessment;
11) Each, of-_the subsystems shall be designed with large
margins and'with"provisions for inflight maintenance,
repair, and replacement.
MCR-70-150
III-8
2. Program
The program guidelines are as follows:
1) A primary goal of the Space Station program is achiev-
ing a major reduction in the cost of space operations;
2) The first Space Station (crew size 12) will be flown
as an operational vehicle in 1975;
3) A data relay satellite system will be operational be-
fore the Space Station reaches flight status.
3. Logistics Systems
The logistics systems transport crew members' to and from the
station, supply the station with expendables, new equipment, and
experiments, and return data, specimens, and other cargo to earth.
Two classes of logistics systems will be considered: advanced,
low cost systems; and more limited systems derived from current
spacecraft and launch vehicles.
4. Mission Control - • •
The mission control responsbilities are as follows:
1) The crew of the Space Station will be assigned greatly
increased operational control of^the mission, and, as
a goal, will be autonomous when the space base is
operational. To the extent possible, the crew will
.be given the responsibility for checkout and status
monitoring of onboard subsystems, fault isolation,
. , maintenance, calibration, and ropair of onboard sub-
systems and experiments and other equipment;
r, "2) ,The crew shall be freed of routine operations ' to the
greatest practical extent by the use of-automated
systems;
3) Full advantage shall be taken of onboard systems for
checkout, fault isolation, guidance'and navigation,
programing, and data,processing and editing, and of
other features providing the Space Station and the
logistics spacecraft with a high degree of autonomy;
4) Space base activities will ultimately be staffed with
specialists with a minimum of astronaut-type training
or physical conditioning. They will also include
engineers and technicians with a specialized back-
ground in instrumentation and system operation and
repair.
MCR-70-150
5. Safety
The safety requirements of the Space Station are as follows:
1) Redundant safety-critical systems shall be placed in
separate compartments to ensure that a single emergency
or failure shall not destroy both the primary and re-
dundant systems;
2) Provision shall be made so that an emergency situation,
with the exception of prime structure failure, can be
isolated, contained, and controlled;
3) Safety-critical equipment shall be designed to allow
emergency operation by using redundance and/or separa-
tion of parallel or similar functions, and the placing
of such redundant or parallel equipment in isolation
compartments or locations;
4) Potentially explosive containers such as high-pressure
vessels or volatile gas storage containers shall be
placed outside of and as remotely as possible from
crew living and operating quarters , and wherever possi-
ble isolated. The possibility of providing such con-
tainers with special pressure release valves and/or
vents should be explored;
5) If dangerous liquids must be handled on the Space Sta-
tion, positive standards for handling such liquids in
6) Interlocks, automatic valves, or other means of isola-
tion shall be provided for liquid and gas systems so
that a maintenance effort shall not inadvertently re-
sult in liquid or gas leaks to the cabin and eventually
to the environmental control system (ECS).
7) Intravehicular and extravehicular activity (IVA and EVA)
equipment shall be designed to allow the astronaut
ready access to items to be serviced or maintained;
8) Self-test and self-diagnostic equipment shall be in-
stalled in conjunction with the safety-critical sys-
tems, to allow constant monitoring and the detection
and location of active and incipient failures in these
critical areas;
9) EVA operations shall be minimized to the maximum extent
possible.
MCR-70-150 IV-1
IV. INFLIGHT MAINTENANCE
The need to determine the feasibility and practicability of
providing a repair capability for an earth orbital Space Station
Auxiliary Propulsion System (APS) is confirmed by the fact that
today's systems will not maintain a reliability consistent with a
10-year manned space mission. This means that future long-dura-
tion manned space missions will require a drastic improvement in
spacecraft capabilities to attain satisfactory probabilities of
mission accomplishment. The anticipated increase in reliabilities
of components and systems will not be sufficient in themselves to
achieve the overall assurance that is required. The solution to
this problem lies in the inclusion of appropriate onboard resources
to augment or maintain, through the mission, the high reliability
that a spacecraft initially possesses. In the past, for the rel-
atively short missions, redundancy and overdesign of system hard-
ware was the approach taken to achieve mission success. However,
there is a point where a repair capability offers more return
than redundancy alone. To determine this crossover point many
factors must be considered, including length of mission, mission
objectives, system design, system requirements, accessibility,
and crew capabilities, to mention only a few. Therefore, to de-
termine the optimum inflight maintenance (IFM) and repair program
for a Space Station APS, one must first know and understand the
_mission_.objectiyes and_then JLntegrate_the JFM program for the APS
into the Space Station Logistics Plan.
A. FEASIBILITY OF IFM
When planning the operation of an APS for a long-term space
mission, it is essential to identify factors and influences that
can have a significant effect on mission success. When adverse
conditions are identified or anticipated, it is necessary to pro-
vide a means to compensate for them. Therefore, some form of
contingency protection must be made available.
The system designer has four basic options in the selection
of a contingency protection to achieve the desired operational
capability. They are to:
IV-2 MCR-70-150
1) Overdesign system hardware;
2) Accept some degree of degraded performance;
3) Incorporate redundancy in the system hardware;
4) Provide IFM capability.
These options are interrelated and one approach does not necessar-
ily exclude the other three. The approach will depend on technol-
ogy level (state of the art), system design complexity, mission
duration, reliability criteria, resupply interval, crew avail-
ability, and safety, etc. This portion of the study is an out-
growth of the recognized need for the development and implementa-
tion of the most realistic approach to contingency protection for
long-term space missions — an IFM capability. Defined simply,
IFM consists of all actions necessary for retaining a system, sub-
system, or component "in" or restoring it "to" a specified condi-
tion during spaceflight missions.
Figure IV-1 shows the interfaces and interdependency of IFM
for the APS with other elements of the Space Station. The rela-
tionship of the APS to the Space Station and the operational re-
quirements for the APS will create certain IFM demands., These de-
mands are peculiar for each mission and are caused by.one or more
of the following conditions:
1) Random failure;
2) Damage, human- or environment-induced;
3) Wearout;
4) Resource consumption (normal or emergency).
Once the mission demands have been identified, the next step is
to identify the resource demands and how they will be applied.
Maintenance resources consist of technology, people,, material, and
services applied individually and collectively at the right place,
at the right time, in the required amounts, and in an operable con-
dition. These resources possess a variety of characteristics that
materially affect their application. In all cases, however, the
resource selected must meet the demand in order to have an operable
IFM Plan.
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В. TECHNICAL APPROACH TO IFM
With the multitude of decision factors which have either a
direct or indirect effect on the IFM plan, a mission-oriented
IFM concept must be developed. One way of developing the IFM con-
cept is shown in Fig. IV-2. By following this scheme the optimum
IFM plan should be established. During the development of the
concepts, all tasks are classified in categories as either pre-
ventive (scheduled) or corrective (unscheduled) maintenance.
Some of the factors that affect the maintenance concept are:
(1) performance constraints; (2) mission duration and scheduled
mission events; (3) resupply interval; (4) crew size and available
discretionary time and crew skill; (5) fault isolation technique;
and (6) mission module weight and volume penalties. These factors
are the operational and performance factors that must be consid-
ered in developing an IFM concept for the APS. In addition, there
are hardware and design factors that will influence the IFM con-
cept. These factors are functional design constraints, component
life, and failure rate.
The four basic maintenance concepts considered in developing
an APS IFM capability are:
1) Remove item and replace with spare, repair failed item;
2) Remove item and replace with spare, discard failed
item;
3) Remove, repair, and replace same item;
4) Repair item in place.
The first concept, remove item and replace with spare, then
repair failed item, is described below as an example of a mainte-
nance concept. The first step is the indication of system failure,
fault location, and the corrective action instructions.. This in-
formation will be displayed on the onboard checkout system display
panel and by a predetermined code the crew member will be advised
of what action he must perform. The alternative available to the
crew will depend on the type of failure and its criticality to the
mission. When the repair is to be made, the failed item is iso-
lated from the system and the fluid removed from the system. The
failed item would then be removed and replaced with a spare. After
testing for leakage, the fluid is bled into the repaired section
and the system checked out before returning the system to an oper-
ational status. The failed item would be repaired, tested, and
returned to storage as a spare.
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The requirements for an inflight maintainable system are deter-
mined by performing a step-by-step functional analysis of all pos-
sible IFM concepts and then analyzing what is required to accom-
plish each function. The decision to use a, particular IFM concept
has a definite effect on the requirements for specific resources
such as spares, repair kits, procedures and techniques, repair
time, etc, as shown by the functional flow and requirements matrix
in Fig. IV-3.
Anticipatory malfunction detection, such as electrical, noise,
thermal, visual devices, and sonic monitoring can be used as a
means of delaying scheduled maintenance until a wearout failure is
imminent. These devices can also be used to anticipate random
failures so that repair tasks may be scheduled into the daily work-
load. Reliability of crew performance must also be predicted to
determine the extent to which the system must be designed, either
to compensate for the crew's maintenance limitations or take ad-
vantage of their maintenance capabilities.
It is apparent that maintainability of the APS or any other
system can be directly related to its complexity, the mean-time-
between-failure (MTBF), and the ease of effecting component/module/
system replacement. It is also desirable for the hardware to be
so designed that as new and better equipment (components) is de-
veloped, the obsolete equipment can be removed from the system and
replaced with the new. In the same respect, a maintenance concept
that is flexible enough to adapt to and be compatible with new
maintenance techniques and fault isolation instrumentation is de-
sirable.
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С, IFM CONCEPT EVALUATION
In evaluating the four basic IFM concepts, it is found that
three of these are similar in that the failed component or assem-
bly must be removed from the system. This places a requirement on
the system design and packaging. Each component or assembly that
is expected to fail at some time'.during the mission must have a
parallel redundant backup or be designed so that it can be removed
and replaced. The possibility of failure is evident for all com-
ponents that make up the APS. Therefore, some kind of remedy must
be provided to assure mission success. The greatest improvement
in mission reliability is achieved by the use of isolation valves,
and separable fittings with reusable seals,"which is also a re-
quirement in providing an IFM capability. This fact is further
demonstrated in the reliability analysis. In the two concepts
that require the repair of the removed failed item, more support
equipment for repair and testing of the item will be required, but
the repair kits will have less volume, weight, and cost than a
complete spare. In the concept of replacing the failed item with
a spare and then repairing the failed item and replenishing the
spares with the repaired item, the extra volume, weight, and cost
penalty of the complete spare will be borne only once at launch.
The concept of repairing a failed item in place is not appli-
cable for most components at present. To incorporate this mainte-
nance philos(3ph)T~in ~a~sys~tenr or ~the~Space Station-would requi-re- -
major new development of components and extremely close integra-
tion of system design as well as extensive training of the crew.
This concept does offer many advantages, however, in the saving
of volume, weight, and cost by using repair kits.
The normal onboard system checkout equipment can be used to
test a repaired portion of the system, thereby eliminating the
need for extra support equipment. This concept may be very attrac-
tive for a mission, such as Mars, where volume and weight is a pre-
mium or no resupply is anticipated.
As can be seen from the above statements, which were substan-
tiated during the course of this study, no one maintenance concept
can be applied unilaterally. The maintenance concept for each sub-
system should be determined by careful consideration of subsystem
design features and parameters and the relationship of the system
to the Space Station as a whole.
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Another major area that requires consideration at the time of
developing an IFM capability is the degree of fault detection and
isolation. Even when man is available to perform maintenance ac-
tivities, there can be a considerable difference in the level of
maintenance that can be performed, depending on the fault detec-
tion and isolation capability provided. This is as much of a fac-
tor for an IFM capability as the replaceable component level de-
signed into the system or the crew skills involved. The ultimate
design for ease of maintenance would be an automatic fault detec-
tion and isolation capability that would be able to identify any,
item that might have to be replaced. The fault detection and
isolation techniques applicable to the Space Station APS is more
fully defined in Chapter VIII, Fault Detection and Isolation.
It is concluded that the optimum method of IFM for an earth
orbital Space Station APS is to remove and replace on a component
or module level with in-place repair of the plumbing. The faulty
component or module would be returned to earth for repair or dis-
carded. In some cases it may be possible to perform some repair
on a failed component after it has been removed, such as replace-
ments of seals, poppets, solenoids, etc. However, the capability
must exist in the Space Station general purpose laboratory to make
simple repairs when necessary and critical to system operation.
BASELINE SYSTEM ANALYSIS
The first step in developing an IFM philosophy for the APS was
to analyze the baseline system and the components that make up the
system. This was necessary to determine the actual configuration
and functional capabilities of the APS. The baseline APS is de-
picted schematically in Fig. IV-4 and pictorially in Fig. IV-5. As
can be seen by the schematic, no single failure will cause the
system to become nonoperational but there is no way to isolate
any portion of the system in case of a failure, except for the
engines.
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Fig IV-5 Baseline APS Pod
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In applying the various repair concepts to the baseline APS,
it is found that the system requires extensive EVA and tube braz-
ing to effect either system, module, or component removal and re-
placement. This could be averted if the APS was mounted to a dock-
ing ring on one end of the space station. In case of a failure or
during resupply, the logistic vehicle would dock and remove the
failed or expended system and redock a complete full system. This
concept places mission constraints on both the Space Station and
the logistic vehicle. Therefore, this approach was not further
considered as an optimum approach for an IFM capability. This ac-
tion did not eliminate the pod configuration completely because
techniques could be developed as illustrated in Fig. IV-6, where
the pod is removed and replaced from within the Space Station, or
the components could be so packaged that they were accessible
through removable panels on the interior skin of the Space Station.
Final APS requirements, which will determine size, will be a major
factor in determining if the complete pod can be replaced. If the
present APS size, weight, and packaging were considered, this
method would not be attractive. The approach of making the compo-
nents accessible through removable internal panels is more feasi-
ble even though it would require complete repackaging and use of
separable fittings.
Another IFM requirement is to remove and replace components
when they fail or reach a scheduled replacement time in the pro-
gram. The failed component would be either repaired or discarded.
Here again, the baseline APS packaging does not lend iteself to
this concept. As shown in Fig. IV-7 the baseline APS schematic,
replacement of a component such as a pressure regulator, solenoid
valve, or tank would involve removal of the remaining pressurant
or propellant, removing several parts that are secured with many
small bolts, unbraze the interconnecting tubing to remove compo-
nent, replace component, rebraze tubing, test, and then resupply.
All of these maintenance tasks would have to be performed during
astronaut EVA.
The remaining IFM concept of repairing the failed component
in-place is not feasible or possible on the baseline APS for the
reasons identified above.
It is apparent from this analysis that the baseline APS, as
configured, is not adaptable to providing an IFM capability. The
only possible concept that would be feasible would be the removal
and replacement of a complete pod, assuming the interconnecting
lines were accessible. Therefore, a pod assembly similar to the
baseline that is only accessible by EVA and replaced as a complete
pod is not recommended or feasible for the following reasons: (1)
excessive EVA by several astronauts; (2) extensive handling equip-
ment due to size; (3) large impact on logistic vehicle; and (4)
no flexibility in maintenance or system operation.
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1. Modified Pod Concepts
In the pod concept, the designer has several options in both
system configuration and location of pods to provide an IFM capa-
bility. One approach to the pod concept is to have the externally
accessible pod and system designed so that components or a cluster
of components (module) can be easily removed and replaced with a
minimum number of connections and structure removal. Incorporated
into this design would be isolation valves and quick disconnects
to provide component isolation and removal with simple hand tools.
Some undesirable features about the external pod are the require-
ments for an aerodynamic and protection cover and insulation which
must be removed to perform maintenance tasks, complete remote mon-
itoring and switching control, and extensive EVA. For these rea-
sons, this approach is not recommended. ,
Therefore, the only feasible approach relative to IFM requires
locating the pods on the Space Station so they are accessible from
inside the Space Station. This approach would have access doors
or panels operable from within the Space Station to permit removal/
replacement of all components or modules. This would eliminate
EVA and the requirement to remove the protective shroud and insula-
tion to perform IFM. With this approach, either the modular pack-
aging or individual components could be used. Therefore, as men-
tioned before, packaging is a prime factor in providing an IFM
capability for the pod configuration. The three main levels-to be
considered in the physical arrangement within the pod or Space Sta-
tion are the system, system modules, and components. These are
closely related to each other and are individually vital to the
crew's ability,to successfully perform IFM.
Therefore, it is recommended that if the pod concept is adopted
to house the APS using present-day components and technology, the
pod should be designed so that all components are accessible and
removable from within the Space Station. A technique in perform-
ing maintenance tasks on an externally mounted pod is illustrated
in Fig. IV-8. A portable vacuum glove box is placed over the ac-
cess panel to provide a crewman protection from toxic vapors while
working in a shirtsleeve environment and a clean area to perform
maintenance tasks. A desirable design requirement would be to have
the area within the pod capable of being pressurized during main-
tenance and/or resupply tasks. This would allow maintenance on
all pressurant components in a shirtsleeve environment without the
glove box. The design considerations that are valid for the other
concepts'such as isolation valves, separable fittings, and purge/
bleed capability are also required for this approach.
MCR-70-150 IV-17
Vacuum
Glove
Box
Sealed
around
Vacuum
Box
Fixed Pod
Cover
Component
To Be
Removed/
Replaced
NTOor
MMH
Sealed
around
Engines
Fig. IV-8 Portable Glove Box Concept
IV
~
18
 MCR-70-150
Some disadvantages of the internally accessible pod approach
are: (1) higher weight due to thermal requirements and structure
required for packaging to achieve accessibility; (2) less reli-
ability with either the two- or four-pod configuration; and (3)
packaging complexity. In the two-pod configuration the lower re-
liability is due to the possible damage to a good engine if the
adjacent engine fails by explosion; in the four-pod configuration
the lower reliability is due to the greater number of components
to retain some redundancy and still operate the system.
2. Modification of Baseline APS
To have an inflight maintainable system the baseline schematic
and configuration must be modified. The first attempt was to use
the existing components and add only the items necessary to have
an IFM capability. The first modification consisted of adding
three-way isolation valves, and the addition of self-sealing quick
disconnects and mechanical fittings to the extent necessary to re-
move each component from the system with simple hand tools. These
additions increase the leakage paths for the system, however, the
advantages they offer more than offset the induced leakage poten-,
tial.
The changes" made to the baseline APS are illustrated in Fig.
IV-9, which shows a preliminary modified APS schematic. It was
realized that packaging, monitoring instrumentation, fault detec-
tion, and physical location in or on the Space Station are also
major factors in determining an IFM capability. However, this
modified schematic does show the minimum items that are necessary
to achieve an IFM capability. The isolation valves not only pro-
vide a more easily maintainable system, but increase reliability
of the system. The separable fittings will provide the capability
to remove and replace components either on a scheduled basis or for
random failures with simple hand tools (wrenches, etc).
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E. MODULAR CONCEPT
The modular concept involves the grouping of components and
subassemblies so that inflight maintenance is optimized. Compo-
nents can be effectively grouped, by commodity and/on anticipated
life expectancy, into a single module body, thereby reducing ex-
ternal leakage paths and providing a minimum volume and weight.
Repair or replacement can be performed on the entire module, or
on any subassembly within the module, with only a minimum level
of crew training required. Crew time required to repair or re-
place would also be minimized.
In a typical bipropellant propulsion system, the system can
be divided into four modules to facilitate maintenance. These
modules are: (1) pressurant storage; (2) pressurant control; (3)
propellant storage; and (4) engine module. This concept is de-
picted schematically in Fig. IV-10, and represents the recommended
APS configuration for an optimum IFM capability.-
1. Pressurant Storage Sphere ,
The pressurant storage sphere assembly would consist of a nitro-
gen sphere, a manually operated valve, a self-sealing disconnect,
and a protective covering. Figure IV-11 shows a typical pressurant
storage sphere. The exact number of spheres will depend on Space
Station requirements and the system designer. However, base~d on
the Space Station baseline requirements, the designer has the op-
tion of two to four spheres for the system. Actually, one sphere
could fulfill the pressurant requirements, however, for safety and
some backup, a minimum of two is recommended. The advantages of
two spheres over four is that it reduces total weight and increases
reliability slightly. This design approach is compatible with the
modular resupply concept of replacing the pressurant module. The
self-sealing disconnect is recommended in lieu of separable fittings
because it serves as a back-up valve while reducing modular resupply
time. Present technology does not indicate that repair will be per-
formed on a high-pressure (3000 psi) vessel within the Space Station
workshop. Therefore, half of the disconnect and valve could be per-
manently attached to the sphere by brazing or welding since the
sphere will be returned to earth for servicing.
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Fig. IV-11 Nitrogen Sphere
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The Space Station constraints and guidelines specify that high-
pressure pneumatic tanks and propellant tanks shall not be located
in the crew quarters, and further, that a structural wall shall
separate the tanks from the crew quarters. Figure IV-12 depicts
a compartment configuration that satisfies the above constraint
and still allows IVA maintenance. During replacement of the sphere,
either for resupply or repair, the enclosed tankage area could be
pressurized for a shirtsleeve environment. This would facilitate
repair/replacement and still retain a high degree of safety. Spe-
cial tools and protective packaging are not required to remove or
replace the pressurant storage sphere or to provide protection dur-
ing transportation to and from earth. The modular resupply method
dictates that protection is required for the pressurant sphere and
personnel handling the module. The depleted or failed nitrogen
sphere can be depressurized completely, or to a relatively low
pressure, for the return to earth. Limited quantities of residual
nitrogen can be bled into the living quarters to make up the C>2/N2
atmosphere, thus conserving the commodity within the Space Station.
2. Pressurant Control Module
The pressurant control module consists of the following compo-
nents: shutoff and three-way bleed valve, filters, pressure regu-
lators, check valves, burst diaphragm, and relief valve. These
components could have a common module body with the various hold-
down mechanisms attaching the components to the body as shown in
Fig. IV-13.
This module lends iteself to the two maintenance concepts, (1)
removing and replacing the entire module, and (2) replacing a mod-
ule subassembly in place. This design offers the most flexible
approach in that subassemblies can be replaced with the module in
place in the event of a random failure, and still provide total
modular replacement for scheduled replacement as determined from
wearout data. The principal advantage of this design is that it
offers a high degree of maintainability with relatively few spares
and instructions. In keeping with this design objective, the com-
ponents such as valves and regulators could be designed so that
repair would consist of replacement of subassemblies instead of
piece parts. Since failures for these components are usually the
valve seat or poppet, these items can be designed to be removed
and replaced as a slip-in/slip-out assembly as shown in Fig. IV-14.
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Fig. IV-14 Module Subassembly Removal
MCR-70-150 IV-27
It is assumed with this concept that the pressurant control
module would be located within a pressurized area during all op-
erations. The spares could also be stored in the immediate vicin-
ity for quick access and repair. Instrumentation and logic from
the OCS will isolate the failed component to assist the crew in
determining whether the failure can be bypassed for repair at a
more convenient time, or if the repair should be made immediately.
In either case the module design should require no tools or only
simple hand tools to perform the repair task. The tubing is at-
tached to the module through a separable fitting with reusable
seals.
In summary of the options available to provide an IFM capa-
bility for the pressurant control module, the actual module/
component design is the main controlling factor. However, the
module/components configuration can be designed to enhance main-
tainability, and random failures can be remedied by module or
module subassembly replacement. These tasks would fall in the
category of corrective maintenance.
Preventive maintenance will consist of replacement of the
module or individual subassemblies (such as filters) on a sched-
uled basis. The anticipated replacement schedule for each exist-
ing component and the impact on the logistic vehicle has been de-
termined, and a tentative plan has been derived for replacement
of components. This plan is provided in Chapter V, Maintain-
ability.
As depicted in Fig. IV-15, packaging has a direct effect on
all areas associated with providing an IFM capability. Therefore,
the system and component designer must design with these objec-
tives as a goal.
3. Propellent Storage Tank
The propellent storage tank will consist of a shell assembly,
metal bellows assembly, two three-way solenoid valves, and a fluid
gaging sensor, as shown in Fig. IV-16.
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Fig. IV-16 Propellant Storage Tank
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The shell assembly consists of the pressurant gas inlet head
and a one-piece cylindrical shell welded together. The bellows
assembly consists of the movable head, the bellows core, and pro-
pellant outlet head welded together. The three-way valves attached
to each end of the tank by tubing are solenoid operated with manual
backup and the vent or purge outlets directed to the fluid removal"
tools. The (Quantity gaging sensor is located on the outside and
along the length of the tank. The propellent is expelled when the
pressurizing gas enters a port in the head of the outer shell and
collapses the bellows.
The propellant tank lends itself to the maintenance concept of
removing and replacing the complete tank by using separable fit-
tings at the tube connection to the valves. This concept is at-
tractive because the most probable failure will occur in the bellows
assembly, which would require a complete tank replacement with the
present design. However, a tank could be designed that is repara-
ble. The three-way valves provide a great deal of flexibility for
both maintenance activities and during propellant resupply. During
resupply the three-way valve on the gas head would be positioned to
vent the ullage overboard while the tank is being filled through
the propellant manifold. In case of a failure in the bellows as-
sembly the tank could be isolated from the system and the contam-
inated propellant and ullage removed from the tank through the
three-way valves. The contaminated propellant can be disposed
of by several methods. One method is-to dump the propellant over-
board, however, this may interfere with experiments being con-
ducted and because of the high corrosive nature of the propellant,
this method is not recommended. Another method is to have port-
able sump tanks available to accept the contaminated propellant
and return it to earth via the logistic vehicle. A minimum of
two sump tanks would be required, one for fuel and one for oxi-
dizer. Another consideration, adaptable to an internal leak,
would be to relieve the ullage pressure on the tank, cap the tub-
ing, and return the tank and valves to earth with the contaminated
propellant. For certain failures, propellant could be transferred
to the other partially filled tanks in the compartment, thus con-
serving propellant. Both of the above methods would eliminate the
need for auxiliary sump tanks. The latter two methods appear to
be the most feasible when the factors of time, weight, and safety
are considered. The three-way valves also provide the capability
to purge and test lines and components upstream and downstream
from the propellant storage tank. The reasons for solenoid oper-
ated valves with manual backup are that in case of a major failure
in the propellant side of the tank or any of the propellant compo-
nents, the propellant from the tank and pressurant supply to the
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tank can be immediately and remotely shut off. The manual backup
provides a redundancy to the solenoid and also provides the crew
the capability to control the valve when working in the propellant
compartment. A built-in glove box, as depicted in Fig. IV-17, could
be used as an extra safety precaution when a leak is suspected in
the propellant area. The glove openings would be normally plugged
and sealed to provide a positive seal in the spacecraft skin.
4. Engine Module
The engine module would consist of the engines, two propellant
manifold blocks, electrical bundle assembly, and the supporting
structure. Each engine consists of a nozzle, combustion chamber,
injector, quad-injector valves, and instrument sensors associated
with the engine assembly. Breaking the propellant feed lines and
one electrial connector would suffice to free the engine module
for removal. Engine thrust is transmitted through thrust mounts
on the module which are designed to hold the engine in place with
quick release devices adapted to the mount to eliminate fasteners.
Two propellant manifold blocks are required for each module to
distribute the fuel and oxidizer to each engine. The electrical
bundle assembly provides the necessary wiring for engine control
and monitoring. The supporting structure would provide the sup-
port and protection as required for the various assemblies. A
mounting flange provides the interface between the engine module
and the Space Station. The actual design will be determined from
engine size and the other related assemblies' design. Incorpo-
rated into the design should be the capability to remove or swing-
in the complete module from within the Space Station. This elim-
inates the requirement for EVA and would facilitate maintenance
tasks.
It is recommended that four engine modules, containing three
or four engines, be located 90° apart on the Space Station rather
than two modules containing six or eight engine assemblies located
180° apart. The four-module arrangement gives greater reliability
and flexibility, not only in maintenance, but also in the operation
of the system. For an operational consideration, two of the four
engine modules could be operated from half of the pressurant and
propellant supply for the first resupply interval, then be switched
to the other two modules and the other half of the pressurant and
propellant supply for the next resupply interval. By doing this,
a complete system redundancy or built-in spares would be available
at all times. The nonoperating half of the system, below the shut-
off valve at the pressurant sphere would be in a static condi-
tion at a reduced pressure. This will add to component life and
reduce leakage probabilities. The quad engine valves are recom-
mended as they increase system reliability significantly and
eliminate the need for redundant propellant feedline valves.
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Fig. IV-17 Glove Box Maintenance Concept
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This module lends itself to modular replacement in case of
failure or scheduled replacement. However, after removal the
module may be repaired by the replacement of a complete engine in
a portable glove box or in the General Purpose Laboratory. The
engine solenoid valves have the lowest reliability of all the com-
ponents in the module, and thus are most likely to fail before en-
gine module replacement because of the three-year engine and valve
life.
In case of a failure or scheduled replacement of the engine
module, the interconnecting tubing would be bled, purged, and elec-
trical power interrupted before removing the module from- the opera-
tional position. The bleed and purge operation would be performed
with a fluid removal tool and the three-way valve on the tank. To
prevent inadvertent contact of the fuel and oxidizer, two fluid
removal tools are required for this system, which are physically
incompatible with each other, to perform this task. Engine repair
could be done in a pressurized area in a shirtsleeve environment
after the engine module is removed. Conventional concepts of en-
gine design and mounting have required donning a life support suit
and EVA to remove engines.
One concept is presented in Fig. IV-18 that would not require
the use of a pressurized suit. Space Station constraints require
that EVA shall be minimized, and shall only be used for emergency
situations. Donning and removing an EVA suit is a lengthy proce-
dure, and working in the Apollo-type hard suit requires consider-
able exertion with the result of a high metabolic load. An ele-
ment of safety is involved when the astronaut is in the suit, even
during IVA conditions.
Figure IV-18 shows a configuration with a removable flange-type
engine mount. The glove box approach could be used to permit en-
gine removal without donning a pressurized suit. Each engine as-
sembly could be designed so that it could be removed separately.
Quick-release devices would be used on the engine mount flange
and engine assemblies to permit removal with a minimum of effort
and crew training. This approach is consistent with the anticipated
Space Station design in that there will be a meteoroid shield sur-
rounding the outer wall. This will require placing engine modules
a short distance from the Space Station interior skin.
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F. INDIVIDUAL COMPONENT CONCEPT
To facilitate maintenance on a bipropellant propulsion system
using individual components in the system, several requirements
must be acknowledged. As in the pod and modular concepts, pack-
aging is a prime factor to achieve an IFM capability. Other con-
siderations are the components' design and their retention in the
system to facilitate maintenance tasks.
A system of individual components would be very similar to the
system described in the modular concept and shown schematically,
by Fig. IV-10. The primary difference is in the pressurant con-
trol section of the system, where instead of the two pressurant-
control modules 12 components would take its place. The compo-
nents are two three-way valves, two dual regulators with filter,
four quad check valves, and four burst diaphragm and relief valves.
The same maintenance concepts feasible for the modular concept
would apply to a system of individual components except that sep-
arable tubing fittings are required at all components.
Some components such as valves and regulators may be repaired
in place, depending on design and packaging configurations. One
concept that takes advantage of this maintenance approach and in-
creases system design flexibility is the common valve body ap-
proach depicted by Fig. IV-19. This commonality of valve bodies
with slip-in and -out subassemblies allows the designer many op-
tions while retaining maintainability of the component. Another
component that should be designed as a maintainable item is the
propellant tanks. Due to their size and weight, a great savings
could be realized if the tanks could be repaired in the Space
Station. Therefore, since the most probable failures occur in the
bellows, the tank could be designed so that the bellows assembly
is removed from the exterior shell for either metal welding/brazing
or an advanced epoxy sealant-type repair. Testing provisions are
available after repair of the tank through the three-way valves
and high-pressure (300 psi) nitrogen supply.
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In a system of individual components, packaging is a prime
factor if any degree of optimization is achieved. It is evident
that individual components will require more space and weight be-
cause of the physical size, individual mounting, and interconnect-
ing tubing. The conventional packaging approach of putting com-
ponents in a line with the tubing in a straight line between the .
components can be improved by having tubing ports in parallel and
the tubing loop from one component to the next. Figure IV-20 de-
picts this packaging approach.
• Conventional
Maintainable
Figure IV-20 Conventional vs Maintainable Packaging
This packaging approach not only saves space but provides a
more maintainable system. The components are easier to remove
and replace without interfering with other components or tubing.-
It is concluded that for a Space Station in the 1975 to 1980
time period, systems can be designed using individual components,
although modularization is recommended as the optimum method of
providing an IFM capability. For this reason, emphasis is placed
on such factors as packaging for accessibility; standardization
and commonality of components, fittings, and fasteners; fault de-
tection and isolation; and crew training. These factors, if ad-
hered to, will reduce space, weight, spares, logistics require-
ments, special tools, and maintenance repair time.
IV-40 MCR-70-150
G. SPACE STATION APS CONFIGURATION SELECTION
To verify the conclusions made in regard to providing an IFM
capability and satisfying the many constraints, conceptual de-
signs and configuration drawings for the APS were prepared. Major
emphasis was placed on packaging, accessibility, and crew safety.
This aspect is very important because the packaging and design
configuration enhances IFM, which may determine the success of the
complete Space Station mission.
It was assumed that the APS would be located in a pressurized
segment of the Space Station and housed in compartments that are
normally vented to vacuum. The design considered all aspects of
human engineering per MSFC-STD-267A and MIL-STD-1472 in the place-
ment of equipment and operations required by the astronaut in per-
forming maintenance functions. An example of human engineering
and safety is depicted by the configuration of one of the APS
compartments shown in Fig. IV-21 where all operating controls are
placed between 34 and 70 in. from the floor. Also all removable
fittings and components are placed between 17 and 72 in. from the
floor. The fuel and oxidizer tanks are in separate compartments
with separate access doors to preclude any chance of the two hy-
pergolics coining in contact. The compartment is vented to vacuum
to insure that no propellant vapors will migrate into the Space
Station. Another desirable feature in the propellant compartments
is to have manual control of the vent-to-vacuum valve to allow a
small flow of air from the Space Station through the compartment
to space during maintenance operations. This would provide an
additional safety feature to preclude any change of toxic vapors
getting into the habitable areas of the Space Station. The pro-
pellant storage access doors shall be operable with one hand with
positive indication of locked and open, have all corners rounded,
and be restrained in the open position completely free of and not
obstructing any aisle space. The opening into the propellant
storage shall have rounded corners and the depth to any fitting
or fastener required to be worked on to remove and replace the
tank or any component shall not exceed 17 in. The extra space in
the bottom of the compartment is a convenient location to store
APS spares, etc.
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The pressurant supply and controls are mounted above the pro-
pellant tanks in an adjoining compartment with the pressurant
sphere contained in a protective mounting structure. This pro-
tective shield around the pressurant sphere will also complement
the modular resupply concept by giving added protection to per-
sonnel handling the assembly. The pressurant control components
are accessible from the front of the compartment since the control
module will require the majority of the scheduled maintenance.
Of prime importance in this area is the accessibility to the pres-
surant sphere and the filter since they must be changed every six
months. Some leakage from these components into the Space Station
will do no harm as long as the loss is not sufficient to jeopard-
ize the propulsion function from a lack of APS pressurant. Also,
all the pressurant module tubing connections shall be readily ac-
cessible with a standard wrench to complement easy removal and
replacement of the module.
The Propellant Removal and Servicing Tool is located adjacent
to the gaseous nitrogen storage area. The location of the operat-
ing controls, as with the nitrogen pressurant control module,
place all of the operating controls at the optimum height above
the floor. This compartment is also vented to vacuum to preclude
any toxic vapors from migrating into the Space Station. The pro-
pellant removal and servicing tool shown is typical for each APS
compartment. Two tools are needed because there are two hyper-
golic fluids and the built-in concept for the tool conserves
space, weight, and provides a much safer operation than a portable
tool.
Space Allocation - Space allocation layouts and tradeoff
studies were made on the installation of the APS and spin-despin
propellant and pressurant supply in the Space Station. This is
an important aspect of the study because the physical location
will enhance inflight maintenance, space utilization, and will
complement the entire Space Station.
It was assumed that the propulsion systems.would be located
in the same pressurizable segment of the Space Station and housed
in compartments that are normally vented to vacuum. The instal-
lation considered all aspects of human engineering per MSFC-STD-
267A and MIL-STD-1472 and safety in the arrangement of equipment
and operations required by the crew in performing maintenance
functions.
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The propellent and pressurant required for the spin-despin
operation for the 30-day artificial-g experiment would be stored
in the immediate area with the APS. The propellant requirements
for the spin-despin operation are approximately ten times larger
than the APS, or 10,000 Ib propellant and 300 Ib pressurant, and
will be depleted in the first 75 days of the mission. For a sys-
tem like this, it is not necessary to provide the full inflight
maintenance capability as in the long-term APS to retain a high
degree of reliability. However, to optimize space and equipment
on the Space Station, some isolation and access to the spin-
despin components within the Space Station" are desirable features.
It is also conceivable and feasible to cannibalize this short-
term system to repair long-term systems. Another desirable fea-
ture would be to have the same propellants as the APS so the
Propellant Removal and Servicing Tools connected to the APS could
be used to purge and decontaminate the system. As in the APS,
the fuel and oxidizer tanks should be in separate compartments
that are normally vented to vacuum. The spin-despin compartments
should be fitted with access panels instead of hinged doors.
The segment of the" Space Station selected for installation
of the propulsion systems has an inside diameter of 33 ft, a
central transit and utility core with an outside diameter of 12
ft, and a floor-to-ceiling height of 80 in.
The location of the APS within the Space Station has not been
fully resolved to date, but three alternatives are possible. The
APS may be located on a level that has no docking ports, on a
level that has four docking ports, or a level that has two dock-
ing ports located 180° apart. The main consideration when plan-
ning space allocation is the location and access required for the
docking ports, because each docking port requires a 5-ft aisle
free of permanent installations. This study considered all three
alternatives, and design layouts were prepared showing the best
space allocations for each configuration. The alternatives of
either two or four docking ports were considered as one option,
because for resupply the APS should be located near a docking
port.
The location of the engine modules is assumed to be on the
same level as the rest of the system for nearly all configura-
tions, but this is not an absolute requirement as shown in one
layout configuration.
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The first two layouts, shown in Fig. IV-22 and IV-23, are
those configurations adaptable to the level containing the dock-
ing ports. The APS is located adjacent to the transit and util-
ity core and the spin-despin propellant is located on the outer
wall of the Space Station. This configuration allows complete
access to all propulsion components, but limited access for in-
spection of the Space Station inner wall. However, this configu-
ration does give a redundant pressure wall in case of,meteoroid
penetration of the Space Station wall. Although both configura-
tions are very similar, Fig. IV-23 provides more safety to per-
sonnel working on any area with quick access to the transit and
utility core. Work areas in Fig. IV-23 could be illuminated
better with fewer lights than in Fig. IV-22. Neither configura-
tion interferes with the docking ports or the aisle to the transit
and utility core. The weight distribution of these two configura-
tions during launch is poor, but good for the long-term mission.
In Fig. IV-24 and IV-25 the scheme is just the reverse of
Fig. IV-22 and IV-23 in that the APS is located on the outer wall
and the spin-despin propellant is placed near the transit and
utility core. The space allocation is approximately the same for
all four configurations. Other equipment may be located in the
free areas not occupied by the propulsion system or that desig-
nated as free aisleways. A 40-in. aisle is required in front of
the APS control panels and a 30-in. minimum aisle is required
in front of the spin-despin system. The configuration shown in
Fig. IV-22 does use the docking port aisle for access to the APS
operating panel, thus providing dual usage for space that is
wasted except during resupply.
Layouts in Fig. IV-26 and IV-27 are similar in that all the
commodities are located near the outer wall. However, Fig. IV-26 -
gives direct access to more of the outside wall than the other
configurations. One poor feature of this layout is that the
astronaut has only one escape route when working in the area be-
tween the propellant compartments. Fig. IV-27 depicts an instal-
lation with no engine in the segment with the propellant storage
area. This layout does not have any particular advantages ex-
cept good space use and accessibility to components.
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The remaining four layouts, Fig. IV-28 thru IV-31, depict the
installation of a Space Station segment without docking ports and
a minimum of two access doors to the transit and utility core. Of
these four, Fig. IV-28 and IV-29 provide very good accessibility
to components, and Fig. IV-29 has the optimum weight distribution
and the most access to the Space Station wall. Figure IV-31 gives
good single level access to the components and the Space Station
wall. However, this configuration does not have a good escape
route when performing tasks in between the propellant compartments.
Figure IV-30 requires two-level access to the spin-despin propel-
lant tanks, but there is ample room for this operation. Weight
distribution is mostly near the outer wall, which places a penalty
on the overall system for maneuvering the Space Station.
This study has concluded that the layout shown by Fig. IV-22
is the most attractive layout for a level with docking ports. The
docking ports severely limit the free space available for permanent
installations, but resupply is enhanced if the propulsion system is
located adjacent to the docking ports.
The most optimum layout for the APS and the spin-despin propul-
sion system is shown in Fig. IV-29. It offers maximum use of space,
single level access for maintenance activities, maximum escape
routes for the astronauts, maximum access to the Space Station skin
for inspection and repair, and optimum weight distribution for the
entire mission. These two recommended configurations will remain
the same even if the Space Station diameter is reduced from the 33
ft used in the layouts.
Since the installation may have the spin-despin propellant tanks
packaged one behind the other (two levels) the design must accommo-
date the removal of two tanks at a time. Figure IV-32 depicts a de-
sign that will provide for the removal of two tanks. This concept
shows separate access panels for each set of tanks, although one
panel could be used for two sets of tanks. To reduce isolation
valves, the propellant system could be manifolded into two groups
(two or four) of tanks with a common manifold tied into the main
manifold. It is not anticipated that maintenance would be required
for the intended mission of the spin-despin system, but the system
may be used for other systems on the Space Station. Some uses of
the spin-despin components would be storage of contaminated fluid
in the propellant tanks and cannibalization of components such as
valves, regulators, etc.
In several of the layouts the pressurant storage for the spin-
despin propulsion system is located in the area of the engine mod-
ules. This installation is depicted by Fig. IV-33, which shows a
view of the installation from inside the Space Station.
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Fig. IV-32 Tank Removal Subpack -
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N2 Compartment
Engine Module
N2 Compartment
Fig. IV-33 N2 Compartment and Engine Module Installation
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H. LEAKAGE CRITERIA
The ability to remove components from a system is a very neces-
sary element in inflight maintenance, but„this requirement also
increases the potential leakage paths in the system. In view of
the potential leakage problem, an analysis was conducted to deter-
mine what leakage criteria were allowable for the bipropellant
auxiliary propulsion system (APS) in the Space Station.
The analysis considered the number of external leakage paths
in the propulsion system and the system commodity. Table IV-1
shows the number of leakage paths for each subsystem in the APS
for both the module approach to component packaging and a system
comprised of individual components.
Table IV-1 System Leakage Paths
Subsystem
High-Pressure Nitrogen (3000 psi)
Low-Pressure Nitrogen (220 psi)
Monomethy 1 hydrazi ne
Nitrogen Tetroxide
Total
Equivalent Leakage Paths
Module Approach
16
60
118
118
312
Components
20
66
118
118
322
As indicated, the percentage of exterior leakage paths for the
module configuration, as compared to individual components, is not
substantially reduced. For the Space Station APS, the component
module configuration only reduced leakage paths by'3%, or a reduc-
tion of ten fittings out of 322 exterior leakage paths. The rea-
son for the low percentage reduction in the APS is due to the type
of system in that the pressurant control area is the only portion
of the system that lends itself to a modular configuration.
Parametric leakage data for the fuel, oxidizer, and nitrogen
is presented graphically in Fig. IV-34, IV-35 and IV-36. Using
these graphs, the pounds of commodity lost through external leak-
age can be quickly determined as a function of leakage criteria
and the number of fittings in the system. The data assume that
the leakage criteria (cc/sec) is based on a system that has been
leak checked using nitrogen at the operating pressure of the sys-
tem.
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The system commodity loss is presented in Table IV-2. This
table presents the commodity loss and percent of total commodity
loss for the APS as a function of the leakage rate. The data are
based on an APS configuration using individual components with J22
leakage paths and with all of the leakage paths leaking at the
same leakage rate. This is a conservative estimate since the prob-
ability is small that all of the fittings will be leaking at the
maximum ,rate at the same time.
Table IV-2 System Commodity Loss
Leakage
Criteria
(cc/sec N2 per
fitting)
1 x 10-7
1 x 10-6
1 x 10-5
1 x 10-4
1 x 10-3
1 x 10-2
System Loss
(Ib/year)
N2
6 45 x 10-4
6 45 x 10-3
6.45 x 10-2
0 645
6 45
64 5
МММ
1.18 х Ю-3
1 18 х Ю-2
1.18 х Ю-1
1 18
11.8
118
NTO
2 36 х Ю-3
2.36 х Ю-2
2 36 х Ю-1
2 36
23 6
236
Percent of System Commodity*
(loss per year)
N2
0 00215%
0.0215%
0.215%
2 15%
21.5%
215%
ммн
0 000315%
0 00315%
0.0315%
315%
3 15%
31 5%
NTO
'0.000378%
0 00378%
0 0378%
0.378%
3.78%
37.8%
*Total commodities "are- Nitrogen 30 Ib, fuel 375 Ib, oxidizer 625 Ib.
Hxsto'rically, leakage criteria for propulsion systems have been
very stringent (1Q-7 cc/sec). These criteria were based on the
high toxicity of the propellants, their hypergolic nature, the cor-
rosive environment resulting from a propellant leak, and high pen-
alty for commodity losses due to leakage over an extended period
of time. One of .the constraints on the Space Station is that high-
pressure spheres and propellant tanks must be isolated from the
crew quarters. In addition to this constraint, this study has con-
cluded that the propellant enclosure should be vented to vacuum
during normal operation, with the capability to be repressurized
for maintenance activities.
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With the enclosures vented to vacuum, many of the design prob-
lems related to toxicity and corrosion are greatly reduced. As
indicated by the system commodity loss in Table IV-2, the loss is
not significant until all fittings were leaking in excess of Id"1*
cc/sec per fitting. Therefore, the conclusion of this aspect of
the study is that the system should be designed and qualified
(before launch) to a leakage rate of 10~6 cc/sec nitrogen per fit-
ting, and actually meet a leakage rate of lO"1* atm cc/sec of ni-
trogen for the duration of the mission. This will allow for deg-
radation due to the human element and seal materials. Present
technology and hardware will more than meet these requirements
because a leak rate of lO"1* cc/sec is approximately a bubbletight
joint. This level of leakage will also allow the use of less
stringent methods of determining leakage points in the system.
Thus it is apparent, from all tradeoffs, that leakage criteria
are to be considered, but more emphasis should be on fitting de-
sign criteria for inflight maintenance. Some of the more desir-
able features a fitting should possess are:
1) A fitting with a replaceable seal;
2) Repeated sealing integrity after numerous assembly
and disassembly operations in zero gravity,
3) Compact design with simple and positive assembly;
4) A fitting that is foolproof in assembly and which
can be easily repaired or replaced in zero gravity;
5) A fitting design which eliminates or reduces
failure modes.
I. MAINTAINABLE FITTINGS
In the analysis of separable fittings, it was realized that to
have an 1FM capability-for the APS, the system must have mechani-
cal fluid fittings and replaceable instrumentation sensors. Sepa-
rable fittings are required even though they are heavier and have a
greater potential for leakage than brazed or welded joints.
The evaluation of separable fittings resulted in selecting four
candidate couplings and seals, each with certain features that are
adaptable to IFM. These four couplings are the Bobbin seal devel-
oped under Air Force Contracts AF04(611)-8176, -9578, and -11204, and
used in "the Bob-N-Loc coupling; Astro-Weight couplings with metal К
IV-62 MCR-70-150
seals; Conoseal couplings with metal seals; and Gamah couplings
with metal seals. Each of these couplings consist of a threaded
flange, a nut, a flange and seal as shown in Fig. IV-37. The
primary difference in the various separable joints is the seal
configuration. Also, one manufacturer uses the stub ACME thread,
rather than the straight thread, and a reusable se'al. Of the four
mentioned above, the Bobbin seal and the Gamah seal have given
the better results in test of high-pressure (over 2000 psi) sys-
tems for extreme environmental conditions and long duration. The
major advantages of couplings and fittings of the types described
above are that seals are separate from the coupling, there are no
closely machined surfaces that must be mated, and an unskilled
person can easily make a joint that will meet the lO"1* atm cc/sec
leakage rate. Therefore, since leakage is no longer the predomi-
nant criterion, more emphasis should be placed on the accessibility
to the fitting, the ease of assembly/disassembly of the fitting
and repeated high reliability with each assembly.
The two most" common failures of a separable coupling or fit-
ting is a failure of the seal or threads, which results in exces-
sive leakage. The seal problem can be easily remedied by replacing
the seal if separate seals are employed. The thread failure, due
to stripping or galling, can be a very serious problem if a back-
out solution is not available. A coupling configuration as de-
picted in Fig. IV-38 has one major advantage over the conventional
couplings in that it provides a backout solution to thread f-ail-
ures. The design includes a replaceable nut and split retainer
ring for disassembly purposes. To be assured that the thread fail-
ure occurs in the replaceable nut, the threaded female flange would
be made of a harder material. To remove a faulty nut, the nut
would be moved back over the male flange until the split retainer
ring is exposed and removed, the faulty nut will then pass over the
male flange for removal. Replacement of a spare nut would be the
reverse of this procedure.
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The stub ACME thread is recommended as one way to reduce thread
failures because it is almost impossible to cross thread and is
easy to start even if not visible to the operator. Another consid-
eration in fitting design is to have the seal material made of a
softer material than the seal cavities to preclude damage to the
welded-in flanges. The slight radial clearance in the seal cavity
establishes a rapport between seal and cavity by allowing the cav-
ity to support the seal in the event the modulus of elasticity of
the seal material is reduced by time or temperature. A circular
nut is shown in Fig. IV-38 to achieve a minimum envelope and weight,
although hex nuts could be used. With the circular nut a spanner
wrench is required for tightening. Another concept would be to
have a backup 0-ring as a redundant seal to the metal seal. The
0-ring would be made of Teflon or other compatible material.
An inflight solution to the replacement of an entire fitting
is shown in Fig. IV-39. This Gamah coupling does not require any
welding or brazing processes to complete the fitting and tube re-
pair. To provide the tube coupling repa'ir capability, the initial
tube coupling would have short flanges with the tube swaged and
welded to the flanges. If a coupling requires replacement, the
tube would be cut off immediately behind the coupling. A coupling
with extra length flanges could then have the tubing swaged to
the flanges.
The only flared tube type fittings that have been tested and
gave satisfactory results are the modified AN fittings. A modi-
fied AN fitting is identical to a standard AN fitting with the ex-
ception of a groove machined on the nose of the fitting and a
Teflon ring inserted. This forms a composite metal-to-Teflon and
metal-to-metal seal when in contact with a flared tube. Extensive
development tests have been conducted on this fitting. The tests
concluded that the fittings do require more support for external
loads and for vibration loads than similar joints with AN fittings
without modification. The torque relaxation problem is also greater
with the Teflon seals than the nonmodified fittings. The test in-
dicated that the modified fittings gave good sealing characteris-
tics even when manufacturing specifications were not met. The use
of damaged (by handling or use) fittings and extensive torque re-
laxation did not alter the sealing properties significantly. The
Teflon seals do tend to lose slight sealing properties when reused
but this was not great enough to require changes of seals more
often than approximately once per 50 reassembly times. These tests
were conducted by Brown Engineering Company, Inc., per NASA Con-
tract NAS10-1360.
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The tools required to assemble or disassemble these fittings
are standard open-end wrenches, spanner wrenches, and/or tubing
wrenches that are nonsparking and adaptable to being restrained
in zero gravity.
J. PROPELLANT TOXICITY ANALYSIS
An analysis was conducted to determine contamination levels
in the Space Station due to spillage or leakage of the APS propel-
lants, nitrogen tetroxide (NTO) and monomethylhydrazine (MMH).
Basic data and conditions in the Space Station were taken from
the NASA RFP statement of work, dated 28 April 1969.
The two basic situations treated in this study are contaminant
buildup versus:
1) Spillage of assumed volumes of contaminants;
2) Constant leakage of contaminants at assumed rates.
Each of these categories are investigated separately for NTO and
MMH in both a single floor case and the total Space Station.
Statement of _work parameters describing the Space Station in-
ternal environment are as follows:
Single floor volume = 5987 ft3;
Total Space Station Volume = 29,935 ft3;
Environment:
Т = 68°F = 528°R,
Relative humidity = 40%,
p = 10 psia,
P0 = 2-7 Psia (constant 02 partial pressure);
- Cabin atmosphere leakage = 1170 Ib in 90 days or 1.5 x
m
Ю-
4
 Ib /sec.
m/
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1. Contaminant Buildup vs Spillage
The problem investigated in this portion of the analysis pre-
dicts the contamination levels resulting from spillage of liquid
propellants. It was assumed that, upon spillage, the volume of
contaminant would be instantaneously and uniformly distributed
throughout the volume in question. Spilled volumes of liquid,
v , were assumed and the mass of spilled fluid, w , was found by
с с
w = p v /Ib \ [I]
с с с \ ml l J
with v in cm3, p (liquid density) in Ib /cc
To find the number of moles, n , of contaminant
с
w
n = -- lb moles - ~ '[2]
с H
c
\ m ) l J
where M is the molecular weight of the contaminant. Assuming
perfect gas behavior, to determine the number of moles, n , of
cabin atmosphere gas:
n = |Д /Ib moles] ' [3]
a R т \ m / l J
where
p = 5, 10 or 15 psia or 720, 1440, 2160 Ib /ft2
V = 5,987 ft3 or 29,935 ft3,
ft - Ib. ,
R = 1545 Ib -mole °R'
m
Т = 528°R.
Since ideal gas behavior is assumed, the number of molecules of
atmosphere gas and contaminant are
NA = No na [4a]
and
N., = N n [4b]
С о с
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respectively, where N is Avogadros number, a constant. The
contamination level, С1э is found by
N n (106) n (106)
„ о с с
—- —
о а а
ppm [5]
or, substituting Eq [2] and [3] into [5]:
Now:
p.™MMH 1.92 x ID'
3
 Ib /cc = 54.5 Ib /ft3
m/ m/
- (liquid density) ," -
PMTn = 3.21 x 10~
3
 Ib /cc = 91.0 Ib / f t 3NTO m/ m/
(liquid density) ,
M^ = 46.08 lb
m
/lb
m
-mole
"NTO ' 92'°2 l
Curves plotted from Eq [6] are shown in Fig. IV-40 and IV-41;
They reflect the two contaminants each plotted for one segment
and the total Space Station at three pressures.
Two toxicity levels are indicated in Fig. IV-40 and IV-41.
The emergency tolerance level is the maximum amount allowable for
a ten-minute unprotected exposure. The maximum acceptable con-
centration is the maximum amount that can safely be endured for
an 8-hr workday. The values indicated in Fig. IV-40 and IV-41
reflect contamination levels for the presence of a single contami-
nant. If more than one toxic substance is present, the maximum
concentrations must be proportioned between the constituents.
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The following conclusions were arrived at for propellant
spillage in the Space Station:
1) Emergency tolerance levels will be reached
when (0.7 to 110 milliliters) of spillage
occurs. The amount of critical spillage is
highly dependent upon the propellant, Space
Station atmospheric pressure, and volume;
2) Maximum toxicity levels occur at reduced
Space Station pressures and volume;
3) Propellant systems must be thoroughly decon-
taminated before breaking open the system;
4) Toxicity levels within the system must be
verified safe before opening the system;
5) Astronauts should wear protective flexible
clothing when performing repair on a pro-
pulsion system;
6) Emergency breathing apparatus should be pro-
vided within easy reach, and the Space Station
design should include emergency isolation of
one segment (floor) in the Space Station;
7) Fuel spills (MMH) present the highest toxicity
levels for comparable volumes;
8) Sufficient time is available to take emergency
measures for small spills;
9) Components should be designed with no trapped
volumes, minimum seal material exposed to the
propellant, and minimum internal volume.
V wlc
Space Station
Volume
Space
Fig. IV-42 Propellant Leakage Diagram
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2. Contamination Buildup vs Constant Leakage Rates
The dynamics of this problem are illustrated in Fig. IV-42
where,
w = flow rate of contaminant leakage into the
Space Station lib /sec\,
I m/ I
w = mass flow rate of contaminant removal from
cabin atmosphere by the environmental con-
trol system lib /sec) ,\ ro/ /
w-i = mass flow rate leakage of atmosphere from
cabin to space /lb /sec\ ,
\ m/ /
~w~ = "the contaminant leakage rate out of the
Space Station lib /see) ,
w' = the effective instantaneous mass flowrate
of contaminant accumulating within the
Space Station (lb /sec) .
Summating the mass flowrates of contaminant,
w' = w - w - w [7]
С с 1C СГ
Now if n is the number of moles of contaminant, and n is the
с с
rate of change:
where M is the molecular weight of the contaminant. The number
of moles of Space Station atmosphere n (lb -moles) ,
a \ m /
"a '
 П
Н20
 +
 % + % = f (P V)
[8]
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For 40% humidity, the partial pressure of H20 is
p = (0.40) (vapor pressure of H20 at 68°F)H2 0
= (0.40) (0.34) = 0.136 psia = 19.584 lbf/ft
2
 [10]
and,
P V
„
 nH2O R T
The partial pressure of 02, PQ is constant at 2.7 psia.
P v
n. = [12]
°2 R Т
The partial pressure of N2 is
P.. = P - P~ ~N2 °2
where p is the cabin pressure. Again, the number of moles of N2
is given by
„„ - VLN2 R T
Equation [9] then gave the number of moles of Space Station at-
mosphere gas for the different conditions of the study.
The numbers of molecules of contaminant and atmosphere are
respectively,
N = n N [15]
c e o
N = n N [16]
а а о
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also,
N = n N [17]
c e o -
The rate of contamination buildup, C2, щ ppm/second is therefore
n N (106) n '
C2 = ° n° N ^ (Ю
6) ppm/sec [18]
а о а
The amount of contamination at any time, t, is given by
t
C2 = f C2 dt [19]
•'o
C2 is a function of time as shown belox^:
w ' = w - w , -w - [7]
с с lc cr
however,
, К')
W
a
or
where W = the mass- of cabin atmosphere gas
and
[20]
w~ = w - —П Wi ~ w [2la]
с с "
а
 1 cr
w - w
[21b]
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Substituting the various parameters into Eq [18]:
. (*c - *сг) (1°6)
02
 "Г . VI
 мL Ч* с
Substituting Eq [22] into [19] and integrating:
[22]
C2 =
/ w1 с - w c\ (10
6) In
w t Л
l + 1 \ и1  ' W
[ WaJ a
n M w-,
а с 1
ppm [23]
The values assumed for w are the mass flowrates based on
с
contaminant vapor leakage volumes of 10~2, lO"4 and 10~5 cc/sec.
The density of the contaminant vapors at p = 10 psia are calcu-
lated by
_
[24]
Resulting in:
lb
m lb
= 0.1625
 ft3.
m
р
ммн - °'
0815
 ft3
Then
w = v p .
с с с
[25]
Therefore
C2
W /v p - w \
a \ с с crl 10
6
 In 1 + W
n M w
n
а с 1
ppm [26]
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Figures IV-43 thru IV-46 show contaminant levels versus
elapsed time for three values of total propellant system leak-
age. The data were calculated at a Space Station pressure of
10 psia, and assumed uniform distribution of the vapor with
specification atmosphere leakage from the Space Station. The
toxicity levels will increase, for a given value of propellant
system leakage, as Space Station atmosphere leakage to space
decreases. The following conclusions resulted from" this anal-
ysis:
1) Nominal system leakage (10~^  cc/sec) into the Space
Station will reach MAC levels in approximately two
weeks. Therefore, adequate time is available to
effect repairs;
2) Leakage failures (10~2 cc/sec or higher) will
reach MAC levels in approximately 3 hr, which
_ will necessitate emergency action to be.taken;-
3) The propellant system and its inherent leakage
must be isolated from the normal crew occupied
areas of the Space Station;
4) No failure mode should allow leakage into the
Space Station crew quarters (i.e., leakage shown
is to vacuum) ;
5) The design of the Cataylic burner in the Space
Station environmental control system should con-
sider the requirement to remove propellant con-
taminants -in the event of a spill. A small toxic
removal unit should be located in the same level
of the Space Station as the propellant system to
remove local vapors in the event of a spill or
emergency.
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Fig IV-43 MMH System Leakage vs Toxicity Level
MCR-70-150 IV-7 9
1 DAY 1 WEEK 5 WEEKS 1 YEAR
Т
VOLUME 5,987 ft
LEAKAGE
_2
10 cc/sec
VAPOR
10
50 PPM EMERGENCY TOLERANCE I EVEL - 10 М1М1Л ES
10
5.0 PPM
§
м
1-.0
.IMUM ACCEPTABLE CONCENTRAT] ION 8 HOURS
о
о
.1
LEAKA GE = 10 cc/
зес VAPOR
.01 LEAKAGE 10 cc/sec
10 10 10 10
ELAPSED TIME, SECONDS
10 10
Fig IV-44 NTO System Leakage vs Toxicity Level
IV-80 MCR-70-150
ю
10*
ю
§
ы
н
н 1.0
о
о
Л
.01
5.0 PPM
0.5 PPM
10
1 DAY I WEEK
Т V
5 WEEKS
VOLUME
TOTAL SPACE
EMERGENCE TOL: IRANCE LEVEL
29,935 ft
TATION
LEAKAG
- 10 MINUTES
1 YEAR
Т
_2
10 cc/sec
VAPOR
VAPOR
10 cc/sec
VAPOR
10 10" 10'
ELAPSED TIME, SECONDS
10 10
Fig. IV-45 MMH System Leakage vs Toxicity Level
MCR-70-150 IV-81
EMERGENCY TOLE] ANCE LEVEL
LEAKAGE = 10 сс/зес
10 10 10 10
ELAPSED TIME, SECONDS
10 10
Fig. IV-46 NTO System Leakage vs Toxicity Level
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3. Theoretical Contaminant Removal Requirements
When contaminant is being removed from the atmosphere by the
environmental control system, i.e., w > 0, it is desirable to
know how much must be removed to theoretically restrain the con-
tamination level below a given value at a given time. Figure
IV-47 illustrates the contamination buildup versus w plotted
from Eq [26]. Careful attention should be given to the parameters
which are indicated as fixed on Fig. IV-47.
Summarizing the results of this curve for t = 109 sec:
1) To keep below 0.5 ppm of MMH, 6.8 x I0~k Ib of MMH
must be removed per month;
2) To retain a level of 5.0 ppm of MMH, 7.5 x 10~5 Ib
of MMH must be removed per month;
3) To remain below 5.0 ppm of NTO, 1.5 x IQ-1* Ib of
NTO must be removed per month; m
4) If w =0 the contamination level for NTO will not
cr
exceed 50 ppm at the conditions given at 109 sec.
К. FLUID HANDLING-AND SPECIAL TOOLS
, One of the most critical and necessary maintenance tasks in
providing an IFM capability is propellant removal and handling.
Because of all the potential hazards associated with both NTO
and MMH, special care and tools are required when maintenance
tasks require working with lines or components containing these
fluids. The hazards involved have been explained in the toxicity
analysis; therefore, in this section we will discuss the special
tools and procedures required for the removal and replacement of
modules or components containing NTO and MMH. The procedures
also include the sequence of tasks to remove and replace compo-
nents of the pressurization system.
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FIXED PARAMETERS'
Time = 109 sec
Volume = 29,935 ft3
W.= 1.5 x 10"* cc/sec
10-6
1 2 3
Contamination Level (ppm)
Fig. IV-47 Toxicity vs ECS Contamination Removal
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The minimum number of special tools required to handle and
perform maintenance tasks on components or modules containing NTO
or MMH are the Propellant Removal and Servicing Tool, portable
propellant leak detectors, and propellant leakage monitoring de-
vices for each fluid. In addition, a portable N2 leak detector
is recommended for testing the system for leaks before introducing
the propellant fluid to a repaired section of the system. The N2
leak detector would also be used to check for leaks after repairs
in the pressurization section of the system.
Two Propellant Removal and Servicing Tools, such as the one
schematically illustrated in Fig. IV-48, are required to safely
remove and store contaminated propellants from the APS. Each
tool would consist of a pump, a liquid-gas separator to prevent
venting propellant to the atmosphere, a positive expulsion tank
to store contaminated propellants that can be returned to earth
via the logistic vehicle, gaseous nitrogen supply for purging and
testing the affected s.ections of the APS, and the necessary inter-
connecting tubing, control valves, check valves, and instructions.
The pump is required in case propellants cannot be pressure trans-
ferred, due to a tank ullage failure. The tools could also em-
ploy some of the same components as the APS, thus cannibalization
could be employed, if necessary, to reduce the spares requirements.
The N2 supply for the propellant removal and servicing tools is
self-contained or it could be obtained from the Space Station ECS
for purging1 requirements and from the APS pressurant supply for
leak testing requirements. The low pressure from the ECS would
be sufficient for the purging operations, and since the quantity
required for testing requirements is relatively low, 0.1 Ib per
test, there is ample N2 to satisfy the APS and leak testing re-
quirements.
It is recommended that the propellant removal and servicing
tools be built into the Space Station as an integral part of the
APS. The reasons for a built-in tool, rather than a portable tool,
is that since two are required, one for each propellant, and they
would only be used for the APS, a built-in unit would take less
volume and weight. Also, the use of this tool in any other system
would present a potential hazard due to residual propellant or con-
tamination (oxidizer, organic, water) remaining in the tool after
use. Safety constraints would not allow any other usage of a tool
used in a propellant system, even considering cleaning after use.
This concept is depicted in the conceptual design of the APS com-
partment. This configuration uses the available space that is ad-
jacent to propellant storage tanks and thereby reduces interconnect-
ing tubing, monitoring and detection devices, and provides the crew
the capability of controlling all phases of maintenance tasks on the
APS compartment from the immediate area.
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It should be noted that the checkout and decontamination equip-
ment, once considered to be ground equipment, now becomes a piece
of flight hardware. The purge lines are an appendage in the pro-
pulsion system. Even though the equipment is in a standby mode
the majority of the time, the equipment must be considered in the
overall propulsion system integrated design and reliability pre-
dictions.
Since one of the primary safety constraints is that the APS
propellant lines shall not be opened until there is a positive
indication of safe toxic levels, it is evident that purge ports
are required at the engine module to provide a loop for the purg-
ing commodity, gaseous nitrogen. It would be desirable to have a
purging port at each engine solenoid valve; however, this is not
very practical. A more feasible location for the purging ports
would be in the fuel and oxidizer manifolds on each of the four
engine modules. This would require a total of eight purging ports
to purge all the components between the propellant tanks and the
engines.
The propellant tanks would not be purged, but would be de-
contaminated by removing the remaining fluid with the propellant
removal and servicing tool, and then a controlled sequence venting
of the ullage and the propellant storage volume to vacuum through
a cold trap.
The detection and monitoring of the storable propellants and
their residues in the storage compartment and on the surface of
the components is essential for two reasons: (1) to protect per-
sonnel who are required to work in the compartment with the com-
ponents, and (2) to prevent damage to the-components.
The term detection is used to designate noncontinuous quantita-
tive test for propellants or their residues. A separate sample is
examined each time and in each area that is suspected of containing
propellant or propellant vapor.
The term monitoring is used for the process in which sampling
is continuous. Monitoring equipment also can incorporate alarms
or provisions for reducing or eliminating the detected material
from the area being sampled.
Two portable detection devices, one for fuel and the other for
oxidizer, are required for isolating propellant leaks and for a
verification of system integrity after the removal and replacement
of propellant components. The preferred portable detection kit for
fuel uses a ppm meter specifically for MMH. The test, which is
extremely sensitive, can be applied to wet or dry surfaces, solu-
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tions, and air samples. The nitrogen tetroxide portable detector,
suitable only for air sampling, indicates the presence of N0£ on
a ppm meter. Surfaces can be tested for Ж>2 with pH-indicating
paper since N02 diluted with water produces nitric acid. Refer-
ence to a color chart indicates the level of acidity and the
corresponding level of dissolved N62- It may also be feasible to
coat fittings and other potential leakage paths with a substance
which would give a visual indication of a propellant leak.
The monitoring system to detect propellants in their compart-
ments would consist of gas analyzers. It is recommended that the
monitoring devices be compatible with the Onboard Checkout System
(OCS) to give rapid indications that a failure has occurred. The
location of the sensors will be determined by the actual design
configuration of the propellant compartments.
In keeping with the primary maintenance philosophy of removal
and replacement of components or modules, Table IV-3 lists the
sequence of events required to rectify failures or to perform
planned maintenance activities. The Propellant Removal and Serv-
icing Tool schematic and recommended APS schematic were used as a
functional guide to determine the necessary operations to remove
and replace the APS components or module and put the system back
in service. The procedures in Table IV-3 do not include the de-
tail step-by-step procedures to perform the maintenance task.
This can be done only after the actual system is designed. Also,
such items as donning protective clothing, pressurizing and de-
pressurizing compartments, pulling circuit breakers, etc, are
not included in the table. The time to accomplish these tasks
was used in the maintainability analysis in determining the time
to effect repair.
The engine solenoid valve replacement was included since it is
a high failure item. If the solenoid valves were located away
from the injector, it may be feasible to repair the valves. This
is possible for long burn maneuvering functions. For an engine
design such as the baseline engines, the solenoid valves would
not be a replaceable component except in a clean room environment.
If quad solenoid valves are used, the engine failure probability
is so near the failure probability of the quad solenoid valves
that it is more feasible to replace a complete engine assembly.
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Table IV-3 Sequence of Component/Module Replacement Tasks
Repair Procedure
I Isolate Faulty Item and Bleed-
A Position Valve on N2 Sphere to OFF
В Position Three-Way Pressurant Control
Valve to Vent N2 Sphere
С Position Three-Way Pressurant Control
Valve to Vent N2 Module
D Position Three-Way Pressurant Valve(s)
on Propel 1 ant Tank to Vent Control Module
and Lines
E Position 'Three-Way Pressurant Valve(s)
on Propellent Tank to Vent Ullage
F Position Three-Way Propellent Valve(s)
on Tank to Bleed/Purge to Remove Propel -
lant
II Propellent Purge
A Position Control Valves on Propellent
Removal Tool(s) to Circulate N2 thru
Engine Mamfold(s) and Lines
В Vent Propellent Components and Lines
thru Propellent Removal Tool to
Vacuum
III Component/Module Removal
A Remove Item
В Cap Ports on Component or Module
IV Component/Module Installation
A Install Spare Component or Module
В Package Removed Item for Transport to
GPL or Return to Earth for Repeir
С Store Removed Item
V Leak Check
A Position Valve on N2 Sphere to ON
- В Position Three-Way Pressurant Control
Valve to Operating Position
С , Charge Propellent Lines and Components
with N2 from the Propellent Removal Tool
D Check for Leaks with N2 Leak Detector
Tool
E Vent Propellent Components end Lines thru
Propellent Removal Tool(s) to Vecuum
F Position Three-Wey Pressurant Valve(s)
on Propellent Tank to Operating Position
G Position Three-Wey Propellent Velve(s)
on Tank to Operating Position
H Check for Leaks with MMH and/or NTO Leak
Detector Tools
VI Checkout System
A Perform Standby Test with DCS
В Perform Dynamic Test with DCS
VII Return System to Service or Stendby
Component or Module
N2
Sphere
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
N2
Filter
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Pressurant
Module or
Component
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Propellent
Filter
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Propellent
Tank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16*
17
18
19
Engine
Module
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Engine
Solenoid
Valve
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
*Follow Resupply Procedure
0
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V. MAINTAINABILITY
The maintainability analysis of the APS resulted in analyzing
four areas of concern that are necessary to provide an IFM capa-
bility. These analyses were based upon the recommended modified
APS shown schematically in Fig. IV-10 (Chapter IV). The areas
studied were:
1) Mean-time-to-repair (MTTR) of the various components;
2) Estimated scheduled and unscheduled maintenance times;
3) Crew-time profile to accomplish APS maintenance, re-
pair, and resupply;
4) Recommended list of onboard spares.
In addition to the above analyses, a brief study was conducted
to evaluate engine life as a function of Space Station mission
requirements; including spin, despin, sun track, and gravity
gradients. The design aspects of maintainability have been dis-
cussed in Chapter IV.
It is apparent that the achievement of a ten-year mission re-
quires the combined use of high reliability components, redundancy,
and an in-space maintenance and repair capability. Maintenance
can be defined as all the activities necessary to keep the APS
in, or restore it to, a satisfactory operating condition. Main-
tenance may be either scheduled or unscheduled.
Unscheduled maintenance is defined as any corrective maintenance
required as a result of equipment failure or damage. Maintenance
actions conducted as a result of conditions found during scheduled
inspections including OCS are also classified as unscheduled main-
tenance .
Scheduled maintenance is any planned maintenance action deemed
necessary to enhance the" functional success of the equipment and/
or preclude operational failure.
V-2 MCR-70-150
A. UNSCHEDULED MAINTENANCE
Tables V-l, V-2, and V-3 present the estimated unscheduled
maintenance time per year for the APS subsystems and their com-
ponents. The estimates assume that complete failed components,
such as valves (level 7), were removed and replaced. Lower tier
items such as valve poppets would not be replaced with the com-
ponent installed in the APS. The times required for each main-
tenance task were estimated for the modular internally mounted
concept that requires no EVA.
The average unscheduled maintenance times per year were cal-
culated as follows:
- 1) The times to perform the individual tasks necessary
to replace components were estimated and then summed
to obtain the average total replacement time. For
example, the average total time to replace a nitrogen
sphere is 81 minutes (Table V-2);
2) The probability of each component failing during a
year due to random failure was tabulated. These prob-.
abilities, in ppm/year, were taken from the reliability
analysis presented in Chapter VII. The failure prob-
abilities include environmental and application ad-
justment factors. For example, the probability of a
nitrogen sphere random failure is 406 ppm/year;
3) The probable unscheduled maintenance time per component
type in a subsystem is equal to the product of the re-
placement time, number of components, and probability
of component failure. Thus the probable unscheduled
maintenance time for the two nitrogen spheres is 0.07
minutes per year;
4) The sum of the unscheduled maintenance times for com-
ponents in a subsystem equals the unscheduled maintenance
time for that subsystem. For example the average esti-
mated unscheduled maintenance time requirements for the
pressurization system is about 6.9 minutes per year.
Obviously no maintenance can be performed in 6.9 minutes;
however, over a period of years, the average maintenance
time prorated over the mission years will be 6.9 minutes
for the pressurization subsystem.
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The average unscheduled maintenance time per year for the APS
is about 74 minutes. As might be suspected, the engine solenoid
valves require the most unscheduled maintenance time, 31 minutes
per year average (Table V-3).
The maintenance times in Tables V-l, V-2, and V-3 are average
values. Assuming a log normal distribution, multiply the average
value by 0.5 and 3.2 to obtain the low .and high values respec-
tively at the 95th percentile distribution level. Thus the low,
average, and high unscheduled maintenance times per year are ap-
proximately 36, 74, and 235 minutes, respectively.
Should it become necessary to employ either EVA or suited IVA,
the estimated unscheduled maintenance times must be modified. The
"don protective clothing" task must be increased to ,3 hr, which
includes donning a pressure suit and breathing pure oxygen for 45
minutes. EVA and suited IVA conditions require a buddy system,
or two men. Also the task times in Tables V-l, V-2, and V-3 must
be multiplied by 2.5 to account for the lack of mobility in a
pressure suit.1
В. SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE
The maintenance planned for any system depends in part upon
the basic philosophies adopted. The most prevalent philosophy
is to replace components either before they wear out or before
their calendar lives are exceeded. This philosophy ensures con-
tinued high system reliability normally required for primary
systems. These analyses assume component replacement before life
limits are exceeded.
The APS system for the Space Station has been designated as
a secondary system and some degradation of system reliability may
be acceptable to reduce maintenance and spare requirements. The
philosophy adapted for component replacement can be at or anywhere
between the two "extremes" of replace components long before their
lives are exceeded and replace components after they have failed.
Allowing components to fail could provide life information useful
to future programs. Substantiated data on mechanical component
lives under spatial environments for long durations is not readily
available. Allowing components in a secondary system to function
until failure and then analyzing the failures would provide much
needed information. This approach could be considered as a sec-
ondary experiment for the space station.
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A compromise approach would be to replace the components in
one-half of the APS before failure and allow the components in the
other one-half to function until failure. Although having less
statistical significance than replacing all components after life
expiration, useful failure information would be gained, but system
reliability would not be degraded as much. Should a component
fail because of life limitations, the corresponding components in
the other one-half system could be" replaced before their lives are
exceeded since they are newer components.
The conservative and more conventional approach of replacing
components before their lives are exceeded was employed in esti-
mating scheduled maintenance. However, if the final APS functions
are secondary and some reliability degradation is acceptable,
serious consideration should be given to allowing some components
to function until failure to gain useful failure information.
Table V-A presents the estimated life limitations of the APS
baseline components. Most of the estimated component lives in
Table V-4 are from "Workshop Attitude Control System (WAGS),
Propulsion Module Component Description Document," S&E-ASTN-PAS,
dated March 25, 1969.
It is believed that the estimated two-year calendar lives of
valves in the foregoing document are conservative. A study of
mechanical component lives and reliability problems under spatial
environments has been conducted by Martin Marietta Corporation,
and the results are contained in the "Handbook of Long-Life Space
Vehicle Investigations (1967 and 1968)," M-68-21, dated December
1968. This document, based upon literature and industry surveys,
indicates that high reliability valves are capable of 3 to 5 year
calendar lives, depending on seal material and valve type. Cyclic
lives in excess of one million cycles can be obtained upon speci-
fication. Therefore, it is believed that if all valves are re-
placed either shortly after three years in space or after a total
ground and space environment life of 5 years, the calendar lives
of properly designed valves will not be exceeded. Analysis of
system requirements indicates that the cyclic lives of the valves
will not be exceeded if the valves are replaced on the calendar
basis recommended.
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Table V-4 Estimated Lives of APS Components
Component
A. Valves
1. Engine Solenoids
2. Feedline
3. Check Valve
4. Pressure Relief & Burst Disc
5. Pressure Regulator
6. Three Way
7. Quick Disconnect
B. Nitrogen Sphere (0-3200
psig - 0 = 1 cycle) and
Js Quick Disconnect
C. Filter Bodies (change filter
element once a year)
D. Propel lant Tanks
1. Bellows (1 complete
expulsion = 1 cycle)
2. Shell (0-219 psig - 9
psig = 1 cycle)
E. Transducers
F. Engine Assembly
1. Engine
2. Valve
3. Thermal Control System
Spatial Life „Limitations
Cycles
100,000
100,000
5,000
3,000 (valve)
5,000
5,000 Min
400
400
--
100
2,000-
—
100,000 Starts
100,000
100,000
Ref
a
a
a
a
a
с
a
a
--
a
a
—
a
a
с
Years
3
2
3
3
2
3
2
2
10
-
10
10-
3
10,000 Sec Burn
3
3
Ref
b
a
b
b
a
b
a
a
с
с
с
d
a
b
с
References: a. "Workshop Attitude Control System (WACS), Propulsion Module
Component Description Document," S&E-ASTN-PAS, 3-25-69
b. "Handbook of Long Life Space Vehicle Investigations,"
Martin Marietta Corporation, M-68-21, December 1968
c. General Data Indication
d. "Experiment General Requirement Document - AAP," MSC-KA-6D-
68-1 Rev B. EGRD useful life specification for transducers
is 5 years, assumed terrestrial life is two years.
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It may be possible to design and develop valves with a full
ten-year life. However, since the valves will be required before
1975, real-time life tests of these valves would not be possible.
To date no accelerated life tests of valves have been developed
that are acceptable according to a Martin Marietta Corporation
shelf-life study conducted for NASA-MSFC. (Reference A Study of
Programs for Evaluation of Component Life, MCR-69-366, August
1968, Contract NAS8-21296.)
The transducer useful lives are five years total (terrestrial
and spatial) per NASA-MSC specification MSC-KA-6D-68-1. Assuming
a two-year life before launch, the spatial life of a transducer
is three years. Martin Marietta Corporation experience indicates
that these life estimates are essentially correct.
Combining the task times data of Tables V-l thru V-3 with the
estimated component lives of Table V-4, the scheduled maintenance
time requirements can be calculated. To minimize the total main-
tenance time, identical components/module requiring replacement
at the same time were assumed replaced during one maintenance
operation, saving preparation and travel time. Since the engine
solenoid valves, thermal control system, and transducers all have
three-year lives, complete engine modules should be replaced,
rather than replacing the components separately because the time
to replace one engine module is less than the total replacement
time of individual components. It was assumed one-half of the
filters are replaced after each pressurant and propellant resupply
that occurs every six months.
If all the components with three-year lives were replaced during
one maintenance period, available crew time might "be exceeded.
Therefore, it is suggested that only half the valves, engine mod-
ules, and transducers be replaced at one period. The components
in the system half that was active immediately after orbit inser-
tion should be replaced first after three, six, and nine years.
The initially redundant standby half of the APS should have the
subject components replaced at 3% and 6^ years.
About 3 hr will be required every six months to replace filters.
It will require approximately 23 hr to replace and check out half
of the valves, transducers, and engine modules (see Table V-5).
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Table V-5 Approximate Ten-Year Scheduled Maintenance
Task Times
Replacement
Interval
I . Every
h year
II. Every 3
years
III. Every
3h
years
Component Module Replaced
One-half of total filter elements (3)
Total I
Pressurant control module
Two engine modules
One-half three-way solenoid
valves (8)
Transducers not on replaced
modules (6), and propellant-
quick disconnect (1)
Total II
Same as II above except the replaced
items are from other half of the
system
Total III
. Totals I, II, HI
Average
Replacement
Time
(minutes)
175
175
124
448
434
385
1391
1391
1391
Total Time in
Ten Years
(hr)
55.4
-
69.5
69.5
194.4
Note: 1. Tasks combined to decrease maintenance times below are sum of
individual task times in Tables V-l thru V-3.
2. Maintenance is performed in shirtsleeve environment.
3. Maximum continuous maintenance period is 8 hr.
4. Feedline cross-over valves not replaced until failure occurs.
Only fail open of normally closed valves or leakage through
solenoid seals can negate APS redundancy, a low probability
of occurrence.
5. Tasks are performed by one man.
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С. PROPELLANT AND PRESSURANT RESUPPLY
Estimated time for propellant and pressurant resupply is 10 hr;
9 hr preparation, checkout, and configuration restoration plus
1 hr actual transfer time. Three men may be required for the re-
supply operation. Hence, a total of about 30 man-hours will be
required every six months.
Total Time Profile - The preceding data provide the estimated
maintenance repair and servicing times for the mission. The maxi-
mum requirements of 57 man-hours occurs at 3, 3%, 6, 6^, and 9
years. Any replacements at 9% years are deemed superfluous be-
cause of the ten-year mission duration. About 33 man-hours are
required for each consumable resupply, which includes replacing
three filters.
D. ONBOARD SPARES
The recommended onboard spares were selected because they fell
within one or more of the following three categories:
1) Components whose failure would adversely affect crew
safety. No components met this criterion;
2) A component whose failure (single point) would seri-
ously degrade the probability of mission success. An
engine detonation could inundate its standby counter-
part; sufficient spacing, if applicable, could mate-
rially reduce the probability of this occurrence. The
crossover solenoid valves on the storage and transfer
propellant and nitrogen systems could be single point
failures for the failure modes of: (a) failed closed
or (Ъ) leakage through the solenoid seals, but the
failure probabilities are small for these normally
closed valves;
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3) Either a component with a high failure probability or
a number of identical components whose collective
failure probabilities are high. Because of redundant
usage, a component with a high random failure rate
may not necessarily seriously degrade the probability
of mission success; but may require relatively fre-
quent replacement. Thus onboard spares should be
carried for those components that may require fre-
quent replacement.
Tables V-l thru V-3 present the estimated random failure prob-
ability per year for the various components by subsystem. The
total estimated failure probability, in ppm per year, for iden-
tical or very similar components is given in descending -order in
the following tabulation. The failure probability decreases
rapidly below component grouping 4, the pressure regulator pack-
age. This suggests that, as a minimum, component groupings 1 thru
4 should be spared.
Component Grouping
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Engine Solenoid Valves
Engines Less Solenoid Valves Plus
Thermal Control
Three-Way Valves
Pressure Regulator Package
(Redundant Regulators in Package)
Propel 1 ant Tanks
Pressure Relief Valves & Burst
Discs
Check Valves
Transducers
Lines & Fittings
Random Failure
Probability
(ppm/year)
0.1748
0.0868
0.0474
0.0412
0.0257
0.0206
0.0118
0.0094
0.0004
The weights and volumes of onboard spares for the APS must be
integrated with other systems in the Space Station for overall
Space Station optimization. The Space Station Phase В Study is
not being worked at the level of detail that will permit alloca-
tion of spares for each subsystem.
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It is suggested that, as a minimum, the following major spares
be carried onboard if weight and volume constraints permit:
1) One complete engine module. The solenoid valves could
be cannibalized for separate valve replacement if de-
sign allows;
2) Two solenoid three-way valves — one oxidizer and one
fuel compatible type (either one should be nitrogen
compatible);
3) One nitrogen pressure regulator assembly.
Spare transducers are not identified in the minimum spare parts
list because of the variety of types and ranges required. Leakage
or rupture were the only failure modes germane to system failure
because the loss of one transducer would not preclude^ ascertaining
the system condition using other transducer data and simple logic.
Commonality can be achieved in transducers by standardizing sizes,
range, fittings, material compatibility,-etc. This will reduce the
number of spares that must be stored onboard the Space Station.
E. ENGINE LIFE ADEQUACY
This section discusses the life adequacy of the baseline engines
for the APS maneuvering functions and additional functions that in-
clude spin up, despin, gravity gradient, and sun track. Engine
assembly life may be limited by either burn life or calendar life
constraints. Engine assembly calendar life is limited by the esti-
mated three-year life of the solenoid valves as discussed pre-
viously. Better definition of the Space Station control require-
ments are needed to determine if the burn lives of the engines can
meet APS requirements and constraints. Table V-6 presents the'total
impulses required for the various APS functions and the- total burn
times per engine for these functions.
The baseline engine has a nominal thrust of 22 Ib, a 10,000 sec
burn life, and a start life of 100,000 times. If the 200,000 Ib-
sec impulse required per year for maneuvering functions (Table, V-6)
is divided evenly among the 12 engines, the engine burn life ex-
ceeds the ten-year mission requirements (7575 sec/engine). Thus
the "basic" engines need not be replaced during a ten-year mission
if only maneuvering functions are required. However, since the
engine solenoid valves, transducers, and thermal control system
should be replaced every three years as discussed previously, the
engine module will also be replaced in the process.
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Table V-6 Estimated Engine Burn Times
Occurrence
(days after
launch)
1 - 3650
45
45 - 70
75 - 90
75
Function
Maneuvering
Spin-Up
Gravity
Gradient
Sun Track
Despin
Impulse
Required
(Ib-sec x 106)
2.000
0.493
1.275
0.142
0.493
No. of
Engines
Used
12
2
4
6
2
Average Burn Time/
Engine (sec)*
22-lb Thrust
7,575
11,200
14,500
1,070 -
11,200"
100-1 b Thrust
1666
2465
3180
237
2465
*Not all engines required for all functions.
Should the spin-despin and associated functions be included
as part of the basic attitude propulsion system, the burn life of
the baseline engine (22 lb) will be exceeded before the first 75
days of the mission. This is a particularly undesirable situation
because onboard replacement engines" must be available before the
first resupply, which occurs at 90 days. This situation can be
corrected/alleviated by employing (1) separate engines for spin/
despin; (2) baseline engines with longer burn lives; or (3) higher
thrust engines with burn lives sufficiently long to permit the
total impulse required before burnout.
Table V-6 also shows the burn times required for 100-lb thrust
engines to accomplish the denoted functions. Some engines will
perform more than one function, such as maneuvering, sun track,
and gravity gradient functions. A 100-lb thrust engine could re-
quire as much as 5083 sec (1666 + 237 + 3180) of burn, per Table
V-6. This figure is well within the present performance of these
engines.
Other burn life-thrust combinations could satisfy mission re-
quirements. An engine with a ten-year mission burn life is not
required since the engine solenoid valves and engine instrumenta-
tion calendar lives are about three years. Therefore, it is more
desirable to replace entire engine modules rather than replace
individual components because the time required to replace an
engine module is less than the time to replace engine valves and
instrumentation transducers separately. However, spares weight
and volume constraints and actual design may dictate replacing
components and not the entire engine module.
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Because of the present indefinite nature of the functional re-
quirements of the various Space Station systems including APS,
definite recommendations regarding the lives and thrusts of APS
engines are not now possible. It may be desirable to use a sep-
arate set of engines for the spin-despin functions to allow thrust
level optimization. One conclusion is possible: the baseline
engines with 22 Ib of thrust and a burn life of 10,000 sec will
not meet the total burn time engine requirements of 23,145 seconds
for the combined functions of gravity gradient, sun track, and
maneuvering. These three combined functions will be imposed on
some of the engines.
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VI. ORBITAL RESUPPLY
A capability for orbital resupply of consumables to the 'Space
Station APS will be necessary to economically satisfy the ten-
year life requirements of the Space Station program. The major
results of the resupply study reported in this chapter are:
1) The feasibility of the orbital resupply of consumables
to the Space Station APS has been established;
2) An integrated resupply system has been identified and
recommended for application to the advanced logistics
system;
3) An alternative system has been identified and recom-
mended for application to an accelerated program
schedule;
4) Independent of other Space Station systems considera-
tions, a resupply interval of 90 days has been iden-
tified as optimum from the standpoint of minimizing
launch costs chargeable to the APS;
5) When considering all of the program integration re-
quirements, shuttle schedules, and Space Station con-
straints; a six-month resupply interval is recom-
mended .
A. STUDY SUMMARY
The study itself was conducted in four phases:
1) Phase I - Identification and Evaluation of Potential
Fluid Transfer Techniques;
2) Phase II - Determination of an Optimum Resupply In-
terval ;
3) Phase III - Definition of Candidate Resupply Systems;
4) Phase IV - Evaluation of Candidate Resupply Systems.
The results of each of these study phases are summarized in
this section and discussed in more detail in subsequent sections.
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1. Concepts
Approximately 50 fluid handling concepts were identified and
evaluated for their applicability to the resupply of propellants
and pressurant for the Space Station APS. Results of the evalua-
tions are summarized below and appear in more detail as Appendix
A. The majority of the discussion in this chapter centers around
five resupply systems that were the most promising candidates
from among the 50 approaches considered.
a. Propellant Resupply - Three fundamental approaches to the
resupply of propellants were considered; fluid transfer, module
replacement of the propellant storage tanks, and integrated con-
sumable resupply systems. Module replacement was rejected pri-
marily because the requirement for extensive commitment of crew
members, extensive fluid removal and decontamination, access
facilities, and cargo handling equipment. Integrated resupply
concepts, such as replacement of the propulsion modules, or con-
tinuous supply from a docked logistics vehicle or attached con-
sumables module, were found to be very attractive strictly from a
resupply and maintenance point of view. However, no detailed
investigation of these approaches was made during the study, be-
cause determination of their overall suitability requires con-
sideration and further definition of major aspects of the program
such as the logistic vehicle configuration.
Several pressurized fluid transfer techniques were found
to be applicable to the propellant resupply function. These in-
clude the use of residual pressurant from the pressurant resupply
operation, a separate high-pressure source, a conventional blow-
down pressurization system, and a modified blowdown system using
residual ullage from the expended propellant storage tanks.
Several suitable expulsion devices were also identified,
including capillary screens, nonmetallic bladders and diaphragms,
metal bellows, and several versions of metallic diaphragms and
bladders. Selection of the most appropriate of these devices'de-
pends on the relative importance placed on system weight, develop-
ment status, growth potential, and cost. All of these devices,
however, are considered feasible at this time for the application
being considered. - ,
b. Pressurant Resupply - For application to the baseline APS
both a simple blowdown system and modular replacement of the gas
storage spheres are considered feasible. In addition several
modifications to the baseline propulsion system were also investi-
gated to determine whether they would materially reduce the resup-
ply requirements.
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Volatile liquid systems afford an attractive potential
in that resupply of pressurant can be entirely avoided, barring
malfunction or damage to the tankage. However, the possibility
of development and operational problems should be recognized be-
cause of the early development status, sensitivity to certain
duty cycles, and thermal conditioning required for these systems.
, Use of a blowdown bipropellant system for the Space Sta-
tion APS represents another means of eliminating the pressurant
resupply requirement. This is accomplished by allowing recompres-
sion rather than venting of the ullage during propellant resupply.
Disadvantages result from the lack of experience in bipropellant
applications.
Integrated APS/ECLSS nitrogen sypply systems were also
considered. However, since this approach is highly sensitive to
duty cycle requirements, detailed evaluation requires further def-
inition of both the ECLSS and APS operating duty cycles, and con-
sequently was not attempted during this study.
2. Determination of an Optimum Resupply Interval
For the APS' propellant load and impulse requirements specified
for the baseline design, a resupply interval of 180 days is neces-
sary to satisfy reliability and inflight maintenance requirements.
Space Station Phase В Definition Studies have also specified 180
days as the optimum interval for resupply of the total con-
sumables requirement. Independent of other systems, however, a
resupply interval of 90 days is optimum for the APS from the stand-
point of minimizing total launch costs chargeable to the system.
3. Definition of Candidate Systems
Based on the subsystem evaluations summarized above, five
integrated resupply systems were fully defined in the detailed
evaluation and analysis phase. The five candidate systems are
presented schematically in Fig. VI-1 thru VI-5.
Figures VI-1 thru VI-3 illustrate systems that are suitable
for resupply of the baseline APS. Figures VI-4 and VI-5 illustrate
systems suitable for resupply of a hypergolic bipropellant APS,
but which require major modification of the baseline APS.
System VI-1 - Eressurant is resupplied by equalizing pressures
between a high-pressure storage bottle onboard the logistics craft
and the expended storage spheres onboard the Space Staion. Pro-
pellant resupply is by pressurized transfer using residuals from
the pressurant resupply operation as the energy source.
Vi-4 MCR-70-150
System VI-2 - Pressurant is resupplied by modular replacement
of the gas storage spheres; propellant by blowdown of the propel-
lant transfer tanks.
System VI-3 - This system is similar to System VI-2, except
that ullage gases from the expended APS propellant storage tanks
are used for pressurization of the transfer tanks.
System VI-4 - This system uses a permanent volatile liquid
pressurization system, thus avoiding the necessity of routine
pressurant resupply by recondensing the pressurant during propel-
lant servicing. Propellents are resupplied by pressurized trans-
fer using a separate regulated gas as the energy source.
System VI-5 - This system uses a blowdown pressurization sys-
tem for the APS. Pressurant is recompressed-during propellant
servicing. Propellants are resupplied by pressurized transfer
using a separate regulated gas as the energy source.
4. Evaluation of Candidate Systems
Comparative evaluations were made of the five candidate sys-
tems described above. Of the systems evaluated, System VI-2 is
the recommended resupply system. However, all of the systems
evaluated were found to be feasible approaches and System VI-1,
which requires minimum development of new techniques, might also
be considered if immediate application is required.
The major characteristics of each of the candidate resupply
systems are summarized below.
System VI-1 - This system requires a minimum of new technology
development and is well suited for immediate design and develop-
ment. However, this is the heaviest system considered, both with
respect to the Space Station launch weight and the shuttle resup-
ply weights.
System VI-2 - This system is recommended as the best resupply
system for resupply of the Space Station APS. This system is
very nearly the lightest weight and requires only minor develop-
ment of new technology, namely the packaging, handling, and in-
stallation of the pressurant spheres.
System VI-3 - This system was rejected as being slightly
heavier and less reliable than System VI-2, without providing any
additional capability.
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System VI-4 - This system was rejected because of the increased
program costs and added development risk, without any significant
improvements in weight or reliability.
System VI-5 - This system was rejected for reasons similar to
those applied to System VI-4. The basic system can be modified
to reduce development costs and risk, but the system weight is
increased and performance flexibility reduced.
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В. DETERMINATION OF AN OPTIMUM RESUPPLY INTERVAL
For the propellent load and impulse requirements specified
for the baseline design, a resupply interval of 180 days is nee-'
essafy to satisfy reliability and inflight maintenance requirements,
Space Station Phase В Definition studies, also have specified
180 days as the interval for resupply of the integrated consumables
requirement. Recognizing that the APS must be integrated into the
overall Space Station resupply schedule, the maintenance, resupply,
and design studies reported here have been based on a 180-day
resupply interval. In addition, however, studies were made to
determine the optimum resupply interval for the APS, independent
of other Space Station systems.
The dominant factors influencing the determination of an op-
timum resupply interval are the following:
1) Reliability and inflight maintenance considerations;
2) Effects on Space Station and logistics vehicle launch
weights;
3) APS total impulse requirements.
As discussed in Chapter VII, and as illustrated in Fig. VII-1,
reliability considerations demand that the APS consist of two in-
dependently operable subsystems, A and B, with one subsystem on
standby at all times. On the other hand, volume and weight con-
siderations argue for a minimum number of storage tanks. Conse-
quently, eight is the optimum number of tanks for a bipropellant
APS.
Minimization of Space Station volume and launch weight suggests
that the APS be sized to provide the minimum propellant quantities
consistent with operational requirements. Of course for a given
impulse demand, reduction in APS propellant quantities will in-
crease the frequency of resupply. Therefore, payload launch costs
for the Space Station launch vehicle as compared to the logistics
vehicle must be evaluated in order to optimally size the APS. The
results of such a study are summarized in Tables VI-1 thru VI-3
and Fig. VI-6. As shown here, a 90-day resupply interval is op-
timum for the APS from the standpoint of minimum launch costs over
a ten-year program. This conclusion is based on an assumed launch
cost of $1000/lb for the Space Station and requires that launch
costs for the logistics vehicle be kept below approximately $500/lb.
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Table VI-1 Estimated Launch Weight Chargeable to
APS-Space Station
Item
APS -
"Usable Propellent
Propel! ant Removal
Servicing Tool
Maintenance Com-
partment
Volume Penalty
(P 5 lb/ft3
Total APS Launch
Weight (Ib)
Launch Weights for Various"
Resupply Intervals (Ib) ,
90 -Day
850
500
150 .
450
150
2100
180 -Day
1150
1000
200
600
250
3200
360- Day
1750 . .
2000
' 300
900
400
5350 -
fable VI-2 Estimated Launch Weight Chargeable to
APS Resupply-Shuttle
Item
Resupply System
Usable Propellent
Volume Penalty
@ 2 lb/ft3
Total Resupply
Weight/Launch
Total Resupply
Weight/Program
Note: 1. Weights
resupply
transfer
Resupply Weights for Various .
Resupply Intervals (Ib)
90 -Day
156
250
11
417
16.3 x Ю3
180 -Day
234 - -
500
20
754.
14.3,x Ю3
360- Day
398
1000 ,
38 ;
1
1436 ,'
12.9 x Ю3
shown are based on the recommended
system, i.e., blowdown propellent
• and modular pressurant transfer.
2. Propel lant weights shown are usable; pres-
surant and residual propel lants are in-
cluded in basic system weight.
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Table VI-3 Estimated Program Launch Costs for Space Station APS
Item
Space Station APS
Launch Costs at
$1000/lb
Resupply Launch
Costs at
$500/1b
Resupply Launch
Costs at
$100/1 b
Resupply Launch
Costs at
$50/1 b
Total APS, Launch
Cost for Ten-Year
Program
Launch Costs for Various
Resupply Invervals
($ millions)
90-Day
2.1
8.1
•
10.2
2.1
1.6
3.7
2.1
0.8
2.9
180 -Day
3.2
7.2
10.4
3.2
1.4
4.6
3.2
0.7
3.9
360-Day
5.35
6.5
11.85
5.35
1.3
6.65
5.35
0.65
6.0
С. DESCRIPTION OF CANDIDATE RESUPPLY SYSTEMS
'Based on the subsystem evaluations summarized above and pre-
sented in greater detail in Appendix A, five candidate resupply
systems were defined for comparison and detailed evaluation during
Phase IV of the study.
The candidate resupply systems illustrated in Fig. VI-1 thru
VI-5 can be classified into two major categories. The systems
shown in Fig. VI-1 thru VI-3 are suitable for resupply of the base-
line APS. .These systems require only minor modification to the
APS, such as fill connections and provisions for venting the pro-
pellant tank ullage. The major differences among systems in this
first category are associated with the method of pressurant resup-
ply. System VI-1 is resupplied by blowdown from a high-pressure
storage bottle, systems VI-2 and VI-3 by modular replacement of
the expended gas storage bottles.
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The'second category of systems is shown in Fig. VI-4 and VI-5.
Both of these systems require major modification to the baseline
APS. System VI-4 replaces the baseline pressurization subsystem
with a volatile liquid subsystem. System VI-5 uses a blowdown
pressurization subsystem rather than the conventional regulated
gas. From a resupply point of view the major effect of these
modifications is to eliminate the requirement for pressurant re-
supply. Pressurant can simply be recompressed or recondensed dur-
ing propellant servicing.
Each of the five resupply systems is described in greater de-.'
tail in this section.
1. System VI-1
a. Pressurant Resupply - Pressurant is resupplied by equal-
izing pressures between a 3000 psia nitrogen storage bottle on-
board the logistics craft and a 1000 psia nitrogen storage bot-
tlb onboard the Space Station. The maximum operating pressure of
the APS nitrogen storage spheres is reduced from the baseline
value of 3200 psia to 1000 psia. To accommodate this reduced pres-
sure, a maximum of 3000 psia has been selected for the logistics
vehicle tanks. Selection of this pressure combination is based
on a 'weight optimization analysis summarized in Table VI-4. As
shown, reduction in the APS operating pressure can reduce the
logistics vehicle payload by approximately 32 to 64 Ib, or from
640 to 1280 Ib over a ten-year mission. This is accomplished at
the expense of a 24-lb increase in Space Station liftoff weight
and a slight increase in APS volume, i.e., 24.3-inch spheres vs
15.5-inch spheres. In fact, logistics vehicle payloads could be
reduced even further by selecting a Space Station operating pres-
sure below 1000 psia. However, as becomes evident when consider-
ing the 500-psia case, Space Station weights (205 Ib) and packag-
ing requirements (Eight 25-in.-diameter spheres) rapidly become
prohibitive when pressures are reduced much below 1000 psia.
A regulator and relief valve are installed in the servic-
ing line to. prevent overpressurization of the APS during servicing
operations. Provision of a pressure regulator avoids any require-
ment for active control by the crew and also allows partial resup-
ply if desired, without venting of the receiver tank.
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Table VI-4 Weight Estimates for Space Station and Logistics1 Vehicle
Pressurant Storage Spheres
Space Station
Max
Pressure
(psia)
500
1000
3000
Note: 1
2
Number
of
Spheres
8
2
2
Diam of
Spheres
(in.)
25.0
24.3
•
15.5
Total
Weight
(lb)
205
106
82
Logistics Vehicle
Max
Pressure
(psia)
1,000
3,000
5,000
10,000
2,000
3,000
5,000
10,000
5,000
10,000
Number
of
Spheres
1
1
1
•1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Diam of
Spheres
(in.)
26.5
15.9
13.7
11.8
21.3
17.1
14.5
12.1
18.7
13.9
Total
Weight
(lb)
, 67
43
44 ,
'51 -
72
53
50, ' ,
55'
117
85
. Totals listed under Space Station are for the complete APS.."
. Totals listed under Logistics Vehicle are requirements for
the normal б-month resupply operation. ' , ,
An alternative approach, not shown in Fig. VI-1, mi'ght
also be considered. The logistics vehicle resupply bottle can'
be precisely loaded to a preselected value and the expended APS
receiver bottle vented before servicing. The flow process can
then be controlled by a simple throttling orifice rather than by
a pressure regulator; since controlled loading of the supply bot- '
tie and venting-of the receiver assures that when an equilibrium
condition is reached the proper loading the APS receiver bottle '
is achieved. However, overdesign of the receiver bottle or ex-
tremely low flow rates may be required to avoid compressive heating
problems.
The pressurant servicing line is manually connected and "
disconnected after docking of the Space Station and logistics
craft. System A is normally serviced by docking at Port No. 1,
and System В at Port No. 2. However, redundant servicing capa-'
bility is provided by interconnect lines between the two systems. -
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b . - ' Propellant Resupply - Before propellent resupply, the
APS propellant tanks are vented to reduce backpressure during serv-
icing. Resupply is then accomplished by pressurized transfer of
propellants from the logistics vehicle tanks. Residual pressurant
from the pressurant resupply operation is used as the source for
transfer energy. APS ullage gases are vented through the propel-
lant removal and servicing tool to avoid contamination of the
'Spac'e "Station exterior in the event of a leak in the bellows expul-
1
sion device.
i
Separate servicing lines are provided between the docking
interface and the propellant storage tanks. Common use of the pro-
pellant distribution lines is avoided because it would result in
i back flow through the propellant filters.
Propellant transfer tanks of the logistics vehicle are
sized to support the nominal six-month resupply operation, i.e.,
'each transfer tank services two receiver tanks. If both Systems
A and В must be serviced in a single resupply mission, identical
parallel tanks would be installed in the logistics craft.
A pressure regulator is used to provide a constant trans-
fer pressure of approximately 50 psia, which is necessary to sup-
,press propellant vaporization in the transfer lines and to over-
come hydraulic losses. Propellant flow can be automatically ter-
minated by a signal from the APS gaging system. Pressure switches
are also installed in the APS tanks to avoid overpressurization
during servicing. This acts as a backup to the gaging system.
Each transfer tank is provided with a relief valve and emergency
overboard vent to protect against leakage or open failure of the
regulator. • ,
Propellant service lines are disconnected only after being
isolated at the docking interface and vented through the propellant
removal and servicing tool. This procedure serves as a backup to
prevent propellant spillage in the event of disconnect leakage.
c. Recovery of Contaminated Propellant - The logistics vehi-
cle resupply tanks serve as receivers for the contaminated propel-
lants. Transfer occurs by pressurization of slop tanks in the
propellant removal and servicing tool itself.
Maximum capacity of the slop tanks is slightly greater
than that of a single storage tank. This capacity is necessary to
allow replacement or repair of the APS tanks. On the other hand
maximum capacity of the logistics vehicle transfer tanks is twice
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that of the APS storage tanks. This factor in conjunction with
the relatively low operating pressure makes venting of the receiver
tanks during recovery of contaminated propellants unnecessary.
Ullage control can be provided by any of the several devices dis-
cussed in Appendix A without fear of contaminating the Space Sta-
tion exterior. Check valves are provided in the pressurant lines
leading to each tank to avoid any possibility of mixing the hyper-
golic propellants.
Contaminated propellant is transferred from the propellant
removal and servicing tool to the docking interface through sepa-
rate transfer lines rather than through the propellant servicing
lines. This is required to avoid subsequent contamination of
Space Station components.
2. System VI-2
a. Pressurant Resupply - The system illustrated in Fig. Vl-2
employs modular replacement of the pressurant storage spheres as
the means of pressurant resupply. The pressurant spheres are pre-
packaged before launch to avoid mechanical damage during handling
and installation. Figure VI-7 illustrates a conceptual packaging
design.
The size of the pressurant package will permit a manual
transfer of the sphere from the logistics craft to the Space Sta-
tion.
A manually operated isolation valve and self-sealing dis-
connect are integral parts of the pressurant package. This allows
the expended pressurant bottle to be vented before removal. The
isolation valve also serves as a backup to the disconnect during
installation of the replacement unit.
b. Propellant Resupply - After venting the APS receiver tanks,
propellant is resupplied by pressurized transfer from the resupply
tanks of the logistics vehicle. Tank pressurization is by means
of a blowdown system, which is incorporated as an integral part
of the tanks and avoids the requirement for high-pressure gas stor-
age, pressure regulators, and relief valves. This approach is
feasible because of the relatively low operating pressures required
for transfer of propellants. A minimum operating pressure of 50
psia is maintained to assure suppression of propellant vaporization
during transfer, and a maximum operating pressure of 250 psia was
selected to allow minimum gage tank design. Orifices are provided
in the transfer lines to dampen out flow surges during the initial
transfer process.
VI-24 MCR-70-150
Fig. VI-7 Modular Resupply, Pressurant Sphere
MCR-70-150 VI-25
Other features are similar to those of System VI-1. These
include redundant docking and servicing capability, passive control
of the flow processes, and backup of the service line disconnects.
c. Recovery of Contaminated Propellants - Recovery of contam-
inated propellants is identical to that described for System VI-1.
3. System VI-3
a. Pressurant Resupply - Resupply of pressurant is identical
to that described for System VI-2.
b. Propellant Resupply - As with the previous two systems,
propellant is resupplied by pressurized transfer from the resup-
ply tanks of the logistics vehicle. Pressurization is accomplished
by using ullage gases from the expended APS propellant storage
tanks. This involves venting the first tank of each of the pro-
pellants to be serviced and allowing ullage from the second tank
to pressurize the corresponding transfer vessel on the logistics
vehicle. After venting the second tank it is then serviced by
blowdown of the logistics vehicle transfer tanks. Use of the APS
ullage permits a minimum ullage volume for the logistics vehicle
tanks without requiring a high-pressure system as in System VI-1.
Other features are similar to those of System VI-2.
c. Recovery of Contaminated Propellants - Recovery of con-
taminated propellants is similar to that described for Systems
VI-1 and VI-2, except that the resupply tank ullage can be vented
through the APS propellant removal and servicing tool before pro-
pellant recovery. This allows use of the total tank volume without
the danger of venting propellant vapor overboard.
4. System VI-4
a. Pressurant Resupply - In System VI-4 the baseline pressur-
ization system is replaced by a permanent volatile liquid system
that incorporates a heat storage material for maintaining required
operating pressures. Pressurant is recompressed and condensed
during propellant resupply, thus eliminating the necessity of
periodically resupplying pressurant. Difluoromethane (Gentron 32)
was selected ^ s the APS volatile liquid pressurant and is used
with Nonadecane as a heat storage material for thermal conditioning
of the pressurant during operation and servicing of the propulsion
system. A heat storage material is used rather than external thermal
control equipment because of the anticipated duty cycle character-
istics of the Space Station APS. Engine operation is expected to
consist mostly of relatively long-duration burns for maneuvering
and CMC desaturation, rather than short-duration pulses for atti-
tude control.
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Experience by TRW Systems* indicates that in cases where
average propellant flow rates are relatively low and the level of
pressure decay associated with a single expulsion pulse can be
tolerated, heat can usually be added between pulses by using an
available external heat source such as a waste heat loop. However,
in cases where the propellant flow is continuous for a prolonged
duration, the response characteristics of a reasonably sized ex-
ternal heat source is generally too slow to satisfy system pressure
requirements. Consequently, in these cases, a heat storage material
is recommended for incorporation in the pressurant cavity in in-
timate contact with the volatile liquid.
A tentative selection of the specific combination of pres-
surant and heat storage material was based on a comparison of the
results of these studies and the anticipated operating pressures
and temperature of the Space Station APS. A final decision would
require specification of the APS operating conditions, duty cycles,
and allowable thrust variation.
b. Propellant Resupply - Since a permanent pressurant is used
for this system, propellant must be resupplied without venting
ullage from the APS propellant storage tanks. This, in turn, re-
sults in a relatively high servicing pressure, 250 psia. Propel-
lant transfer by a blowdown pressurization system, such as used in
System VI-3, therefore, becomes unattractive on the basis of re-
quired volume and weight. Consequently, a regulated gas was
selected as the pressurizing mechanism for propellant resupply of
this system. Requirements for pressurization control and distri-
bution are similar to those described for System VI-1. Propellant
servicing connections are also handled in a similar manner to that
of System VI-1.
c. Recovery of Contaminated Propellants - Contaminated pro-
pellants are recovered by venting the logistics vehicle tanks
and using them as receivers for the contaminated propellants.
Venting of these tanks requires that only nonpermeable expulsion
devices be used for ullage control. As with the previously dis-
cussed systems, propellants are transferred by pressurization of
the storage tanks in the propellant removal and servicing tool.
Servicing connections are also handled in a similar manner.
*S. F. Giffoni: All Metal Volatile Liquid Positive Expulsion
System. No. ER-5980, TRW Electromechanical Division, Final Sum-
mary Report to NASA under Contract No. NAS9-1004, June 1964; and
R. G. Eatough: All Metal Volatile Liquid Positive Expulsion Sys-
tem. No. 05019-6001-ROOD, TRW Systems, Inc., Final Summary Report
to NASA under Contract No. NAS9-4550, June 1967.
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5. System VI-5
a. Pressurant Resupply - System VI-5 replaces the APS base-
line pressurization system with a blowdown system. Pressurant is
therefore recompressed during propellant servicing, thus eliminat-
ing the necessity of periodic resupply. Optimum engine inlet con-
ditions are maintained by flow control valves in the propellant
feedlines rather than by maintaining constant ullage pressures.
An alternative system, without feedline control valves, was also
considered. Here the engine inlet conditions are allowed to vary
directly as the propellant tanks blow down.
A blowdown ratio of 2:1 was selected for the modified APS
based largely on the results of weight estimates summarized in
Fig. VI-8. Although, as shown here, the blowdown ratio which
results in minimum weight is approximately 2% to 1, tank weight _
is relatively insensitive over a reasonable range of blowdown
ratios. Consequently, the selection of a design ratio can consider
other factors in addition to Space Station weight, e.g., packaging
constraints and the effect on logistics requirements. A blowdown
ratio of 2:1 was tentatively selected for the candidate system as
being near .optimum from the standpoint of Space Station weight and
its effect on logistics requirements. Operating pressures are also
maintained in a range that will minimize leakage and safety hazards
without imposing a major packaging (volume) penalty.
b. Prope1Iant Res upply - As with System VI-4, the increased
operating pressures required during propellant resupply demand a
regulated gas as the source of transfer energy. Requirements for
pressurant control and distribution as well as servicing line
connections are therefore similar to those described for Systems
VI-1 and VI-4.
c. Recovery of Contaminated Propellant - Contaminated propel-
lants are recovered in a manner identical to that described for
System VI-4.
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D. EVALUATION OF CANDIDATE RESUPPLY SYSTEMS
1. Evaluation Criteria
,The comparison of candidate systems was based on system weight,
performance, reliability, safety, human factors, technology status,
refurbishment potential, and effect on APS performance and inflight
maintenance requirements. The following categories were considered
the most important criteria in the selection of a resupply system
for the APS:
1) Cost;
2) Reliability;
3) Weight;
4) Technology status;
5) Safety and human factors;
6) Performance;
7) Effect on APS.
a. Cost - Because of the anticipated high usage rate, operat-
ing costs will be a major factor in the design of vehicle systems
for an advanced logistics system. Systems must be designed for a
minimum of maintenance and with ease of inspection, cleaning, and
refurbishment or replacement of components. Refurbishment of equip-
ment becomes a major consideration and use of specialized facilities
and equipment such as clean rooms and vacuum facilities must be
minimized. Methods of reducing refurbishment requirements and
vehicle turnaround time are discussed in Chapter X of this report.
Although of major importance, these factors were not found to have
a dominant influence on the relative rating of the various candi-
date systems; because all systems require similar propellant com-
ponents. Differences among systems are primarily with respect have
pressurization components that require a minimum of refurbishment
for each resupply and will allow quick vehicle turnaround.
Development cost remains as a major consideration and the
technology status of each system has been evaluated based on the
number and magnitude of areas requiring further developmental ef-
fort. The cost factor, along with development risk, were the major
reasons for rejecting Systems VI-4 and VI-5.
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b. Reliability - Reliability was viewed as a major evaluation
criterion, however variations among the five candidate systems were
found to be slight and this factor did not have a major effect
on the selection of a suitable resupply system.
Reliability assessments of the airborne APS and the resup-
ply systems are summarized in Tables VI-5 and VI-6, respectively.
APS reliability predictions are an estimate of the proba-
bility of continuous APS operation for a ten-year period and as-
sume the following:
1) Although the normal consumable resupply interval is
six months, the opportunity exists for consumables-
and spares replacement every three months if required;
2) Subsystems A and В are operated sequentially, i.e.,
one subsystem is maintained in a standby status at
all times;
3) An inflight maintenance and restoration capability,
as well as an advanced fault detection and isolation
system, will be provided for the APS.
Reliability estimates for the five candidate resupply
systems are a prediction of the probability of a successful resup-
ply of consumables, and assume the following:
1) Successful docking of the logistics craft and Space
Station;
2) Resupply, systems are operable at the time of launch;
3) APS components and subsystems are functioning properly
at the time of docking;
4) Actual transfer of consumables occurs within 30 minutes
to an hour;
5) Resupply operations may be delayed for as many as seven
days after docking;
6) Repair of resupply system and/or APS components during
this seven-day period is prohibited (worst case).
MCR-70-150 VI-31
Table VI-5 Estimated APS Reliability
Configuration
APS VI -1
APS VI -2
APS-VI-3
APS VI -4
(with active
heating
system)
APS VI -5
(with no
flow
control)
Probabilities of Mission Success
One Year
Pressuriza-
tion, P
0.9997
0.9999
0.9999
Propellent
System, P
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9994
0.9983
0.9989
0.9996
Overall ,
VSPE*
0.9965
0.9967
0.9967
0.9966
0.9955
0.9962
0.9968
Ten Years
Overall
0.9655
0.9675
0.9675
0.9665
0.9559
0.9622
0.9685
*PP = Probability of mission success for engine modules =
0.9972 for all configurations. Quad solenoid valves
employed on engines in lieu of single solenoid valves.
Engine modules physically separated to minimize engine
detonation effects.
P = Probability of mission success for propellent storage
and transfer subsystem (S&T)
P = Probability of mission success for pressurization
P subsystem.
Table VI-6 Estimated Resupply System Reliability
Configuration
APS VI -1
APS VI -2
APS VI -3
APS VI -4
APS VI-5
Probability of Success
Per Resupply
Space
Station, P
0.9998
0.9998
0.9998 •
0.9999
0.9999
Logistics
Vehicle, P.
0.9989
0.9992
0.9991
0.9990
0.9990
Overall =
PsPL
0.9987
0.9990
0.9989
0.9989
0.9989
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c. Weight - Weight estimates of the five candidate systems
are summarized in Table VI-7 which includes weight estimates of
both the Space Station APS and the logistics vehicle resupply sys-
tem. Two major conclusions regarding resupply of APS consumables
result from these studies.
1) Space Station APS weight will be a secondary factor
in the selection of a consumable resupply system, be-
cause variations between candidate systems are esti-
mated to be less than 8% of the total APS weight,
excluding usable propellant;
2) Although logistics requirements may vary as much as
50 Ib/resupply cycle, or 1000 Ib over a ten-year oper-
ating life, system weight is not the dominant factor
in the selection of a resupply system. If, as esti-
mated, payload costs of less than $100.00/lb are
achieved, little development effort can be justified
to reduce payload weight.
Payload weight is expected to become a major consideration
only if the following two factors apply to the particular payload
in question:
1) The payload package becomes weight limited, i.e.,
greater than the payload capability of the shuttle; and
2) Payload requirements cannot be partially deferred to
the next resupply mission.
d. Technology Status - Major differences were found among the
candidate systems with regard to their status of required technol-
ogy. Variations in technology status will have a significant
effect on anticipated development costs and risk. Systems VI-1
thru VI-3 are well within the current state of the art; while
Systems VI-4 and VI-5 will require additional development effort
to assure their suitability for application to the Space Station
requirements.
As mentioned in the discussion on costs, a significant
development expense might be justified if it results in a material
reduction in operating expense. Although the principal components
for the shuttle portion of the five resupply systems are currently
on hand, serious consideration should be given to redesign of these
components, including tanks, expulsion devices, pressure regulators,
valves, etc. Design of current equipment for these applications
has generally stressed performance and weight. As a shuttle pay-
load, however, reliability, refurbishability, and operating life
become much more important considerations.
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e. Safety and Human Factors - Qualitative evaluations regard-
ing safety and human factors were based largely on a consideration
of the complexity of each of the candidate transfer techniques.
Each system has been evaluated in relation to the basic safety
guidelines presented in Chapter IX. However, no attempt has been
made to generate additional detailed failure mode analyses or
operating procedures for each of the systems; because the prepara-
tion of such analyses would require detailed design definition down
to the component level.
All of the systems considered provide passive control of
the fluid transfer processes, thus encouraging operational safety
and reducing the required crew commitment. In all cases propel-
lant transfer can be terminated automatically by the APS propel-
lant gaging system. Propellant spillage during disconnect of the
servicing lines is avoided by backup shutoff valves and by venting
of the disconnects themselves. Hazards associated with handling
pressurant bottles are minimized by their relatively small size
and mass and by special packaging to preclude mechanical damage.
With the exception of Systems VI-2 and VI-3, crew require-
ments are limited primarily to connecting and disconnecting serv-
icing lines. Pre- and postoperational checkout as well as moni-
toring of the flow processes can be accomplished with a minimum
commitment of crew time by incorporating these functions into
the Space Station or shuttle Onboard Checkout System. Systems
VI-2 and VI-3 require manual transfer of the pressurant storage
modules from the shuttle to the Space Station. However, the small
quantity of pressurant required allows transfer to be performed
by one crew member in a single trip.
f. Performance - Performance was not found to be a major
factor in comparison of the systems. All candidate systems
provide the capability for rapid consumables resupply without re-
quiring an external source of energy. Systems requiring prolonged
operating times were excluded during the evolution of candidate
designs. In all cases actual transfer of fluids can be accom-
plished in less than 1 hr.
g. Effect on APS - Selection of a resupply system from among
the candidates considered will not have a major effect on the APS
inflight maintenance requirements. As discussed in Chapter V,
Maintainability, the propellant and engine subsystems will re-
quire the major portion of the predicted maintenance time for
the APS. Elimination of separate pressurization subsystems,
as is the case for Systems VI-4 and VI-5, would
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reduce unscheduled maintenance for the APS by less than 10%, or
from an estimated 73.5 min/yr to 66.6 min/yr. Scheduled mainte-
nance would also be reduced by elimination of the pressurization
components. Fifty-nine minutes is allocated for filter element
changeout at six-month intervals. Present life limitations for
pressurization control components require that they be changed
out every three years. This will require approximately 124
minutes of maintenance for each half of the system. Elimination
of the pressurization system would thus result in an average sav-
ings of 195 minutes per year. Over a ten-year mission the re-
quirement for spare components would also be reduced by an esti-
mated 40 lb.
In summary, the modifications to the baseline APS required
by Systems VI-4 and VI-5 will reduce the requirement for inflight
maintenance, although not to a major extent.
Selection of a resupply system from among the five candi-
date systems will, with one exception, have little affect on APS
performance. In general, approaches that would materially degrade
APS control capability or engine performance were eliminated during
definition of the candidate designs. Systems VI-1 thru VI-3 retain
the baseline APS, and although Systems VI-4 and VI-5 require major
modifications to this baseline, these systems also are configured
to assure optimum engine inlet conditions. Only the alternative
to the basic System VI-5 would have a significant effect on APS
performance, and this system could be seriously considered only
if Space Station control requirements would allow a pronounced
variation in thrust level during the mission.
2. Comparison of Systems
Evaluations of each of the five systems are presented in this
subsection.
a. System VI-1 - Pressurant is resupplied by equalizing pres-
sures between a 3000 psia nitrogen storage bottle onboard the
logistics craft and a 1000 psia nitrogen storage bottle onboard
the Space Station. Residual nitrogen is then used for pressurized
transfer of propellants. Recovery of contaminated propellant from
the Space Station APS propellant removal and servicing tool is
accomplished by using the logistics vehicle resupply tanks as re-
ceivers.
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Advantages - The major advantages of System VI-1 are as
follows:
• Current technology status;
• Suitability for recovery of contaminated propellants;
• Minimum requirement for crew commitment during resup-
ply operation.
Disadvantages - The major disadvantage of System VI-1 is
as follows:
• Relatively high weight.
The most advantageous characteristics of this system is
its current technology status. Functionally this system is very
similar to the subsystems currently used for pressurization and
propellant storage in the conventional bipropellant APS. Conse-
quently, the development program required for this system should
be relatively straightforward and can take maximum advantage of
past development experience. State-of-the-art components are
immediately available for all of the required system functions such
as propellant and pressurant storage, pressurant control, and pro-
pellant expulsion. Because of the relatively low operating pres-
sures, venting of the propellant resupply tanks will not be neces-
sary during recovery of contaminated propellant. This factor
allows the full range of propellant tank expulsion devices to be
considered. These include capillary devices and nonmetallic blad-
ders that would otherwise be excluded because of their permeability
to propellant and consequent contamination of the Space Station
exterior during tank venting. Resupply of consumables by System
VI-1 also allows the use of a conventional hypergolic bipropellant
APS, requiring only minor modification to the system for fill con-
nections and venting of the ullage.
As the result of the current status of technology required
for both the APS and the resupply system, System VI-1 represents
the earliest available approach for resupply of consumables to the
Space Station APS. The only anticipated major area of development
effort is the modification of current component designs to assure
economical inspection, cleaning, and refurbishment — particularly
the propellant resupply tanks. As discussed further in the Future
Technology chapter of this report (Chap. X)1, significant reductions
in program operating costs may be achieved by development of easily
refurbished components.
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System VI-1 also demands a minimum of crew involvement
during the resupply process, primarily connecting and disconnecting
the fluid transfer lines. Active control of the flow processes
will not be required, because automatic control is achieved by the
pressure regulators and by preselected loading of the pressurant
resupply bottle.
The major disadvantage of System VI-1 is its relatively
high weight. This weight penalty results largely from the exces-
sive pressurant residuals that occur when a blbwdown process is
used for pressurant transfer. The Space Station portion (i.e.,
the APS) is expected to weigh 87 Ib more than the lightest weight
system, System VI-4. Although this weight penalty represents only
8% of the estimated APS dry weight, the effect on the shuttle re-
supply requirements is more pronounced. As illustrated by Table
VI-7, shuttle liftoff weight for the lightest system is estimated
to be 230 Ib, excluding usable propellant. The corresponding
weight for System VI-1 is estimated to be 280 Ib. These figures
are based on a normal six-month resupply interval and result in a
1000-lb weight differential over a ten-year program.
As revealed by Table VI-5, System Vl-1 is also the least
reliable of the systems considered. This factor is not considered
major, however, since total variations between the candidate sys-
tems are small.
b. System VI-2 - With this system, pressurant is resupplied
by modular replacement of the APS gas storage spheres. Propellants
are replenished by pressurization of the propellant resupply tanks
that incorporate an integral blowdown pressurization system.
Advantages - The major advantages of System VI-2 are as
follows:
• Near minimum weight;
• Suitability for recovery of contaminated propellants;
• Minor development requirement.
Disadvantages - The only minor disadvantage of System VI-2
is:
• Required crew commitment during modular replacement of
pressurant bottles.
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Compared with System VI-1, liftoff weight of the logistics
vehicle is significantly reduced by incorporating a modular mode
of pressurant resupply. Logistics requirements are reduced by an
estimated 46 Ib per resupply cycle, or excluding usable propellant,
nearly 20% of the total weight chargeable to the resupply system.
This value corresponds to 920 Ib over a ten-year program life.
Space Station liftoff weight is also reduced by an estimated 21
Ib.
Low operating pressures can be used for propellant transfer
(<50 psia), allowing a high blowdown ratio (5:1) for the transfer
process. Thus, for the propellant quantities required by the base-
line system, single, minimum gage tanks can still be used without
greatly increasing total tank volume above that required for System
VI-1.
Propellant is resupplied using conventional fluid compo-
nents and as shown in Table VI-2, APS reliability as well as the
probability of a successful resupply are slightly increased over
the previously discussed system.
As with System VI-1, venting of the propellant resupply
tanks is not required for recovery of contaminated propellants,
thus allowing the use of permeable expulsion devices, and avoiding
the possibility of contaminating the Space Station exterior.
The only areas requiring further development result from
modular replacement of the pressurant bottles. Some development
effort will be required to achieve safe and efficient transport
of the pressurant packages. Development requirements are expected
to be minor, however, because of the small size and mass of the
required package.
A minor disadvantage of this system is with respect to
crew requirements. Transportation and installation of the pres-
surant bottles will require crew involvement during the resupply
operation. However, since only a single small-diameter pressurant
sphere is required each six months, the required commitment of crew
members and cargo handling equipment will be small.
c. System VI-3 - This system, which is a modification of Sys-
tem VI-2, allows the use of APS ullage as the pressurization source
for the propellant resupply tanks.
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Advantages - System VI-3 provides no significant advantages
compared to System VI-2.
Disadvantages - System VI-3 is slightly heavier and less
reliable than System VI-2.
System VI-3 was initially considered as a means of reduc-
ing tank volume and weight. However, the slight reduction in re-
supply tank weight is more than equaled by the weight of additional
service lines and valves. The additional servicing connections
also slightly reduce the probability of a successful resupply of
consumables. Therefore, the only real effect of the System VI-3
modifications is to provide the additional capability of venting
! the resupply tanks through the Propellant Removal and Servicing
I Tool. This in turn permits recovery of larger quantities of con-
| taminated propellant without the risk of exposing the Space Station
exterior to propellant vapors. However, Systems VI-1 and VI-2 can
easily recover a full tank load of each propellant without requir-
ing an increase in the maximum design pressure of the resupply
tanks. Consequently, the added complexity of the modified system
is unjustified when compared to System VI-2.
d. System VI-A - This system requires major modification of
the baseline APS. The baseline pressurization system is replaced
by a permanent volatile liquid system that incorporates a heat
storage material for maintaining required operating pressures.
Pressurant is recompressed and condensed during propellant resup-
ply, thus eliminating the necessity of periodically resupplying
pressurant. Expended propellants are replenished by pressurized
transfer using a regulated gas as the energy source.
Advantages - The major advantages of System VI-4 are as
follows:
• Minimum weight design;
• Minimum requirement for crew commitment during resup-
ply operation;
• Noticeable reduction of inflight maintenance require-
ments. '
VI
~
40
 MCR-70-150
Disadvantages - The major disadvantages of System VI-4
are as follows:
• Extensive development required; affecting development
costs and program risk;
• Ullage venting required for recovery of contaminated
propellant.
Of the candidate systems considered, System VI-4 represents
the minimum weight design, both with respect to resupply weight
as well as Space Station launch weight. It is not, however, rec-
ommended for incorporation into the Space Station design.
The two major characteristics of System VI-4 that detract
from its suitability for application to the Space Station are the
early status of its required technology and the necessity of vent-
ing the resupply tanks to recover contaminated propellants.
Although the feasibility of a volatile liquid system has
been demonstrated by the programs reported by TRW, several addi-
tional factors must be considered if this pressurization technique
is to be applied to the Space Station APS. For the volatile~liquid
system to be competitive with other more conventional systems,
condensation of the APS ullage during propellant resupply must be
accomplished passively, i.e., without active cooling-. Servicing
of equipment during the test program reported by R. G. Eatough
(TRW) suggests that transfer of propellants from the logistics ve-
hicle to the Space Station APS can be accomplished within a reason-
able length of time, say 1 hr, without an active cooling loop.
Nevertheless, further analysis and testing will be required to
adequately demonstrate this capability. Final selection of the
specific pressurant and the optimum heating source will be highly
dependent on engine inlet conditions and duty cycle. Consequently,
an early but firm definition of required engine operating condi-
tions also must be specified before serious development effort
can be initiated.
These factors, in conjunction with the early status of
required technology, will result in increased development costs
and anticipated development risk. It is estimated that development
of a volatile liquid pressurization system for the Space Station
APS would increase program costs by at least $5 million.
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Since a permanent pressurant is used to avoid resupply,
propellants must be replenished without venting the APS receiver
tanks. This in turn requires relatively high operating pressures
for the logistics vehicle transfer tanks. Consequently, efficient
reuse of these tanks for recovery of contaminated propellants re-
quires that they first be vented to reduce system backpressure
during the transfer process. This is particularly true if a simple
pressurized transfer technique is to be used. As a result, only
nonpermeable expulsion devices are considered for System Vl-4.
The weight estimates of Table VI-3 assume the development of a
lightweight metallic bladder or diaphragm. An acceptable alterna-
tive to this design would be the provision of additional servicing
connections for venting, as in System VI-3. Two other techniques
for recovery of contaminated propellant might also be considered.
Pumped transfer of the contaminated propellant seems feasible if
it is incorporated as an additional capability of the same pump
which is used for removal of propellant from the APS. Even
so, the additional power requirements and inherent reduction in
reliability may outweigh the problems associated with the develop-
ment of a suitable expulsion device for the logistics vehicle
tanks. If the receiver tanks for the Propellant Removal and
Servicing Tool are sized to permit easy handling, modular re-
placement of these tanks may be another feasible technique for
recovery of contaminated propellants.
The particular system selected as a candidate relies on a
heat storage material as the heating agent rather than on an active
heating source, such as a heat exchanger or electric heater. As
revealed in Table VI-5, the reliability of the APS is approximately
the same as that of Systems VI-1, -2, and -3, which are regulated
gas systems with a degree of component redundancy. To further re-
duce system weight, active heating sources were also considered in
lieu of the heat storage material. However, in all cases, system
reliability was reduced and the complexity of the system was in-
creased.
It was concluded finally, that although System VI-4 is a
feasible approach and represents the minimum weight system, it is
not recommended for incorporation into the Space Station design.
e. System VI-5 - This system also requires major modification
of the baseline APS. The baseline pressurization system is replaced
by a blowdown system that is an integral part of the propellant
storage assemblies. Pressurant is recompressed during propellant
resupply and expended propellants are replenished by pressurized
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transfer using a regulated gas as the energy source. The basic
system includes feedline flow control valves to maintain optimum
engine inlet conditions. An alternative design excludes these
flow control valves and allows inlet conditions to follow propel-
lant tank blowdown.
Advantages - The major advantages of the basic System VI-5
are as follows:
• Minimum requirement for crew commitment during resup-
ply operation;
• Noticeable reduction of inflight maintenance require-
ments .
Disadvantages - The major disadvantages of the basic
System VI-5 are as follows: '
• Moderate increase in development requirement;
• Ullage venting required for recovery of contaminated
propellants.
Compared to the basic system, the alternative blowdown
bipropellant design provides the following advantages:
• Slight increase in reliability;
• A noticeable reduction in development requirements.
The following disadvantages result, however:
• Major reduction in performance flexibility;
• Significant increase in weight.
Although pressure-fed bipropellant propulsion systems
have conventionally used regulated gas as the pressurizing medium,
a blowdown system is considered to be entirely feasible. This
technique is well established for use with monopropellant systems
and, as a result, the required tankage and expulsion technology
is currently available. The feasibility of employing flow control
valves to maintain a constant flow rate to the engines also has
been clearly demonstrated by the development and qualitication of
low thrust throttleable engines such as the Lunar Lander and
Surveyor vernier propulsion engines. Nevertheless, some additional
development must be expected if System VI-5 is to be used. Devel-
opment of flow control valves for this specific application will
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be required. Additional requirements for performance demonstra-
tion testing are also anticipated. These additional requirements
are expected to increase program costs by as much as $1 to 2 mil-
lion. However, development risk is expected to be slight.
Next to System VI-4, VI-5 is the lightest weight design
with respect to Space Station launch weight. However as noted
before, the total variation in liftoff weight for all of the can-
didates is only approximately 8%, and this factor is not considered
to be significant. As shown in Table VI-7, logistics vehicle re-
supply weight lies approximately midway between the heavy and
light systems. Compared to System VI-1, logistics requirements
for a ten-year program would be reduced by an estimated 440 Ib.
Compared to System VI-2, however, these requirements would be in-
creased by 480 Ib. The effect, assuming launch costs of less than
$100/lb, does not seem to justify a major development effort for
any of the systems concerned.
Elimination of the baseline pressurization components will ,
reduce the incidence of required maintenance. However, since ex-
posure to propellants makes replacement of components much more
difficult, this effect is partially offset by the additional re-
quirement for flow control valves in the propellant feedlines.
System VI-5 was initially considered as a candidate be-
cause of two characteristics: the elimination of a requirement
for a pressurant resupply, and the reduced number of components
and resultant potential for increased system reliability. However,
as shown in Table VI-5, the hoped for increase in reliability was
not realized. This again results largely from the requirement for
flow control valves that are necessary in the propellant feedlines
if optimum engine inlet conditions and a constant thrust level are
to be maintained. Therefore, if Space Station control requirements
allow, consideration might also be given to eliminating the feed-
line control valves and allowing the engine inlet conditions to
vary directly as the propellant tanks blow down. For a blowdown
ratio of 2:1, the resultant thrust variation is predicted to be
±26.5%. Although some degradation in I will also occur due to
sp
variations in mixture ratio and thrust level, it is expected to
be less than 2% under worst conditions.* Compared to Systems VI-1 .
and VI-2, a slight increase in development and qualification costs
for required performance demonstration should be anticipated.
However, no major increase in development costs or risk is expected.
*Performance estimates are based on analytical and empirical
studies by the Bell Aerospace Company. Results are summarized
in Fig. VI-9.
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Compared to the controlled blowdown system, i.e., with
feedline control valves, a new increase of 25 Ib in Space Station
launch weight is expected. This results from an increased propel-
lant load required to compensate for the predicted performance
degradation and increased propellant residuals while maintaining
the same total impulse capability. Degraded engine performance
will also increase logistics vehicle resupply weight by an esti-
mated 9 Ib per resupply cycle.
Another noticeable effect of eliminating the flow control
valves is to increase the APS ten-year mission reliability by an
estimated 0.0063, making this system the most reliable of the can-
didates studied. The requirement for inflight maintenance is
also reduced.
In spite of these factors, a blowdown system is not re-
commended for the Space Station APS. Compared to System VI-2,
it is significantly heavier, requires additional development of
new technology, and unless system complexity is increased by
the addition of feedline flow control valves, allows for less
flexibility in control capability.
MCR-70-150
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VII. RELIABILITY
The three major objectives of the reliability analyses reported
in this chapter are as follows:
1) To define an attitude propulsion system configuration
that will meet the life requirements of a ten-year
mission;
2) To determine the impact of reliability considerations
on the design, operation, resupply, and repair of a
storable bipropellant APS for an orbiting Space Sta-
tion;
3) To support a quantitative evaluation of the various
APS and resupply system configurations evolved during
the study.
With respect to the first objective, study results show that
conventional propulsion system design is not consistent with ten-
year space missions. Component redundancy and improved component
reliability will not, in themselves, be sufficient to support man-
rated systems. To achieve the overall assurance that is required,
the following will be necessary:
1) Capability to isolate the propellant tanks, and redun-
dancy for the system components and engines;
2) Operation of the APS subsystems must be sequential
with one-half of the subsystem on standby at all times;
3) A capability must be provided for isolation and re-
placement (inflight maintenance) of the APS components
and assemblies.
With respect to the above objectives, the following basic con-
figurations were analyzed:
1) The baseline configuration (Fig. VII-1);
2) Preliminary modified APS configuration (Fig. VII-2).
This system is a minimum modification of the baseline
APS to allow isolation and replacement of the major
components and assemblies, i.e., inflight maintenance;
3) Recommended APS configuration (Fig. VII-3). This sys-
tem is a modification to the baseline APS to provide
standby operation as well as to allow inflight main-
tenance. Quad engine valves are also provided and en-
gines are located to avoid detonation damage;
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4) Resupply Configurations 1 thru 5 (Fig. VI-1 thru VI-5).
These are the five candidate resupply systems dis-
cussed in Chapter VI. Reliability estimates were
made of both the resupply system and the APS itself.
Results of the reliability analyses of the above configurations
are summarized in Tables VII-1 and VII-2, and a description of the
mathematical models and assumptions appears in Section D of this
chapter.
Starting with the baseline APS, a building block approach was
applied to establish an APS configuration that would have suffi-
cient reliability to assure the successful completion of a ten-
year mission. Configuration tradeoffs were conducted to achieve
this objective with a minimum of added weight and complexity.
Figure VII-4 graphically shows those factors required to
achieve a ten-year mission. As seen here, component redundancy
alone is not the answer. The system must also be reparable, must
be functionally redundant with standby capability,* and must pro-
vide propellant tank isolation or extra commodity tanks.
*A standby system is one in which one-half of the system can
be operated at a time, thus permitting maintenance and resupply
on one-half, while the other half is operating.
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Table VII-1 APS Reliability Estimates
Configuration
Baseline
Preliminary APS
Recommended APS
APS Resupply 1
APS Resupply 2
APS Resupply 3
APS Resupply 4
APS Resupply 4a
APS Resupply 5
APS Resupply 5a
Probability of Mission Success
One Year
Pressur-
ization
0.9862
0.9987
0.9999
0.9997
0.9999
0.9999
--
--
--
--
Propel -
lant
0.9495
0.9947
0.9998
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9994
0.9983
0.9989
0.9996
Engine
0.9788
0.9777
0.9972
0.9972
0.9972
0.9972
0.9972
0.9972
0.9972
0.9972
Overall
0.9161
0.9713
0.9969
0.9965
0.9967
0.9967
0.9966
0.9955
0.9962
0.9968
Ten-Year
Overall
0.4161
0.7472
0.9689
0.9655
0.9675
0.9675
0.9665
0.9559
0.9622
0.9685
Table VII-2 Estimated Resupply System Reliability
Configuration
APS VI-1
APS VI-2
APS VI-3
APS VI-4
APS VI-5
Probabilities of Successful Consumable Resupply
Space Station,
Ps
0.9998
0.9998
0.9998
0.9999
0.9999
Logistics Vehicle,
PL
0.9989
0.9992
0.9991
0.9990
0.9990
Overall =
(Ps)(P0
0.9987
0.9990
0.9989
0.9989
0.9989
MCR-70-150 VII-7
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Fig. VII-4 APS Reliability Comparisons
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A. BASELINE CONFIGURATION
The baseline APS schematic is shown in Fig. VII-1. In addi-
tion to the assumptions listed in the attached model description,
the following assumptions were used in calculating the baseline
configuration reliabilities:
1) The system does not have the capability for replace-
ment, refurbishment, or repair of components;
2) The consumables are refurbished once a year;
3) Consumables are drawn from all propellant tanks and
nitrogen spheres simultaneously.
As shown in Table VII-3, the probability of mission success
was estimated to be 0.4161. The mission success estimate of
0.4161 is certainly not sufficient for a ten-year mission, but
does provide a baseline to which the probability of mission suc-
cess of other configurations can be compared.
Table VII-3 Estimated Probabilities of Ten-Year Mission Success
Item
1. Baseline (Fig.
VII-1)
2. Baseline Except:
a. One N2 tank-out
capability
b. One NTO and MMH
tank-out capa-
bility
c. Item 2a and 2b
capability
Probability of Mission Success
Propel 1 ant
Storage and
Transfer
0.5957
0.5957 ,
0.9494
0.9494
Pressur-
ization
0.8705
0.8783
0.8705
0.8783
Engines
0.8024
0.8024
0.8024
0.8024
Total
APS
0.4161
0.4198
0.6631
0.6691
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1. Propel 1 ant Storage and Transfer Subsystem
Table VII-3 also illustrates another significant characteris-
tic of the baseline APS. A major increase in total APS reliabil-
ity can be achieved by providing the propellant storage and trans-
fer subsystem with the capability of functioning with either an
NTO or MMH tank failure. This is required by the system to have
a mission success probability comparable to the other two subsys-
tems. Without this capability, the reliability of the propellant
subsystem (0.5957) is two to three orders of magnitude below the
estimated reliabilities of the pressurization subsystem (0.8705)
or engine subsystem (0.8024). The one-tank-out capability can be
provided either by redundancy, by oversizing the tanks (three of
four required) or by providing a capability for refurbishment,
repair, or replacement. To ensure a reasonable minimum level of
mission reliability, the baseline bipropellant system will require
some redundancy. As a minimum, a capability must be provided to
isolate failed propellant tanks.
2. Engine Subsystem
The calculated engine subsystem reliability equals 0.8024 for'
a ten-year mission. Each primary engine module has an estimated
one-year mission reliability of 0.9052. The propulsion system
reliability calculations assume that: (1) each primary module has
an identical backup module; (2) two engine modules in series must
function; and (3) the probability of an engine detonation not ne-
gating the redundant features equals 0.99801 per pair of primary
modules for one year. R4D engine data indicates that the maximum
probability of an engine detonation equals 4.2% of the total prob-
ability of an engine failure. The best estimate probability of
an engine detonating and destroying an adjacent engine is 2.1% of
the estimated engine failure probability, which is a conservative
value.
3. Pressurization Subsystem
Providing a one-nitrogen-tank-out capability improves relia-
bility from 0.8705 to 0.8783. This small reliability increase of
about 0.008 would require a weight-reliability tradeoff study be-
fore any decisions are made about providing a one-tank-out capa-
bility. The pressurization system for the baseline system is
already redundant in control components.
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В. BASELINE MODIFICATIONS
Table VII-4 presents the estimated probabilities of ten-year
mission success for various modified baseline configurations. The
weight difference between the baseline configuration shown in
Fig. VII-1 and those denoted are also shown. This table indicates
what reliability increases can be obtained by the addition of se-
lected redundancies. Figure VI1-5 presents some of the data of
Table VII-4 in graphic form.
Table VII-4 Ten-Year Mission Success and APS Weight Differentials for
Modified Baseline Configurations
Configuration
A. Baseline
B. Baseline except:
1. Two N2 SpheresOnly
2. One-N2-Sphere-Out
Capability
3. Cross Engine Det-
onation Effects
Eliminated
4. Two Sets of Quad
Valves per Engine
5. Capability to
Isolate Failed
Propellant Tank*
6. One-Propel 1 ant-
Tank-Out Capabil-
ity*
Ten-Year
Mission
Reliability
0.4161
0.4163
0.4198
0.4330
0.4844
0.6516
0.6631
д above Baseline
д Weight
(IbJ
--
(-2)
24
25
24
10
367
д Reliability
--
0.0002
•0.0037
0.0169
0.0683
0.2355
0.2470
д
 Re]
д wt х 10
--
-0.100
0.154
0.676
2.850 '
23.550
• 0.672
*Repair/ replacement of any failed tank accomplished at end of
each year.
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Providing the capability to isolate a leaking or malfunction-
ing propellant tank increases the ten-year reliability of the
baseline configuration from 0.4161 to 0.6516 with a weight penalty
of only about 10 Ib (Table VII-4). The capability to function a
complete year without replenishment/refurbishment with a failed
propellant tank costs 367 Ib in additional propellant and tank
weight; and only increases the probability of mission success by
0.0115 above that of the previously mentioned isolation capabil-
ity. The weight penalty consists of 286 Ib of propellant and 81
Ib of additional tankage and isolation hardware. The one-tank-
out weight penalties occur only once and could be considered as
an in-place spare. One would probably not choose this configura-
tion over that of the propellant tank isolation configuration be-
cause of the weight penalty.
Replacing the two single propellant solenoid valves on each
engine with two sets of quad valves increases the reliability from
0.4161 to 0.4844 with an estimated 24-lb penalty.
The baseline reliability can be increased by about 0.0169 by
physically separating the engine modules sufficiently to essen-
tially delete the possibility of one engine detonation damaging
its redundant counterpart.
Replacing the four pressurization spheres with two larger
spheres of total equal volume increases reliability by only 0.0002,
but it reduces weight by approximately 2 Ib. It is questionable
that the additional 0.0037 reliability provided by a one-nitrogen-
sphere-out capability justifies the weight penalty of 24 Ib for
the bipropellant system.
1. Preliminary APS Configuration
Figure VII-2 presents the preliminary APS configuration. This
configuration is essentially the baseline configuration except
that minimum modifications have been made to allow replacement or
repair of components. The estimated probability of this config-
uration completing a ten-year mission is 0.7472. Thus, providing
for component replacement or repair raises the mission reliability
of the baseline configuration by 0.3311, which is a significant
increase. The preliminary configuration weighs approximately 13
Ib more than the baseline configuration.
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2. Recommended APS Configuration
Reliabilities of the baseline APS and of the preliminary APS
are not acceptable for a ten-year manned mission. However, these
configurations do not take full advantage of methodology available
to increase long-life reliability. Methodologies that can be ap-
plied include full use of inflight maintenance and restoration,
use of either system and/or selected component redundancies, and
individual component improvement.
At some point in time, the mission reliability requirements
can be met only by employing inflight maintenance (IFM). Increases
in the reliabilities of parts and assemblies will not be sufficient
-in themselves to achieve the overall levels of assurances that are
sought. To maintain the high level of reliability a spacecraft
initially possesses, both redundancy and inflight maintenance must
be provided. The redundancies can be either active or standby.
Inflight maintenance can be either replacement or repair of the
failed part. IFM is discussed more fully in Chapter IV. The gen-
eral problem is to obtain the optimum balance of redundancies and
inflight maintenance, considering such parameters as reliability,
maintenance times, crew availability, weights, volumes, useful
lives, induced environments, human performance, and safety.
By selecting the most advantageous mode of operation, a sig-
nificant improvement in APS reliability can be achieved with a
minimum change in hardware.
If consumables are drawn from all tanks simultaneously, they
must normally be replenished once a year. Emergency resupply and/
or component replacement is available on a 90-day interval if nec-
essary. Since the commodity tanks can be isolated in the pressur-
ization subsystem and the propellant storage subsystem, APS opera-
tion can be continued until either replenishment, refurbishment,
and/or replacement is made. Thus the pressurization subsystem is
in effect redundant an average of 342 days a year, and the propel-
—lant-storage-and-transfer-subsystem_is-redundant_between_320_and
342 days per year depending on the particular failure mode.
A more advantageous operating mode is now described. Consum-
ables are drawn from only one-half the system at a time and are
normally replenished every 6 months. Except for leakage, rupture,
or contamination of the crossover lines and valves, this mode of
operation provides an active side and a standby redundant side.
VII-14 MCR-70-150
In general, the internal pressure of the inactive side will be
maintained at less than that of the active side; hence, the
component failure rates of the standby side are lower than those
of the active side. Table VII-5 shows that Standby Mode В mis-
sion success probabilities are significantly greater than those
for Mode A. Since no hardware modifications are required, total
APS weight is unaffected. As illustrated in Table VII-6, the in-
crease in launch costs necessitated by a 180-day resupply interval
are small, depending somewhat on the eventual unit cost for logis-
tic support.
Table VII-5 Mission Reliability vs Operating Mode
Configuration
Mission Success Probability
for One Year/(Ten Years)
A. All Consumables Used
Simultaneously Entire
APS
Pressurization
Propel 1 ant System
Engines
B. Only Ц. Consumables Used
Simultaneously Entire
APS
Pressurization
Propel 1 ant System
Engines
0.9723 (0.7559)
0.9988
0.9952
0.9782
0.9779 (0.7999)
0.9999
0.9998
0.9782
Table VII-6 Cost for Standby Operation
Resupply Interval (days)
APS Launch Cost at $1000/lb ($ million)
Resupply Cost at $500/lb ($ million)
Resupply Cost at $100/lb ($ million)
Resupply Cost at $50/lb ($ million)
Total Launch Costs for Ten-Year Mission
($ million)
Mode A
360
3.2
6.5
9.7
3.2
1.3
4.5
3.2
0.65
3.85
Mode В
180
3.2
7.2
10.4
3.2
1.4
4.6
3.2
0.7
3.9
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Sufficient data and program definition are not available at
this time to permit a complete weighted parametric study for op-
timization of all of the minor parameters affecting reliability.
However, the reliability analysis reported here can be employed
to advantage to determine general conclusions.
Figure VII-4 illustrates how a reliability analysis can be a
useful tool to help select a configuration that will have a satis-
factory probability of mission success. Mission duration is plot-
ted against the estimated mission reliability for various APS con-
figurations. The curves for the configurations provide a visual
aid in ascertaining how much redundancy (active or standby) and/
or maintenance may be required to obtain acceptable levels of mis-
sion reliability. APS reliability requirements have not been
quantitatively established to date; hence, data are presented
parametrically. Mission success probabilities are normally re-
quired to exceed 0.90 for most subsystems. On this basis, it is
apparent that the baseline configuration in a nonredundant form
is not acceptable since its probability of mission success is less
than one-half before 3 years. Figure VII-4 indicates that to meet
reliability requirements the APS configuration should provide
standby redundancy and a capability for inflight maintenance.
In view of these factors, the recommended APS configuration
was evolved as a means of satisfying the ten-year reliability re-
quirements. Figure VII-3 schematically illustrates this system.
In this configuration, which is a modification of the baseline,
the pressurization system is modularized, the number of nitrogen
spheres is reduced from four to two, and minor hardware additions
are ^ provided to facilitate using one-half the system in a standby-
redundant mode. If the consumables are drawn from all tanks si-
multaneously (no standby redundancy), consumables must be replen-
ished once a year and failed components may be replaced on 90-day
intervals, if required. The estimated ten-year reliability for
this operating mode is only 0.7559. The probability of mission
success can be increased to 0.7999 if standby redundancy is em-
~~p I6ye~d~i7e. , if^ only one-half ~of~the~~APS~is used~at a time. The
consumables in the active half then require replenishment every
six months. The increase in mission reliability by employing
standby redundancy and by replenishing the consumables twice a
year is thus 0.0440.
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The estimated ten-year mission success probabilities for the
recommended configuration and selected variations are presented
in Table VII-7. The denoted variations are self-explanatory.
Note that a relatively high reliability of 0.9689 can be obtained
by adding sufficient "reliability building blocks" to the basic
configuration shown in Fig. VII-3. These reliability building
blocks are depicted in Fig. VII-5 to illustrate how the reliabil-
ities can be increased by their use. Configuration E of Table
VII-7 is the recommended APS design.
Table VII-7 Mission Success Probabilities for the
Recommended APS Configuration
Configuration Variation
Mission
Reliability
Д Rel above
Baseline A
A. Consumables drawn from all tanks
simultaneously. Replenish once a
year. Repairs every 90 days
available.
B. Same as A except one pressuriza-
tion system used for both halves.
C. Two halves of system used inde-
pendently. One-half consumables
replenished every 6 months. Re-
pairs/replenishment available
every 90 days (no weight pen-
alty).
D. Same as С except a set of quad
solenoid valves used on each
engine.
E. Same as D except cross engine
detonation effects eliminated.
F. Same as E except no repairs or
replacements allowed.
0.7559
0.6969
-0.0590
0.7999
0.9311
0.96B9
0.6721
0.0440
0.1752
0.2130
0.2972
less
than E
Figure VII-6 presents estimated mission reliabilities for the
three configurations considered (baseline, preliminary and recom-
mended) and their variations versus the cumulative weight penalty.
The configurations and variations are plotted from the baseline
configuration in decreasing order of delta reliability per pound.
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Thus, if a mission reliability of about 0.92 is required, the
preliminary configuration with quad solenoid valves and employing
one-half the system in a standby mode will provide the required
reliability at the lowest weight penalty, 37 Ib above the base-
line configuration. Although drawn as a continuous curve to facil-
itate visual interpretation, the plot points are actually discrete
values. Thus, if a maximum weight penalty of 23 Ib is allowed,
the recommended configuration employing standby redundancy would
provide the highest mission reliability (0.799) consistent with
the weight constraint.
Figure VII-7 illustrates how the reliabilities of the baseline
as well as the preliminary and recommended configurations can be
increased by application of various methodology and configurations
(building blocks).
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С. RESUPPLY CONFIGURATIONS
Reliability estimates were made of the five candidate resupply
systems considered in Chapter VI (Fig. VI-1 thru VI-5). For each
configuration estimates were made of the APS as well as the re-
supply system itself. This was necessary because in all cases
some modification of the basic propulsion system is required to
provide a resupply capability. Results of the reliability esti-
mates are summarized in Tables VII-2 and VII-8, which follow.
With the exception of configurations .VI-4 and VI-5, the APS por-
tion of each configuration is identical to the recommended APS
configuration except for minor modifications for resupply of con-
sumables. Configurations VI-4 and VI-5 incorporate major modifi-
cation to the APS pressurization subsystems. Nevertheless, as
evident in Tables VII-2 and VII-8, variations in overall system
reliability are minor when comparing the various candidate resup-
ply systems. Consequently reliability considerations did not
greatly affect the selection of an optimum resupply system for
the Space Station APS.
.Table VII-8 Estimated APS Reliability
Configuration
APS VI-1
APS VI-2
APS VI-3
APS VI-4
(with active
heating system)
APS VI-5
(with no flow
control )
Probabilities of Mission Success
One Year
Pressuriza-
tion, P
0.9997
0.9999
0.9999
—
Propel lant
System, PS
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9994
0.9983
0.9989
0.9996
Overall (PRST)
(Pp)(Ps)(PE*)
0.9965
0.9967
0.9967
0.9966
0.9955
0.9962
0.9968
Ten-Years
Overall
0.9655
0.9675
0.9675
0.9665
0.9559
0.9622
0.9685
*PF = Probability of mission success for engine modules = 0.9972/yrfor all configurations.
P = Probability of mission success for propel lant storage and
transfer subsystem.
P = Probability of mission success for pressurization subsys-
p
 tern.
PR_ = Probability of propellent removel and servicing tool func-
tioning = 1.0 (assumption).
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The purpose of the reliability studies reported here is two-
fold. First, to estimate and compare the ten-year mission reli-
abilities of the resupply and APS configurations and secondly, to
estimate the probability of a successful consumables replenishment
operation.
1. Configuration Descriptions
All of the APS configurations employ one Propellant Removal
and Servicing Tool (PRST) for the MMH, and one for the NTO. The
design of the PRST is only conceptual at this point, therefore,
an estimate of its reliability was not attempted. However, since
the primary objective of the studies is to compare the various
configurations, the PRST probability of functioning can be assumed
a constant for all configurations and the comparisons'are not af-
fected. The PRST configuration should be nearly the same on all
APS configurations. The resupply configurations are fully de-
scribed in Chapter VI, however, they are briefly described, below
for quick reference:
Configuration Description
APS VI-1 Regulated Pressurant Transfer Using Residuals
for Propellant Transfer;
APS VI-2 Propellant Transfer by Ullage Slowdown - Pres-
surant Transfer by Modular Replacement;
APS VI-3 Slowdown Propellant Transfer with Modular Pres-
surant Transfer;
APS VI-4 Volatile Liquid Pressurized APS -
a) With passive heat storage material,
b) With active heating system;
APS VI-5 Slowdown APS -
a) With flow control valves in propellant sys-
temsy ~
b) Without flow control valves.
Table VII-8 presents the estimated APS reliabilities for the
various configurations. This analysis assumed the following:
1) Quad solenoid valves "are employed for the engines in
lieu of single solenoid valves;
2) Engine modules are physically separated sufficiently
to minimize engine detonation effects;
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3) A standby redundant configuration and procedure is
employed, i.e., only one-half the system is used at
a time, consumables being replenished every six months;
4) The capability exists for inflight maintenance. Con-
sumables and component refurbishment are available
every 90 days if needed.
2. APS Reliability Comparisons
With one exception, the ten-year probabilities of mission suc-
cess for all of the APS configurations which were considered are
within 0.007. The one exception is alternative APS VI-4. This
configuration incorporates a volatile liquid pressurization sub-
system with an active heating element that detracts from mission
reliability.
The probability of mission success for the recommended APS
configuration is 0.9689. This is slightly higher than any of the
resupply configurations. This is to be expected since the recom-
mended configuration does not have some of the hardware refine-
ments for consumables replenishment that the resupply configura-
tions demand. The propellant system reliabilities for the resup-
ply configurations are lower than that estimated for the recom-
mended configuration, especially APS VI-4 and VI-5. The lower
propellant system reliabilities of the volatile liquid systems
(APS VI-4) and the blowdown systems (APS VI-5) are not offset by
the elimination of a separate pressurization system. This is be-
cause of the high degree of component redundancy employed by the
pressurization subsystem of the recommended APS configuration.
3. Resupply Reliability Comparisons
The estimated probabilities of a successful resupply operation
are presented in Table VII-2 for each of the candidate resupply
configurations. These probabilities also fall within a narrow
band (0.0008), and consequently the selection of an optimum re-
supply technique was based on factors other than reliability.
The assumptions employed in estimating the values in Table VII-2
are as follows:
1) The actual transfer of consumables requires ^  hr;
2) The transfer system on the logistics vehicle was
functioning properly at launch;
3) The logistics vehicle is successfully docked.
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D. MATHEMATICAL MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
The primary purpose of the reliability estimates reported
above was (1) to compare systems by identifying the more favorable
configurations; and (2) to indicate the areas that require the most
attention and improvement. Although mission environments and
functions of the APS have not been fully defined at this time, it
is believed that the indicated reliability differences between
systems are sufficiently accurate to permit valid conclusions.
The differences remain essentially the same although the absolute
system reliability estimates may vary as environments, configura-
tion, and program constraints become more firm. The reliabilities
of the various systems tend to increase or'decrease together as
definitions, constraints, etc, change.
Estimating the absolute numerical reliability of each config-
uration was a secondary objective. Hence the probabilities of
failure modes or events that do not affect either the comparison
of differences between systems or are numerically insignificant
have not been considered. For example, the probabilities of mete-
oroid damage to the various configurations are essentially equal
and, therefore, not considered. The same is assumed true of the
Malfunction Detection System and control systems.
The mathematical models, failure rates, and assumptions are
standards generally accepted by those engaged in the reliability
disciplines. The product rule was used to predict the total reli-
ability of a number of items in series. The overall reliabilities
of redundant, series-redundant, active, or passive standby redun-
dancies, etc were calculated by accepted techniques delineated in
most standard texts on reliability. The failure rate of an item
was allocated among the failure modes to determine the effective
failure rate of an item; this allocation is particularly necessary
to determine the equivalent series failure rate of redundant items.
The generic' failure rates were selected from the sources deemed
-most-recent—applicable,- and—accurate.— The-ma-j or-i-ty~of- the -fail-—
ure rates were derived from among the following references or
sources:
1) Handbook of Long Life Space Vehicles Investigations
(1967 and 1968). M-68-21. Martin Marietta Corpora-
tion, Denver Division, December 1968;
2) Failure Rate Data Handbook. USN Fleet Missiles Sys-
tems Analysis and Evaluation Unit;
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3) EADC Unanalyzed Nonelectronic Part Failure Rate Data,
Interim Report NEOC01. Technical Report RACD-TR-66-
828. Rome ADC, December 1966;
4) Engineering Reliability Policy and Procedures Manual.
M-63-3. Martin Denver, October 1963;
5) Titan III Reliability Studies;
6) Titan III Experience, Test Data;
7) Average of typical aerospace components.
The following basic assumptions are used in all mission suc-
cess calculations. Assumptions peculiar to a particular config-
uration are stated in the section on that configuration:
1) The duration of the mission is ten years;
2) Double malfunctions are statistically improbable;
3) Instrumentation is configured such that failure of
one sensor does not preclude calculating performance
parameters;
4) An active system to cool components is not required.
Active heating units are redundant;
5) The response rates of ancillary equipment such as
sensors and controls are sufficiently fast enough to
permit successful switchover to the backup component/
system;
6) Leakage through either an engine or propellant feed-
line solenoid valve constitutes a failure, although
they are in series. Upon detection of leakage, a
switch will be made to the backup engine module;
7) All components have been checked out and are function-
ing properly at the start of the time period It \ for
which reliabilities are being calculated; ^ '
8) Infant mortality has been eliminated through prein-
stallation burn-in or operation. The cyclic/wear or
calendar limits of components are not exceeded; re-
placement or refurbishment is allowed for all config-
urations except the baseline configuration;
9) The engine modules are identical for all configurations;
10) Explosion of an engine will damage the adjacent engine
50% of the time (best estimate);
11) The reliability of the control and Malfunction Detec-
tion Systems (MDS) are equal for all configurations
studied.
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For convenience of calculation and comparison, each system
was divided into three parts as shown in Fig. VII-8: pressuriza-
tion subsystem, propellant storage and transfer subsystem (S&T) ,
and engine subsystem. The reliability of each part was calculated
separately. The probability of mission success P, ,. is as shown.
P(S) = (
R
P) (
RS&T) [(
RE + 2RE QE) \\2 R c
where :
R = probability of mission success for the pressuriza-
" tion system — expressed as the series equivalent
probability for redundant systems;
Rq = probability of mission success for the propellant
storage and transfer system expressed as the series
equivalent probability for redundant systems;
R = probability of mission success for one engine
module containing three engines, propellant mani-
folds, instrumentation and connections. Proper
functioning of both Module 1 (or backup) and Module
2 (or backup) is required for mission success;
QE - 1 - V
R^ = probability of one engine module not detonating
or the detonation not damaging at least one engine
in its backup module during a mission. R^ ap-
proaches 1.0 if the modules and their backup are
sufficiently separated in distance;
R = 1.0 = probability of mission success for controls
and MDS. Equals 1.0 for comparative purposes.
The system probabilities of mission success such as R , R,,,.,,,, and
p Ь&Г
RP are calculated by applying the product rule to the reliability
of each item in a system! The reliabilities~of— redundant— items
or subsystems are converted to a series equivalent reliability
before applying the product rule.
vi \-i Ml K-/0-l'jO
Engine
Subsystem
Rp
Pressurization
Subsystem
S&T
Propellent Subsystem
Storage and Transfer
RL
Backup to
Module 1
Engine
Module 1
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I
[and MDS I
'Control KCI
1
\
r
RE
Backup to
Module 2
_____
r
ч
r
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Engine
Module 2
1
1
1
1
J
Success
Fig VI1-8 Baseline Configuration
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The more general equations employed to calculate the phase
failure and mission success probabilities of an item are:
X.t
1) 0. = К К С_
л
 n t.; an approximation of Q. = 1 - ei op а г К i i
i=b i=b
V42) P x . = l - Q = l - /
 J Q.; an approximation of P = fj
where:
Q = total failure probability of an item during mission
phase i,
К = operational environmental modifier during phase i,
during which the environments are essentially con-
stant,
К = application modifier during phase i,
С„ = generic failure rate,
г К '
n = number of items ,
t. = elapsed time during phase i,
A = total effective failure rate during phase i =
_
K
oP Ka GFR П>
, ,= probability of mission success for an item,
QT = total failure probability of an item during the
entire mission, '
P. = probability of success for an item during phase
i = 1 - Q±,
b-=-number— of-mission^phases.
Note: The approximations of Q, and P.. , are used only where thei \s ^
results would be accurate to the fifth decimal place.
The operational environmental modifiers /К \ increase the\ °P/
generic failure rates to account for the higher operational fail-
ure rates associated with the actual service environments encoun-
tered. Service environments are usually more severe than the be-
nign environments under which the generic failure rates are estab-
lished. The К 's are less than one during periods of nonopera-
tion. A review of К 's employed by Martin Marietta Corporation,
Aerospace Companies, and NASA resulted in the use of the following
К 's that reflect the severity of the environments at various
op
locations and mission phases.
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Type Item
Mechanical
Operating
Not Operating
Engine Burning
"Structure" Portion
Valves
Engines, not Burning
"Structure" Portion
Valves
KQD for Denoted Phase
Boost
80
50
80
80
80
80
In Orbit
No APS Burn
1
0.100
N/A
N/A
0.001
0.100
APS Burn
1
0.100
1000
100
10
10
The application/installation modifier, К , is used to modify
the generic failure rate to account for the increase in failure
rate due to installation and test effects. These effects of in-
stallation and tests vary according to class of equipment. The
К 's used are based primarily on data and experience obtained at
the Denver Division of the Martin Marietta Corporation. The nu-
merical values of those employed are:
System
Hydraulic
N2 Pressurization
Propel 1 ant Storage and Transfer
Engine*
K
a
1.60
1.30
1.20
1.00
*K factor was included in engine failurea
rate data.
One sample calculation of the reliability of a component
should illustrate the general approach. The reliability estimate
of the four nitrogen spheres in the baseline configuration was
accomplished as follows:
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Failure Modes
Leakage
Rupture
Contaminates the System
Total GpR
Generic Failure
Rate (ppm/hr)
0.0044
0.0352
0.0044
0.0440 each
These spheres are always "operative" in the sense that they are
always pressurized and stressed. Thus К =1 during orbit, and
К =80 during boost. The К =1.30 since they are part of a
pressurization system. Boost time, t., equals 10 minutes. In
orbit time, t2 = 10 years = 87,600 hr.
+ (1) (87,600) ,
Q. = К К G__ t. n,i op a FR i
QT = Ql + Q2»
Г / '
QT = (1.30) (0.044) (10-
6) 80 Ш
Q = 0.0050115 each sphere,
P =
 e
-
0
-
0050115
 = 0.99500 each sphere,
/ \
= probability of all four spheres functioning
for entire mission,
(s) = 0.9801.
When standby redundancy is employed, the following equation
was employed:
2
where:
R,(t) = probability of mission success for time, t,
\l = operating failure rate of primary system,
X2 = operating failure rate of standby system after
becoming operational,
Хз = nonoperating failure rate of standby system,
R = probability of switch-over to standby system.
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VIII. FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION
As discussed in Chapter VII, Reliability, a capability for
inflight maintenance is absolutely essential if the ten-year
life requirements of the Space Station are to be achieved. This
requirement, in turn, demands a fault detection and isolation ca-
pability that can be satisfied only by an onboard-checkout sys-
tem (OCS). Such a system has 'been designated for control, moni-
toring, and checkout of the integrated Space Station systems.
The major results of the study reported in this chapter are
as follows:
1) The primary fault detection and isolation require-
ments for the Space Station APS have been identified;
2) The feasibility of an advanced OCS has been estab-
lished; " "
3) Requirements for integration of the Space «Station
APS with the OCS have been identified;
4) Incorporation of an OCS for checkout and monitoring
of the Space Station APS has been shown to reduce
instrumentation requirements.
A. FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION REQUIREMENTS
The required level of fault detection and isolation will be
directly influenced by the level of component replacement and
repair and by the maintenance techniques used. The level of
fault isolation must correspond to the lowest level of repair
specified. Three possibilities were considered:
1) System end-to-end test and replacement;
2) Module level test and replacement;
3) Component level test and replacement.
Only on-line testing was considered. Bench testing and trial
and error techniques do not support a continuous standby operat-
ing capability.
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For the inflight maintenance plan developed in Chapter IV, a
capability of fault isolation at the component level is necessary.
On-line fault isolation at the component level will, in turn,
require the development of an advanced DCS for reasons of mission
effectiveness, reliability and safety, ground station limitations,
and inflight maintenance.
1. Mission Effectiveness
Incorporation of an automatic DCS will promote mission effec-
tiveness by providing the flight crew with sufficient performance
information so that the mission can be adjusted as necessary to
adapt to unique problems as they occur. The OCS will also pro-
vide a means for effective operation of marginal equipment through
interpretation of calibration data. Propulsion system data can
be validated by calibration before, during, and at the completion
of each maneuver. Before each maneuver, maximum assurance of a
successful operation will be provided by assessing the system
status before commitment. Test integrity is improved by on-line,
real-time calibration. A means of determining resupply require-
ments will also be available before the logistics vehicle is
launched.
2. Reliability/Safety
The OCS will alert the flight crew in real time to perform-
ance degradation or system malfunction so that corrective action
or alternative operating modes can be implemented. System per-
formance can be verified before each operation and performance
repeatability can be established immediately afterwards. Opera-
tional status can also be verified immediately following mainte-
nance or resupply operations.
Long life reliability is achieved by providing the capability
to isolate faults to the required level for component or modular
replacement. A key factor with respect to safety and reliability
is that fault isolation is achieved in real ,time and under actual
operating conditions. This allows immediate response by one of
the following actions:
1) Computer-initiated automatic switching to a replace-
able spare;
2) Computer-initiated automatic switching from a redun-
dant to simplex mode;
3) Manual switching or replacement of the failed module;
4) Subsequent failure analysis and correction for follow-
on flights.
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Here, immediate response is the key characteristic of an
OCS.
An automatic checkout capability also reduces the required
crew training and improves crew performance by reducing or elim-
inating routine monitoring tasks. The number of-onboard dis-
plays that require continuous on-line presentation is also re-
duced. Because of the added depth of system interrogation, con-
trol can be expanded to such functions as automatic sequencing,
control of the propulsion systems operation, and data management.
3. Ground Station Limitations
Arv OGS can provide onboard data reduction, to relieve poten-
tial ground station overloads. Since accessibility to data han-
dling ground stations is only periodic, fault isolation may not
always be possible, particularly for intermittent failures. Al-
so test requirements may be compromised due to transmission limi-
tations or priorities. For a ten-year mission the level of sys-
tem monitoring required will also be prohibitively expensive if
ground station monitoring is used as the primary mode.
4. Inflight Maintenance
An OCS provides rapidly accessible instructions for trouble-
shooting and repair procedures that are keyed directly to the
test and monitor- operations. This will reduce the reaction time
required to isolate and correct faults. Continuous trend analy-
sis will be possible, allowing prediction of performance degrada-
tion and impending failures.
В. ADVANCED CHECKOUT SYSTEM CONCEPT
An advanced, automatic, OCS is necessary to satisfy the fault
detection and isolation requirements of the Space Station APS.
As a consequence, an advanced checkout concept was developed dur-
ing the study to demonstrate the feasibility of an OCS for appli-
cation to the Space Station APS. The major characteristics of
this system are discussed in this section. The functional units
of the system are described along with operation and performance
characteris tics.
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The checkout system concept, as depicted in Fig. VIII-1, is
a general data system that can process performance data and ex-
perimental data, and can initiate command data. The concept com-
prises (1) a man interface; (2) the checkout system; and (3) the
system in test.
1. Man Interface
The man interface provides the initial or final evaluation of
system performance, and also provides the necessary decisions.
These man interface functions can be executed by initiating one
or more of the following options:
1) Enable monitor;
2) Select checkout sequence;
3) Start and stop points and bypasses;
4) Enable step by step or automatic checkout;
5) Halt monitor or checkout;
6) Enter new test;
7) Modify existing test.
2. Checkout System
The checkout system provides the functions of data acquisi-
tion, data processing, and display of results.
During data acquisition, signal conditioning equipment ranges
and/or formats the electrical quantities of subsequent processing.
The signal conditioning equipment may be a part of the checkout
system or part of the system under test.
The data processing function consists of processing three
types of data: performance data, experimental information, and
initiate command data. Performance data are necessary to evalu-
ate the performance of the system under test, while experimental
information are'necessary for trend analysis, curve fitting, and
mathematical manipulations^ "Initiate Command" data are the in-
structions issued by the checkout system for command and control
of the evaluation of the system under test.' Data are processed
in two function steps.
M
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The first data'processing function may take the form of data
compaction and/or data evaluation. For experimental information,
the emphasis is placed on the accumulation of meaningful data,
therefore, data compaction is desired. Data are compacted by
eliminating redundant information and meaningless zeros and by
data rearrangement. However, limits can be set up, which if ex-
ceeded, will result in automatic display to the crew for evalua-
tion and command action.
For" performance data, the emphasis will be placed on compar-
ing-results against stored limits which, if exceeded, will cause
automatic displays and/or commands. The commands will alert the
crew-to take corrective action to restore system integrity. If
of a critical nature with respect to reaction time, the commands
can be automatic. The data are then stored in the form of change
information oriented to a time base. The data can be stored to-
tally onboard, totally within the ground network, temporarily on-
board, permanently on the ground, or any combination of these al-
ternatives.
The second processing function provides the longer term re-
duction of the data that includes trend analysis, curve fitting,
mathematical manipulation, and cleanup operations such as noise
removal and presentation formatting. Rate of change limits can
be established which when exceeded will result in automatic dis-
plays and/or commands. Tabulated or displayed data will be pro-
vided to the crew on call and on a periodic basis for evaluation
and required command action.
The Onboard Checkout System (DCS) combines the versatility
of an Airborne Digital Computer .(ADC), the flexibility of periph-
eral hardware, the adaptability of test oriented and interpretive
software, and the capability of a technician to perform the fol-
lowing functions:
1) Sequence a series of predetermined mission operations,
as required;
2) Determine the performance status of the interfacing
APS system by periodic monitoring, by end-to-end
checkout, and by system interrogation;
3) Analyze the performance of the APS system by accom-
plishing the necessary computations, by comparing the
results with prestored standards, by evaluating the
significance of the results, and by deciding subse-
quent action;
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4) Accomplish the necessary control over the operations
of the APS system, either as a part of normal opera-
tions or as dictated by emergency conditions, by
initiating start/stop functions, by switching to al-
ternative equipment systems, and by communicating
results/decisions for operator knowledge and/or ac-
tion.
PCS System Description - The DCS itself will comprise the
following units that are shown in the functional diagram, Fig.
VIII-2.
Airborne Digital Computer (ADC) - The ADC contains mission-
oriented programing, decision making, data processing, and se-
quencing information.
Data Interchange and Control Unit (DIACU) - The DIACU is an
input/output timing unit that comprises the single inter/intra-
system interface and, as such, provides data formatting, signal
level conversion, and timing. In providing for interface conver-
sion the DIACU must accomplish the following functions:
Perform logic level conversion;
Perform serial-to-parallel conversion for computer opera-
tions ;
Perform parallel-to-serial conversion for other unit op-
erations ;
Perform computer word packaging;
Verify proper receipt of -transmitted data;
Control application of power to other units when changing
between standby and operate modes;
Provide interface capabilities with ground equipment and
space station systems.
Stimulus Generator Unit (SGU) - The SGU is a programable sig-
nal generator that converts digitaf~data into "the Yequire~d~type
and level of stimulus or command signal.
Measurement Unit (MU) - The MU is a signal sealer/digital
converter that converts the performance and experimental data into
digital format. The MU performs the following data manipulations
and conversions:
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DC voltage to digital;
AC voltage to digital;
Detects discrete voltage levels;
Detects contact closure;
Converts signals carrying time information to digital
data;
Recovers a low frequency modulation signal from an AC
carrier and converts to digital.
Stimulus and Measurement Switching Units (SSU-MSU) - The SSU
and MSU are remote switching units that route signals between
the DCS and the system under test (APS) or supporting control
systems (ACS).
Control and Display Unit (CADU) - The CADU enables the opera-
tor to initiate checkout operations, diagnostics testing, and
experiment information processing that might also be programed
for periodic accomplishment; revise stored computer operations
or add new operations; and present critical performance data on
a continuous basis, "exceptional" results, trend data, and spe-
cifically requested data.
Each unit in the OCS is addressable and receives instructions
from a common control bus. The address and accompanying instruc-
tion is recognized by the proper unit, an error check is per-
formed, and a verification signal is- transmitted. The transmis-
sion of verification responses and requests for data are accom-
plished by a common response (data) bus. The transmission of
signals to and from the remote switching units is by a common
stimulus or measurement bus.
OCS Software - The OCS software is a test oriented interpre-
tive system that effectively bridges the flight communications
with the checkout equipment. The software consists of an air-
borne system and a ground system.
Ground System - The ground system provides the means for
translating test engineer documented test procedures into a set
of test descriptions for loading into the airborne computer mem-
ory. Test procedures comprise a sequential set of general test
elements (e.g., stimulate, measure, sense, delay, compare, trans-
mit, display, etc). These elements are modified to specify appli-
cations with the assignment of values and test application points
(test data).
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The airborne system comprises:
Supervisory/Control Program - This program is that set
of processing routines used for control and processing
of the OCS operating status, modes, and functions dur-
ing normal system operation;
Utility Programs - Waveform generation, input/output
operations, etc;
Test Orders - These orders provide test element subrou-
tines for the test descriptions produced by the ground
system.
OCS Characteristics - Listed below are the characteristics
of the present OCS being developed by Martin Marietta for NASA-
Houston under NASA Contract NAS9-8000. Although this system has
less capacity than will be required by the integrated Space Sta-
tion systems, the data shown are representative of a "500 tests"
capacity system.
Power (avg.) - 0.165 kw-hr/mission day;
Average Heat Dissipation - 12.2 watts;
Reliability - 0.995 goal for 90-day mission;
Test Capacity - 500 separate tests;
Computer Memory Size - 24 К words (32 bits/word)
Mean Time to Repair - 0.25 hr/occurrence exclusive of EVA
repairs;
Duty Cycle - 3.6% to 4.2% of mission time;
Maintainability - Replace modules - total of 105 modules,
62 different configurations;
Data transfer Rates - 1/30 sec, 14.2 bits/occurrence aver-
age, 1 M bits/sec.
The OCS measurement characteristics are tabulated in Table
VIII-1, and stimulus characteristics are indicated in Table VIII-2.
*
OCS Operation - The OCS operations are divided into perform-
ance data processing, command data processing, and experimental
information processing.
The performance evaluaton of an APS interfacing system com-
prises a sequential series of individual tests that will verify
the system's operability. Monitor, checkout, and diagnostics
testing, listed in the order of increasing depth of inteirogation,
are encompassed within the function of performance data processing,
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Table VI I I -1 OCS Measurement Characteristics
Measurement Range Accuracy
AC Voltage (Sine Wave,
Square Wave, Triangle
Wave)
Frequency
Time (Time Interval,
Pulse Width)
Phase Delay
DC Voltage
Discretes
Contact Closure
Digital Data (Serial
or Parallel)
PCM
50 mV to 40 V Peak
0.1 Hz to 1 MHz
5 sec to 10 min
0.1 Hz to 100 KHz
50 mV to 40 V
2 V to 32 VDC
Logic Decision
RZ or NRZ
8 bits/word to 40
bits/word, 40 bits/
sec to 64K bits/sec
±1%
±0.1%
±0.1%
±0.1%
±1%
±5%
Table V I I I - 2 OCS Stimulus Characteristics
Stimulus
AC Voltage (Sine Wave,
Square Wave, Triangle
Wave)
Frequency
DC Voltage
DC Current
Discretes
Voltage Pulse
Current Pulse
Range
50 mV to 40 V Peak
0.1 Hz to 1 MHz
50 mV to 40 V
1 ma to 250 ma
2 V to 28 VDC, 50 ma
Simultaneous Supply
5 sec to 1 sec
5 sec to 1 sec
Tolerance
±1%
±1%
±1%
±2%
±5%
±1%
±2%
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A typical checkout or diagnostics test would proceed with a
computer instruction to close a particular switch in a remote
switching unit. The next instruction would be to the signal gen-
erator to supply a specific signal to the common bus, which then
would apply the stimulus to the particular point desired in the
APS. A remote switching unit would then be directed to connect
a specific test point to the MU (signal sealer/digital convector)
for conversion to digital format and serial transmission along
the periodic response but to the DIACU (Input/output/timing unit).
Signal level conversion is accomplished and response data are sent
to the computer. The computer would then make a decision based on
an evaluation of the response. This decision might be to proceed
to the next test, store the results as change data, go' into "stand-
by" mode, perform a diagnostics test sequence, alert the crew, or
initiate a correction command. The monitor operation is performed
passively, negating the requirement for stimulus application, con-
sequently the first two steps of the checkout test are thereby ex-
cluded. A particular type of monitor operation, such as continu-
ous and direct display, would be routed over the continuous re-
sponse but to the CADU instead of the computer.
Command data processing comprises the first two types of steps
described for the checkout test and will provide excitation of
some element or elements in the APS or supporting systems, Guid-
ance Control (GC) and Electrical Control System (ECS).
The experimental information processing encompasses the same
functions as the checkout test, with two exceptions: the first
two steps are excluded, and the data are routed over the continu-
-ous response bus to the bulk storage unit instead of the computer.
On a periodic basis, perhaps concurrently with the monitor cycle,
the computer compares the new data with previous data also stored
in the bulk storage unit, updates the file with change data, and
eliminates redundant and meaningless data. Should a rate of change
limit be exceeded, the computer makes a decision to initiate a
correction command and/or alerts the operator. Mission require-
ments or storage limitation may dictate direct transmission of
some types of data over-the telemetry link instead of to the bulk
storage unit. Functions such as curve fitting and trend analysis
can be accomplished by the computer performing further data proc-
essing on performance data and experimental data, and the results
can be displayed or correction commands initiated.
The OCS has two functional states: standby and operating.
In the standby state all power is turned off except that power re-
quired for timers in the DIACU; circuits needed to bring the sys-
tem up to the operating state; isolated circuits that process the
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experimental information and continuous display data. In this
manner a limited number of circuits are isolated for special re-
liability emphasis. The system can be changed from standby to
operating, by a programable time or by external command. In the
operating state, the OCS can perform a programable periodic moni-
tor operation or a periodic or requested checkout operation con-
currently with experimental data and direct display data process-
ing.
The OCS has three operating modes: automatic, semiautomatic,
and manual.
Automatic Mode - In the automatic mode a complete series of
tests is commanded and cycled through until the last selected
test is completed. If a malfunction is detected, a specific
group of tests are performed to isolate the fault to a failed
module. After the fault has been isolated, the OCS will stop
and display pertinent information. The operator may restart the
sequence if so allowed by the program.
Semiautomatic Mode - This mode is very similar to the auto-
matic mode in that a series of tests is commanded. However, when
enabled, the tests proceed one at a time. After each single test
is completed, the next test is called up but is not performed un-
til the operator enables it. This allows the operator to step
through a test sequence and view actual test values as well as
NO/GO status.
Manual Mode - In the manual mode the operator may perform a
single test, accomplish emergency control of OCS, revise an ex-
isting test, or construct a new test.
3. System under Test
In the system under test, a sensor, which is an integral part
of the system, converts some physical quantity such as temperature,
pressure or mass quantity into an electrical quantity. Where the
system output is electrical, sensing is normally obtained directly
С. OCS INTEGRATION TASKS
Use of an advanced OCS for control, monitoring and checkout
of the APS makes it necessary to integrate the OCS and APS func-
tions. In turn, integration of the two systems requires that the
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tasks listed below b,e»accomplished. To demonstrate the feasi-
bility of incorporating the APS requirements into the OCS func-
tion, these tasks were completed for the modified baseline APS
and the advanced OCS previously described.
1. Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
This analysis (Tables VIII-3, -4, and -5) was performed to
determine those hardware items contributing most to system unre-
liability and crew safety problems. In addition, the level of
criticality for each component is established, based on func-
tional analysis of the system.
2. Determine Instrumentation Requirements
In determining the instrumentation requirements, the tend-
ency is to monitor every aspect of the system under test. How-
ever, by taking advantage of the real time, on-line checkout ca-
pability of the OCS, as well as its ability to provide trend
analysis and continuous diagnostic evaluation of the system, in-
strumentation requirements can be maintained at a reasonable
level. In fact, incorporation of an onboard checkout capability
was found to reduce the baseline APS instrumentation require-
ments by approximately 40%, from 90 to 50 sensors. Fig. VIII-3
illustrates the optimized instrumentation required by the modi-
fied APS for integration with the advanced OCS.
3. Fault Isolation Flow Diagrams
This task involves the definition of the sequence of events
necessary to detect and locate malfunctions. This sequence of
events consists of operator and/or OCS actions and/or decisions.
Events are a series of cue and response actions between OCS and
the APS. The fault isolation flow diagrams for the APS system
test, APS dynamic test, and the pressurant standby checkout are
'shown in Fig. VIII-4, -5, and -6.
4. Develop Test Sequences
During this task the flow diagrams are translated into test
sequences that are sequential groups of single tests required to
test the performance aspects of the APS. These test sequences
are developed from the performance characteristics of the APS
system. The performance characteristics required are:
1) Mission profile;
2) Timing sequences;
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3) Parametric values and tolerances;
4) Interfaces within the APS and with the supporting
systems (GC, ECS).
5. Develop Crew Maintenance and Repair Procedures
As discussed in Chapter IV, Inflight Maintenance, detailed
procedures are required for each maintenance and repair function.
These procedures are programed and stored by the OCS for imme-
diate reference by the crew and are directly keyed to the appro-
priate failure analysis.
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Table VIII-3 Failure Modes, Pressurization Subsystem
POTENTIAL FAILURE FAILURE MANIFESTATION FAILURE HOPE PERFORMANCE MONITOR DIAGNOSIS
HIERARCHY PROBABILITY
LEVEL OF SUCCESS
FOR 1 YEAR
1 Pressure 0 9938
Regulators
2 Nj Spheres 0 9979
3 Resupply 0 9992
Filters
4 Burst Discs 0.9999
5 Relief Valve 0 9999
6 Low Risk Components
A Check 0 9994
Valves
В Joints 0 9995
С Lines 0 9998
D Quick 0 9999
Disconnects
. No Fuel and/or
Oxidlzer Flow
2. Low Engine Perfor-
mance or no Engine
Ignition
ea age
Leakage
. No Pressurant Flow
2 Leakage
3. Resupply Impossible
1 Partial Loss of
2. Gross Contamination
of Relief Valve
3. No-Over Pressure
Relief
4 Leakage
L Total Loss of Pres-
surant
2 No -Over Pressure
Relief
1 Loss of Pressursnt
2 Leakage
.egulator
a) Filter
I. Clogged
2. Leakage
3. Rupture
1 Fail Open
2. Fail Closed
3. Improper Regulation
4. Instability
5 Leakage
c) Module Structure
1. Leakage
2. Rupture
Sphere Structure
a) Worn Seals
>) Rupture due to Wear -out
or Corrosion Stress
_
a) Filter Clogged
b) Rupture
c) Contaminant
a) Premature Rupture
(No rupture)
c) Produced Gross Con-
tamination
a) Fail Open
b) Fall Closed
a) Rupture
D) Worn Seals
!.
 P[) „p or P(0ffl .
2 24
ЛР
°
N2 N2
3. Р„ and Т„ (Mass)N2 N2
4. Р„
 0 and P2
 4 MMH
5. Р„ „ and t
mtl
2°4
7 P and P^ --,
8 P and Т (Mass)
N2 2
'•
 PN2
 and TN2
 (Mase)
10. PN and Т„ (Mass)
1 PN and TN (Mass)
"2 "2
U PN,
"2
2
-
 PN2
3. P
1 PMMH
PMMH
1 р„
2
1. Evaluate Д P_
2. Compare PV - MRT to
Trend Limits
N204 MMH
 8
4. Is P.,
 л
 or P Low'
N204 MMH
5 1в PN 0 °Г PMHH
Steady?
6
-
 Ie PN204
 or PMMH
Pulsating?
7 Compare PV = MRT to
Trend Limits
8 Compare PV «= MRT to
Trend Limits
1 Compare PV e MRT to
Trend Limits
2. Sound Alarm when
Hearing Empty Condi-
tion
1. Monitor P« during
Resupply 2
2 Is P» Increasing?
2> Ie PMMH StaX'n8 Con-
tinually High?
1 Is P.-,, Low?
2. Is Pj^ g High?
1 Monitor Qulesent
Pressure of Sphere
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Table VI11-4 Failure Modes, Propel 1 ant Subsystem
POTENTIAL УАПДТИЕ FAILURE MANIFESTATION FAILURE НОПЕ
HIERARCHY PROBABILITY
LEVEL OF SUCCESS
FOR 1 YEAR
1. Tanks 0.95380
A. Shell
В Bellows
2. Filters 0.99860
-
3 Transducers
A. Pressure 0.99870
В Temperature 0.99870
4 Quick Disconnects
(Fill and 0.99970
Vent)
5 Low RUk Component.
A Joints 0.99980
B. Lines 0.99991
C. System
Structure 0.99993
D. Quantity
Sensors 0.99995
.. Loss of Propellent
2 Low Performance of
Engine or No Igni-
tion
3. Resupply Not Possi-
ble
L. No Propellent Flow
2. Leakage
1 Improper Data Input
2 Leakage
1. Loss of Propellent
2. Leakage
3. Resupply Not Possi-
ble
1. Leakage
2. Leakage
3. Affected by Boost
Phase Only
6. Improper Data Input
-
A. Shell
1. External Leak
2. Rupture
B. Bellow»
I. Preesurant mixed
with Propellent
(Rupture or Puncture)
2. No Expulsion (Bel-
lows Stuck)
1. Clogged
2. Leakage Due to Horn
Seals
3. Rupture
4. System Contaminated
(Element Failure)
I. Sensing Element Shorted
2. Sensing Element Open
3. Out of Calibration
4. Leakage Due to Worn
Seals
-
1. Rupture
2. Leakage Due to Worn
Seals
1. Rupture
2. Rupture
3. Misalignment Due to
Vibration
4. Janmed Bellows
S. Open Electrical Con-
nection
.. Quantity Level
Sensors' (Mate)
!* Gas Analyzer
1. Д P Across Filter
!. Quantity Level Sen-
sors (Mass)
.. E, voltage
t. If current
1. Quantity Level Sen-
sors (Mass)
.. Quantity Level
Sensors (Mass)
L. Quantity Level
Sensors (Mass)
!. Quantity Level
Sensors (Mass)
1. Compare Quantity to
Trend Limits
2. Is Pressurant Ingest-
ed with Propellent?
1. Is Др Across Filter
Approaching 801 of
Maximum Contamination?
2. Compare Steady State
Quantity to Trend
Limits
1 Is E - 0? Implies a
short
2. Is I - 0? Implies an
Open Circuit
3. Are Instruments With-
in Calibration Limits?
4. Compare Steady State
Quantity to Trend
Limits
1. Compare Steady State
Quantity to Trend
Limits
1 Compare Steacb Stste
Quantlt> tn Trend
Limits
2. Compare Steady State
Quantity to Trend
Limits
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Table VI11-5 Failure Modes, Propulsion Subsystem
HIERARCHY PROBABILITY
LEVEL OF SUCCESS
FOR 1 YEAR
1. Engine Module 0.9052
(3 each Engine»)
2. Thermal Control
System 0.9993
3. Heating Unit 0.9997
* Lov Rl.k Component.
A. Temperature p
Tranlducer 0.9999
В Preaaure,
Tranlducer 0.9999
C. Llnea and
Jotnta 0.9999
D. Filter» 0.9999
E Line
Coupling» 0.9999
F. Structural
Support 0.9999
1. No Thrueter Ignition
2 Irregular Ignition
and/or Burn
3 No Thrueter Shutdown
it. Explosion
5. Nozele Eupture
6. Leakage
1. Frozen Lines
2. Heat Soak Back
,
L. Improper Data Input
2. Leakage
3. No Propellent Flow
i. Structure Affected
by Boost Phase
1. Engine Solenoids Failed
Cloae
2. Injectors Clogged
3. No Preesurant
4. No Propellent
5. Filters Clogged
6. Delayed Feeding of one
Propellent
7. Gas Ingeatlon
8. Throat Erroalon
9. Engine Solenoids Failed
10. Electrical Control
System Felled
11. Improper Propellent
Feed
12. Excteelve Heat
13. Worn Seals
14. Rupture
1. Heater Coll Open
2. Thermostat Control
Failed Open
3. Electrical Control
System Fall Open
4. Heater Coll Shorted
5. Thermostat Control
Failed Close
6. Electrical Control
System Failed Cloee
1. Senalng Element Shorted
2. Sensing Element Open
3. Transducers Out of
Calibration
4. Filters Clogged
1. Coll Current
2. Chamber Pressure
3. PB2
4 ДР Across Filter
5. Gas Analyser
6. Coll Current
7. Voltage Across Coll
8. Thrueter Tempereture
9. Inspect System
Physically for
a) Leaks (Detector)
b) Thrueter Condi-
tion
c) Tank Ruptures
L. Feedline Temperature
2. Feedline Pressure
3. Heater Coll Current
4. Thermoatat "On-Off"
Indication
5. Electrical Input to
Heater
1. E, Voltage
2. I, Current
5. ДР Across Filters
1. Is Current On or Off
Continuously?
2. Is PM Low?
™2
3. Is ДР Across Filter
Approaching 801 of
Maximum Contamination?
4. Is Pressurant Ingested
with Propellent?
S Is Current On or Off
Continuously?
6. Is Voltsge On or Off
Continuously?
7. la Thrueter Tempera-
ture Within Llmlta?
1. Is Feedline Tempera-
ture within Limits?
2. la Feedline Pressure
within Limits?
3. Is Heater Current On
or Off Continually?
1 Is E - 0? Implies a
short
2. Is I - 0? Implies an
open circuit
3. Are Instruments within
Calibration Limits?
4. Is Др Across Filters
Approaching 801 of
Maximum Contamination?
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IX. SAFETY GUIDELINES
Adequate safety provisions is one of the most critical param-"
eters in the ability to repair or replace components in a Space
Station propellant system. The following criteria and guidelines
must be considered for safe operation and maintenance of the Space
Station auxiliary propulsion system. This analysis only considers
those items that are peculiar to resupply and repair of the Space
Station Auxiliary propulsion system. It does not denote common
safety criteria that should be considered in the design, build,
and operation of any propulsion system for a manned mission. The
safety guidelines are as follows.
1) The system shall be designed so that no single failure,
other than primary structure, will cause a fatality
to personnel.
2) ' No single failure shall cause an abort of the mission.
3) Equipment that is critical to system performance shall
have redundancy to prevent a single mode of failure.
4) High-pressure vessels, volatile gas, or propellant
tanks shall be located outside of and as remotely as
possible to crew living and operating areas.
5) High-pressure vessels and propellant tanks shall be
located within a compartment, normally at a lower
pressure than the Space Station. The compartment must
be capable of being pressurized for maintenance activ-
ities.
6) The propellant and high-pressure gas compartment shall
relieve or vent to atmosphere, in the event of an over-
pressure within the compartment.
7) Provisions shall be made to preclude the leakage of
propellant vapors into the Space Station.
8) The NTO and MMH propellant storage compartments shall
be either separated or shall have a leaktight pressure
barrier between the two.
9) Astronaut EVA shall be minimized and in general used
for emergency conditions only.
10) The astronauts shall wear protective clothing when
opening or performing maintenance on a propellant
system. The clothing shall be propellant compatible.
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11) Equipment, fittings, and connections shall be designed
so that the fuel and oxidizer equipment, parts, fit-
tings, and connections cannot be interchanged or con-
nected.
12) Propellant removal equipment shall provide a positive
indication of safe toxic levels before component re-
moval from the system.
13) The propellant storage compartment shall have indica-
tors to provide the astronaut an assessment of toxicity
and pressure levels within the compartment.
14) Provisions shall be made in the design of the compart-
ment to contain, isolate, and control major propellant
spills.
15) All materials located within the propellant storage com-
partment shall be compatible with the propellant stored.
16) The propellant compartment shall have provisions for a
flow of air through the compartment when maintenance
is being performed on the system. The flow shall be
from the compartment to the exterior of the spacecraft.
17) Individual emergency self-contained oxygen supplies
shall be located in close proximity to the propellant
system. They shall be designed so that they may be
connected to the central oxygen distribution system.
18) Instrumentation shall be provided to indicate NTO and
MMH toxicity levels on the Space Station level where
the propulsion system is located.
19) Interlocks, automatic valves, or other means of isola-
tion shall be provided in the Space Station atmosphere
distribution system to prevent the distribution of
toxic vapors throughout the Space Station in the event
of a major spill.
20) All systems shall be leak checked after maintenance
repairs have been performed, and before system acti-
vation.
21) High-pressure gaseous storage containers shall be
vented before transport back to earth.
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22) Propellant tanks and equipment shall be decontaminated
to MAC levels before transport to earth. If this pro-
cedure is not compatible, the tanks or components shall
be drained and purged of the bulk liquid and trans-
ported in sealed reinforced containers.
23) Reinforced protection shall be provided for tanks that
are either pressurized or contain toxic fluids, and are
being transported into or around the Space Station.
24) All ,EVA shall be conducted using the "buddy" system,
or, alternatively, within visual range of an astronaut
inside the Space Station ready to exit.
25) A_ secondary logistic resupply connection and transfer
system shall be provided in the event of a docking
mechanism failure.
26) In general, subsystems should be designed for fail-safe
operation.
27) Inadvertent activation of critical systems shall be
inhibited by design of systems and protective devices.
28) Design and procedures shall ensure that all electrical
and propellant systems are inhibited before maintenance
or removal of a propulsion engine.
29) The propellant compartment overpressure vent shall be
separate from vents used to depressurize or vent liq-
uids to space. Common vents may freeze and prevent
overpressure vent.
30) Emergency lighting shall be provided in all compart-
ments independent of the prime power systems.
.31) A -communication_system_is ^ required which will support
communications between crewmen and with the primary
Space Station communication center.
32) All doors or hatches shall be fitted with release
mechanisms operable from both sides. Appropriate
indicators of conditions in adjacent compartments
shall be displayed near the doors or hatches.
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33) Fire suppressant techniques such as fire extinguishers
or automatic isolation and decompression of separate
compartments shall be employed.
34) Pressure walls should be accessible for inspection and
repair purposes.
35) Any electrical equipment that is maintained by the
crewmen shall be designed to be electrically isolated
by interlocking switches or the equivalent before
physical access to exposed connections and compartments.
36) Suitable crew and equipment restraints shall be fur-
nished to allow crewmen to exert necessary forces to
perform routine or maintenance work without personal
injury or equipment damage.
37) Intra- and extravehicular environment shall be free
of rough edges, projections, or sharp corners that
could snag a space suit or cause physical injury.
38) Intra- and extravehiclar equipment shall be designed
'to allow the astronaut ready access to items to be
serviced or maintained.
39) No extravehicular tasks shall require the astronaut to
enter an area or enclosed volume within which he cannot
rotate freely in a fully extended position.
40) Sensors shall be installed in sensitive or danger areas
to provide fire warnings and to initiate automatic
fire suppressant systems.
41) C02 sensors and automatic fan cutoff controls (to re-
duce propagation of fire) will be installed.
42) Tools and equipment must be restrained at all times
when not in use to prevent interference with operating
systems during zero g.
43) Tools and equipment should be made of nonsparking
materials if possible or protected in such a manner to
prevent an ignition source.
44) Materials, grounding techniques, and operational
procedures should be such as to minimize a static
charge buildup.
I, ,... frl , I '
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45) Propellant fill and purge ports or disconnects shall be
designed to ensure that no propellant spills will occur
in the event of a single failure (i.e., poppet stuck
open) upon disconnect.
46) All vents to the exterior of the spacecraft shall be
designed with zero-thrust nozzles.
47) When a propulsion engine is being removed or maintained,
both the fuel and oxidizer systems must be purged and
decontaminated before disconnecting or removing any
of the propellant connections or components.
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X. FUTURE TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENTS
One of the requirements of this study was to identify those
areas of technology that require additional study to develop the
required technology base for inflight maintenance and resupply.
The primary functions required for resupply and repair of the
system can be accomplished, in most cases, by the use of modifica-
tions to currently available components and systems. The feasibil-
ity of more advanced concepts and systems, which are recommended
in the study, has been demonstrated either by the study itself or
by referenced programs. There are, however, several areas of
specific technology that require resolution so that the technology
development will be consistent with the Space Station and shuttle
requirements.
Thirteen specific areas of technology are discussed in this
chapter. Each description contains a statement of the problem»
the technology requirements, and possible avenues of attack that
may provide a solution to the problem.
A. FLUID REMOVAL AND DECONTAMINATION
One requirement that is common to the maintenance of all fluid
systems is that the fluid must be removed from the system before
any repair or removal functions can be accomplished. The Space
Station will contain several fluid systems in the propulsion, en-
vironmental control, waste management, potable water, thermal con-
trol, and hydraulic systems.'
Fluid removal from a potable water system is not critical and
can be accomplished by several methods. However, one of the most
critical technologies for inflight maintenance is the complete
removal and decontamination of toxic fluids before component re-
placement or repair. As little as 3 ml of propellent will raise
the toxicity level of the Space Station to the emergency tolerance
level. Similar problems exist in thermal control systems because
of the toxic fluids used there.
Fluids can be removed from the system by purging, inverse pump-
ing; or in the case of nontoxic fluids, by the vacuum cleaner
technique. These methods will remove the bulk of the fluid and
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probably will suffice for nontoxic fluids. Complete removal and
decontamination of residual fluids pose a greater problem, par-
ticularly in a zero-g environment where weight penalties and fluid
conservation are prime considerations. One of the most effective
'methods of decontamination is to vaporize the fluid by a vacuum
technique.
This technology is required for both the Space Station and the
shuttle programs. Fluid removal is required for all of the Space
Station systems before any maintenance activities. In addition,
all failed components coming from a toxic system must be thorough-
ly decontaminated before they are transported back to earth. After
"the shuttle has docked, and resupply of propellants has been
accomplished, the transfer systems must be purged before disconnect
and return to earth. ,
It is recommended that a study be conducted to determine the
best methods and techniques of fluid removal and decontamination
in a typical spacecraft fluid system., In addition to the study
and analysis of fluid removal techniques, development hardware
should be conducted to prove the concept.
В. WASTE FLUID DISPOSAL
Contamination of the Space Station heat transfer surfaces,
optics, experiments, and solar arrays, is a serious problem; yet
unsolved. Present Space Station ground rules concerning waste
disposal are that no commodities shall be dumped from the Space
Station that will contaminate the Space Station or the .atmosphere
surrounding the Space Station. If disposal of water fluids from
the Space Station is prohibited, then different methods must be
devised for safe and efficient disposal.
This requirement will be especially demanding for a(hypergolic
propellant due to the toxicity and corrosive nature of the pro-
pellants and,their vapors. To perform inflight repair, components
and/or segments of plumbing must be separated from the total sub-
system hardware, thus requiring removal of fluid from the system.
For example, failure of a propellant storage tank may require re-
moval, as well as storage or disposal, of large quantities of
propellant. Resupply of propellants also requires removal of
propellants from the manual disconnects before their disengagement.
This requirement for inflight disposal of propellants, under
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emergency as well as routine conditions, represents a major area
of new technology required for the resupply and repair of a Space
Station propulsion system.
Special waste tanks transferred up on the shuttle will increase
the payload cost per pound and will decrease the shuttle volume
required for essential payloads. Although this method is simple,
it is not very efficient. In addition to evaluating the classic
methods of waste disposal, consideration should be given to con-
verting waste propellant to a usable product. Waste propellant
could be used in a simple secondary propulsion system and thus
could provide usable propulsion energy for the Space Station. It
would also be possible to reclaim certain forms of contaminated
propellant and reuse them in the main propulsion system. Propel-
lants could also be used for auxiliary heating or cooling, or
converted back to their basic elements for use in the Space Station.
In addition to disposal or useful conversion of waste propel-
lants, means must be devised to control vapors venting from the
Space Station and also emergency spills before disposal. Freeze-
out techniques (cold traps) is one method that could be used to
control emergency venting of vapors from the spacecraft.
It is recommended that a study be conducted to conceive and
evaluate various methods of waste propellant control, disposal,
or conservation within the Space Station systems.
С. FLUID FITTINGS DESIGN AND TEST
Today's technology for separable fluid connectors is directed
toward ultratight sealing characteristics at extreme temperatures
and pressures. Fluid fittings designed for inflight maintenance
require' a different set of criteria. They must seal after repeated
assemblies and disassemblies, the threads must not gall, the seal
_must_be_reparable,_require^ simple tools for assembly, and must
provide reasonable sealing characteristics. A design and test
program should be initiated to provide fittings that will meet
these criteria for inflight maintenance.
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D. TUBE REPAIR TECHNIQUES
Present methods of welding and brazing to connect tubing to
components and fittings have several deficiencies when consider-
ing repair in a zero-g environment. New methods and tools are
required to remove and replace fittings and to repair tubing.
The method and the tools must be adaptable to both partial and __
zero gravity, must be simple, provide control of contamination,
be compatible, and require minimum crew training.
Swaging fittings,onto the tube appears to be a simple and
effective method of joining the fitting to the tube. It may be
feasible to use redundant joining methods such as the swaging
process and an epoxy seal. Replacement fittings with longer shanks
than the original fittings could be swaged onto the tube and would
allow for the delta length that occurred because of the tube cutting
operation.
The ability to cut or remove a section of tubing, without con-
taminating the system or requiring a cleaning operation, is a basic
technology that has not been solved. This technology is required
regardless of the tube joining method.
It is recommended that various tube repair concepts be evalu-
ated and that tools be developed to demonstrate the best tube re-
pair methods.
E. LEAK PREVENTION AND REPAIR
Spacecraft fluid systems are normally designed and qualified
to leakage criteria that will neither cause harm to personnel or
equipment, nor deplete the commodity supply for the intended mis-
sion. For long missions it is anticipated that external leaks
will occur due to microscopic leakage through porous materials or
due to relaxation of seals. In the case of toxic propellants,
leakage into the pressurized spacecraft is critical.
In addition to the safety aspects of propellant leakage, it
would be highly desirable to be able to stop small external leaks
without resorting to all of the purge and decontamination opera-
tions that are required to remove a component from a 'propellant
system. For such bulky items as propellant tanks, it may be
necessary to repair the leak in place. Therefore, methods should
be developed to prevent microscopic leakage and to repair leaks
that may occur.
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A leak prevention technique that may be applicable is to add
a substance to the fluid that will seal microscopic holes when
it comes in contact with the surrounding environment. This con-
cept is similar to that used in certain popular commercial anti-
freezes .
Some leak repair considerations, other than welding are:
liquid plastic that sets with heat or in contact with the environ-
ment, epoxy resin sealers, and sealing tapes or other sealing
methods that will adapt to odd shapes as well as more conventional
shapes.
F. INFLIGHT MAINTENANCE EXPERIMENT
An inflight maintenance experiment is required to provide
further definition and development of Space Station operational
and technology concepts, system designs, and crew performance
evaluation.
None of the space flights to date have included any definitive
experiments on inflight maintenance, nor has any extensive main-
tenance been required for the operating systems. Experiment M-508
is scheduled for Skylab I and is designed to acquire basic human
factors data in a zero-g environment.
A logical extension of experiment M-508 would be to assemble
an experiment consisting of actual hardware, representative of the
equipment that will be required on the Space Station, to evaluate
man's capability to repair hardware in a zero-g environment. The
secondary objective would be to evaluate hardware design, prove
technology concepts, and evaluate the tools necessary for inflight
maintenance.
The experiment should not be one-dimensional in scope or based
~on~6He "technology.Such—an-experiment-should- include-equipment— or-
required IFM technology from the basic subsystems on the Space
Station such as propulsion, environmental control, electronics,
communications, and structures.
For example, a task involving a series of propulsion components
could evaluate fault isolation, fluid removal technology, fastner
design, equipment access requirements, tool design, quick release
devices, component vs piece part assembly, time-to-repair, and
Х-
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subsystem checkout after repair. All of these tasks would involve
an evaluation of man's ability to successfully perform maintenance
functions in zero-g.
The experiment should be included in the Skylab II flight to
benefit the Space Station objectives. The flight experiment should
be preceded by a definition phase, prototype hardware, a ground
test evaluation phase, and ground simulation. This phase sequence
is designed to gain the maximum amount of knowledge on IFM and
design, and to maximize the information gained from the experiment.
G. SYSTEM INTEGRATION FOR INFLIGHT MAINTENANCE
It has become apparent in this study that a central organiza-
tion or integrator is required to effectively coordinate inflight
maintenance for the multitude of systems and associated contractors
that will become a part of the Space Station. This central organ-
ization should have the authority to move across subsystem inter-
faces, systems, and different contractor organizations to effectively
establish a uniform plan to optimize inflight maintenance.
Some of the tasks that require a central coordination group are
the establishment of a uniform design criteria, equipment common-
ality, uniform spares requirements, a common logistics plan,
standardization of crew repair procedures and tools, coordinate
fault isolation, and to establish standard design of equipment so
as to optimize inflight maintenance.
System integration for inflight maintenance cannot be considered
as a technology development item, but is listed here as a firm rec-
ommendation because it is so necessary for the efficient coordina-
tion of an inflight maintenance program.
H. COMPONENT DESIGN FOR MAINTAINABILITY
To date, space flight hardware has been designed.with only two
main criteria: optimum performance and lightweight design. None
of -the components to date have been designed for inflight mainte-
nance, which is a basic-requirement on the Space .Station. The
reliability required by a long-term space mission cannot be achievici
unless the capability exists to replace or repair components.
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One method to reduce spares and piece parts is to have common
components for like functions. That is, to design components that
function for several systems rather than a particular system.
Another consideration is to -use a common valve body for several
functions, such as, shutoff valve, regulator, check valve, etc.
This approach would standardize the valve body, which has the
largest area and weight of a valve assemblyj thus a considerable
savings could be realized in reduced spares.
Components designed into a single compact module would reduce
weight, leakage paths, and allow the replacement of either a
single component or the entire module. A design program similar
to the modular concept was initiated by the Navy. Although the
requirements were not exactly the same, they did establish that
components' could be efficiently combined into a subsystem module.
It is recommended that a design activity be initiated to design
representative components for inflight maintenance.
I. SHUTTLE RESUPPLY SYSTEM REFURBISHMENT
The capability for rapid and economic refurbishment of the
logiscics vehicle will be essential if a low cost logistics
system is to be achieved. This factor is expected to be of
major importance in the Space Station program, since to a great
extent the program itself will be contingent on a low cost
logistics capability. Refurbishment of the resupply ^system for
the APS therefore becomes a major design consideration, and
component design must consider economical refurbishment ,as a
major design criteria. Most of the components employed in the
resupply systems are of a conventional design and have been,
applied previously to the transfer of hypergolic propellants.-
Application to the resupply function, however, will require
_.that_many of these components be modified to allow economical
inspection, decontamination,- and refurbishment.
Development of a lightweight metallic expulsion device that
is also replaceable and economically expendable should be in-
vestigated. Such a device may be an attractive alternative to
the metallic bellows, which is undesirably heavy, and to the
capillary devices or nonmetallic bladders that are expected to
be expensive to inspect, decontaminate, and refurbish.
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As a part of the shuttle recycle, it will be necessary to
rapidly isolate failures and to repair subsystems. The evalua-
tion should also consider the tradeoffs of in-place decontamina-
tion, refurbishment, and repair, as opposed to complete subsys-
tem removal and refurbishment at another facility.
J. FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION
Long-term missions require some form of fault detection to
predict failures, alert the crew, and isolate the failure.
Present concepts of fault detection involve sensors that send an
electrical signal to a centralized computer system that predicts
trends, isolates the anomaly, and alerts the crew. However,»this
method of detection does involve some complexity, and is subject
to a certain unreliability within itself. Some types of failures
are very difficult to predict, require substantial equipment,
and demand a significant amount of computer logic to isolate the
failure.
More direct methods of fault detection would ease the load
on the OCS and would possibly improve the total reliability of
the system. Some failures, such as structural failures, cannot
be detected by conventional sensors.
Direct methods of fault detection, that also involve the
astronaut, are visual indications (color changes, position of
devices or indicators, etc.) noise (change in noise level,
irregular sounds, leakage flow), smell (propellant leakage, etc),
and touch.' •
Certain methods of detection already exist, such as ДР pop-up
button indicators on filters; and color changes to litmus paper as
a result of moisture. Other possible means of detection that may
be feasible would be a color change in a chemical, painted on a
fluid fitting, as a result of a propellant leak;-or stress-coat-
ings to detect structural failures. An individual can also detect
propellant vapors at lower ppm's than at the MAC level.
Another method for reducing maintenance time, independent
from the technique of anticipatory maintenance, is.that of
built-in test equipment (BITE). The failure of many of the
vehicle components will require their immediate repair; however,
troubleshooting techniques are often time consuming. The BITE
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concept would provide a means of sensing faults and providing
indication of the condition of the equipment being monitored,
either in the vicinity of the failure or at a single monitoring
point, as appropriate. This could reduce the need for certain
auxiliary external test equipment to perform continuous checkout
of the system performance during the mission.
It is recommended that a study be conducted to conceive
and evaluate direct methods of detecting failures. The study
should also trade off the BITE concept as opposed to the use of
external test equipment.
К. LONG LIFE TEST PROGRAM
Accelerated testing is not an accepted method of demonstrat-
ing the life and reliability of a component used in a long-dura-
tion mission. Qualification data cannot be obtained when the real
time available for testing is less than the mission duration. It
is a fact that the majority of the components that will be used on
the Space Station have not demonstrated the long life reliability
that will be required for the ten-year mission. It is recommended
that long-life demonstration tests commence as soon as possible on
basic components and materials so that long-life reliability data
can be gained prior to the Space Station mission. This test pro-
gram would also serve to correct basic design deficiencies that
only show up in an extended duration type test.
L. FLEX HOSE DEVELOPMENT
Fluid systems on the Space Station will require flexible hoses
that-are-leaktight
 >
_comRa.tible_1 standardjlzed, and contain a high
degree of reliability for long-duration missions. Teflon lined
hoses with steel braid have a high leakage rate and are permeable
to propellant vapors. Convoluted metal hoses have low leakage
rates, but are constructed of a formed metal process or are welded,
both of which are generally problem areas when a long-life duration
is expected. They are also difficult to clean and have a'high
pressure drop.
It is recommended that a program be initiated to develop fluid
system flex hoses that will meet the requirements of the Space
Station.
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APPENDIX A
ORBITAL RESUPPLY CONCEPTS
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Prolonged operation of an earth-orbital Space Station will re-
quire inflight resupply of consumables to the Auxiliary Propulsion
System (APS) . During this study the W&CS (Workshop Attitude Cotv-
trol System) served as the baseline APS for the investigation of
potential resupply techniques.
The WACS_, which_is schematically illustrated in Fig. A-l, is
a conventional low thrust hypergolic bipropellant propulsion sys-
tem. It consists of two propulsion modules, each of.which is
composed of a pressurization subsystem, a propellant storage and
transfer subsystem, and an engine module that contains six 22-lb
nominal thrust engines. The pressurization subsystem uses nitro-
gen gas as the pressurant, which is stored at high pressure (3200
psia) in two 12-in. diameter spheres and regulated to propellant
tank operating pressures (219 psia). There are four (2840 cu in.)
propellant storage tanks per propulsion module. Two of these
tanks store fuel [monomethylhydrazine (MMH)] and the other two
oxidizer [nitrogen tetroxide (NTO)]. All of the propellant tanks
employ metal bellows for positive expulsion of the propellant under
zero- or random-gravity conditions.
A. SUMMARY
The number of fluid handling techniques that can be used for
resupply of consumables (pressurant, fuel, and oxidizer) to a
system such as the baseline APS is quite large. Many however,
-must be-rejected because-of their--development status-or because __.
they are inherently unsuited for transfer of the relatively small
quantities of consumables required for each resupply cycle.*
*Early study ground rules (Ref A-l), established a propellant
requirement of approximately 860 Ib/year. Later studies (Ref A-2)
predict a propellant requirement for the Space Station APS of no
-more- than—1000-lb/yeary-excluding-spin/despin-requi-rements.—Al-—
though these requirements correspond closely to the total impulse
capability of the baseline APS, it was decided to resupply one
propulsion module every six months rather than the entire system
once each year, because of reliability and inflight maintenance
considerations. Also a basic resupply interval of 180 days, ex-
cluding crew rotation, has been recommended as optimum by Ref-
erence A-2.
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1. Propellent Resupply
Three fundamental approaches to the resupply of propellants
were considered: fluid transfer, module replacement of the pro-
pellant storage tanks, and integrated consumable resupply systems.
Modular replacement was rejected primarily because of the ex-
tensive commitment of crew members and cargo transfer capability
that would be required by the excessive transfer times anticipated
for this approach.
Integrated resupply concepts, such as replacement of the pro-
pulsion modules, or continuous supply from a docked logistics ve-
hicle or attached consumables module, were found to be very attrac-
tive from strictly a resupply and maintenance point of view.
Problems may be encountered, however, with respect to program and
vehicle integration. Since these factors affect major program
elements such as Space Station and logistics vehicle configuration,
their proper consideration requires evaluation at the program
definition level. An evaluation of integrated resupply system
appears in Fig. A-2.
If propellant is to be resupplied by transfer through fluid
distribution lines, three major requirements must be met. Pro-
vision must be made for a ullage control mechanism, an energy
source for fluid transfer, and a means of coupling the Space
Station and logistics vehicle transfer lines.
Separation of gas and liquid, i.e., ullage control, can be
accomplished by positioning the propellant mass or by~~separatioif
with a physical barrier — positive expulsion. ~
Among the propellant positioning techniques, surface tension
devices represent the only technique considered suitable for re-
supply of Space Station propellants. Settling by means of rota-
tional or translational acceleration is expected to impose un-
acceptable constraints on the operation of Space Station/logistics
vehicle systems during the resupply operations. Unacceptable
propellant quantities would'also be required to provide effective
propellant settling by this mechanism alone. More advanced sys-
tems such as dielectrophoresis, acoustic pumps, and spray impinge-
ment techniques are judged unsuitable for the relatively small
propellant quantities involved, particularly when considering
their early development status.
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Evaluation of positive expulsion techniques indicates that
several devices are suitable for application to resupply of the
Space Station propellants. These include nonmetallic bladders
and diaphragms, metal bellows, and several versions of metallic
diaphragms and bladders. Selection of the most appropriate of
these devices depends on the relative importance placed on system
weight, development status, growth potential, and cost. All of
the above concepts are considered feasible at this time for the
application being considered.
Use of pumps, ullage control forces, and various pressunza-
tion techniques were evaluated as potential energy sources for
propellant transfer. Ullage control forces were rejected as in- '
sufficient for the application. The power requirements, weight,
and system complexity associated with pumping systems are not
considered justified by the relatively low flow rates and back
pressures required for the propellant resupply function.*
Several lightweight, simple, state-of-the-art pressurization
systems were found to be adaptable to the propellant resupply
function. These include the use of residual pressurant from the
pressurant resupply operation, a separate high-pressure source,
a conventional blowdown pressurization system, and a modified
blowdown system using residual ullage from the expended propel-
lant storage tanks.
Selection of a specific design for transfer line coupling
will depend to a large extent on definition of the vehicle con-
figurations and the docking_ mechanism. Therefore, this aspect
of the resupply function was not investigated in depth. However,
no major development or operational problems are anticipated.
A summary of the propellant resupply subsystem evaluations
appears in Fig. A-3.
*Transfer of 860 Ib of propellant within -a maximum time period
of one-half hour was assumed as a baseline criteria for evaluating
the various propellant resupply techniques. Further reduction in
actual transfer time seems to be of little advantage when it is
recognized that preparation and checkout time are also essential
but time consuming requirements in the overall resupply operation.
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Resupply
Technique
Major Subsystem
Design Option
1) Surface Tension
2) Spray Impingement
3) Artificial Gravity
a) Translation
b) Rotation
4) Acoustic Forces
5) Dielectrophoresis
1) Nonmetal Bladder/Diaphragm
2) Pistons
3) Metal Bellows
4) Metal Bladder/Diaphragm
IPressurization)
1} Residual Pressurant
2) Stored Gas
3) Slowdown
4) PSA Ullage
5) Miscellaneous
I Puraosl
(Ullage Control
I Forces
[Transfer Line
I Coupling
[Proximity
[Rendezvous
Major Advantage
Satisfactory
Major Disadvantage
Unacceptable
Figure A-3 Summary of Subsystem Evaluations for APS Propellant Resupply
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2. Pressurant Resupply
A number of techniques for resupplying pressurant for the
baseline APS were evaluated. In addition several modifications
to the baseline APS were considered as potential means of reducing
the overall resupply requirement.
a. Baseline APS - For application to the baseline APS both a
simple blowdown system and modular replacement of the gas storage
spheres are considered feasible. The primary disadvantage asso-
ciated with modular replacement is its early development status,
whereas the major disadvantage of the blowdown system is the weight
penalty (approximately 50 lb/resupply cycle) resulting from large
pressurant residuals left aboard the logistics craft.
Several other more sophisticated systems were evaluated
to reduce or eliminate the weight penalty resulting from residual
pressurant. These systems included cryogenic storage of the pres-
surant, addition of energy to the residuals by means of a com-
pressor or heat exchanger, and recompression of the propellant
tank ullage. It was concluded, however, that the added system
complexity, power requirements, and integration problems were not
warranted for the relatively small pressurant quantities involved.
b. Modified APS - Several modifications to the baseline pro-
pulsion system were also investigated to determine whether they
would materially reduce the resupply requirements. Of these tech-
niques, systems such as cryogenic pressurants, evaporated propel-
lants, and chemical reaction systems were rejected for a variety
of" reasons "including unwarranted complexity, excessive~weight,~
possible propellant contamination, limited development experience,
and potential safety hazards. Several other systems were found
to be potentially applicable to the Space Station APS, however.
Volatile liquid systems afford an attractive potential
in that resupply of pressurant can be entirely avoided, barring
malfunction or damage to the tankage. However, the possibility
for development and operational problems should be recognized
because of the early development'statusT sensitTvity" to"certairi
duty cycles, and thermal conditioning required for these systems.
Use of a conventional blowdown pressurization system for
the Space Station APS represents another means of eliminating
the pressurant resupply requirement. This is accomplished by
allowing recompression rather than venting of the ullage during
propellant resupply. Disadvantages result from the lack of
A
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experience with regard' tio-bipropellant applications. Some diffi-
culty may be encountered in assuring proper engine inlet condi-
tions, particularly during the pulsing mode of operation. However,
development of such a system seems entirely feasible.
Integrated APS/ECLSS nitrogen supply systems were also
evaluated. Although the total nitrogen requirement for the ECLSS
is expected to be«an order of magnitude greater than that required
by the APS, the propulsion system will likely impose the maximum
demand rate. This factor may greatly increase power requirements
or compromise ECLSS design and/or operation. Since these effects
are highly sensitive to duty cycle, detailed evaluation of this
approach requires further definition of both the ECLSS and APS
operating duty cycles.
A summary of the pressurant resupply subsystem evaluations
appears in Fig. A-4.
В. PROPELLANT RESUPPLY DISCUSSION
Three fundamental approaches to the resupply of propellants
were evaluated. These are fluid transfer, modular replacement of
the propellant storage tanks, and integrated consumables resupply
systems.
1. Fluid, Transfer
' "A large number of techniques and design options are available
for transferring propellants from the logistics resupply vehicle
to the Space Station through fluid distribution lines. Differ-
ences in the various concepts are primarily related to methods
of providing ullage control, energy for the fluid transfer process,
and coupling of the distribution lines between the logistics ve-
hicle and the Space Station. Various methods for satisfying
these three major design requirements are evaluated below as to
their feasibility for application to the Space Station resupply
function.
MCR-70-150
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Resupply
Concept
Resupply
of
Baseline
System
n
-
L
Fluid
Transfer
Modular
Replace-
ment of
GSAs
Recom-
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Ullage
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Modified
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Fig A-4 Summary of Subsystem Evaluation for APS Pressurent Resupply
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a. Ullage Control Methods - Regardless of the selected trans-
fer mechanism, ullage control will be necessary for separation of
the gas and liquid within the propellant transfer tanks of the
logistics vehicle. This is required to prevent ingestion and en-
trapment of noncondensable gas (pressurant) in the Space Station
receiver tanks. To satisfy this requirement, ullage control can
be accomplished by either of two general approaches: positioning
of the liquid mass, and separation of the gas and liquid by means
of a physical barrier. The latter approach is often referred to
as positive expulsion. A comprehensive survey of these techniques
appears in Ref A-3 and A-4.
1) Propellant Positioning - During propellant transfer,
gas and liquid can be separated by applying various generated or
naturally occurring forces. Since transfer will occur in a nearly
zero-gravity environment, the forces required for positioning the
propellants may be quite small. Potential techniques are surface
tension devices, spray impingement, artificial gravity, acoustic ,
forces, and dielectrophoresis.
a) Surface- Tension - In a low-gravity environment,
interfacial_ surface tension forces can be used to orient the
liquid and maintain gas-liquid separation. Several design ap-
proaches are schematically illustrated in Fig. A-5.
The feasibility of using surface-tension devices
for propellant management is well established. The necessary
technology for design and fabrication of such devices is currently
available, having been applied successfully on such systems as
the Apollo Service Module and Titan Transtage primary propulsion
systems. Nevertheless, for systems employing more advanced mate-
rials such as woven cloth screens, a moderate development effort
in the areas of fabrication, inspection, refurbishment, and quality
control should be anticipated. However, the development risk in-
volved is expected to be minimal.
Several performance characteristics of surface-
tension devices make them well suited to the resupply function.
These include excellent expuls.ion and volumetric efficiencies
(particularly for large tank sizes), a virtually infinite recycle
capability, and adaptability to any tank size or shape. These
factors will promote flexibility in cargo placement and help facil-
itate design of the logistics craft. Vehicle integration would
also be simplified by the independent nature of these devices
which require no external forces or energy sources for operation
or control. Their exceptional recycle capability reasonably ad-
vanced development status, and relatively simple construction are
the major advantages of these devices for resupply of the Space
Station propellants.
MCR-70-150 A-ll
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Fig. A-5 Surface Tension Devices for Ullage Control
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Performance limitations for these devices do exist,
however. These limitations are associated with extremely high
expulsion rates, high disturbance forces during outflow, and ab-
sorption of pressurant by the propellants. The first two factors
are not relevant to the Space Station application because the need
for extremely high transfer rates does not exist, and the maximum
screen destabilizing loads will occur during the boost phase and
docking maneuvers when ullage volumes are minimum. The third
factor, however, may constrain the selection of engines and/or
pressurant, because under certain operating environments such as
rapid thermal cycling or pressure drop in the lines, dissolved
pressurant may come out of solution and damage components or de-
grade performance of the engines. Because the tank ullage will
contain propellant vapors, the use of surface tension devices will
also prevent venting of the tanks without exposing the logistics
craft or Space Station exterior to contaminating and corrosive
vapors. This factor may be significant if the propellant transfer
tanks are also used as receivers for waste propellant from the
Space Station. Cleaning and refurbishment of these devices is
also expected to be difficult.
Two characteristics of surface tension devices
are expected to facilitate a minimum weight design. For tank
volumes in excess of 2000 to 3000 in.3 the weight of the expulsion
device and of the residual propellants becomes a small percentage
of the overall tankage and fluid distribution system weight. The
option of choosing unlimited tank sizes and shapes allows selection
of a minimum number of tanks based on packaging considerations
only. This in turn can reduce the tankage and interconnecting
hardware weights considerably, depending of course on the total
propellant quantities involved.
.Considering the lack of any requirement for ex-
ternal power, moving parts, special materials or coatings, seals
or other deformable components, the reliability of surface tension
devices is potentially excellent.
b) Artificial Gravity - Induced vehicle acceleration
represents another method of providing a positioning force for
location of the propellant mass. 'Acceleration can be either trans-
lational, Fig. A-6(a), resulting from continuous axial thrust, or
rotational, Fig. A-6(b), resulting from spinup of the connected
logistics vehicle and Space Station.
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(a) Translational
Settling
(b) Rotational
Settling
Fig. A-6 Settling Modes
Translational Settling - As illustrated in Fig.
A-6(a), the application of axial thrust represents a straight-
forward, well-developed approach for propellant location control.
This method has been used extensively in the past to reposition
propellents after coast and to maintain propellant location before
engine ignition. However, the requirement for continuous thrust
during the propellant transfer process represents a serious handi-
cap for the Space Station resupply application. Assuming a com-
bined weight on the order of a half million pounds for the coupled
Space Station and logistics vehicle, and a required Bond number
of at least 10 to assure adequate propellant positioning, a mini-
mum thrust level of approximately 50 lb, would be required for
ullage control. Therefore, when considered as an ullage control
mechanism only, propellant consumption makes such a system unat-1
tractive from a weight standpoint unless propellant transfer times
can be reduced to a few minutes. At flow rates corresponding to
these transfer times, additional hardware such~as "internal tank
baffles or capillary screens will probably also be required to
minimize propellant residuals resulting from propellant slosh and
surface dip which are quite pronounced at these extremely low g
levels (Ref A-4). Similar devices may also be necessary to pre-
vent entrapment of gases in the transfer lines during preflight
and boost operations. Undesirable orbital or attitude perturba-
tions should also be expected unless the resupply maneuver can be
_made_ to ^ coincide with requirements to make up orbital decay. With
respect to absorption of pressurant and the mixing of vapors with
the ullage, these techniques suffer from the same limitations as
do the surface tension devices.
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Rotational Settling - Two major disadvantages of
the translations! settling technique can be avoided by the rota-
tional settling technique illustrated in Fig. A-6(b). These are
the potential orbital disturbances and the excessive propellant
requirements. Propellant quantities on the order of 10 to 20 Ib
should be sufficient to provide an artificial g level of approxi-
mately 10"1*. Since settling forces can be provided almost in-
definitely without requiring additional propellant, such a system
has excellent growth potential. This approach should also mini-
mize program costs since it makes use of existing systems. Other
characteristics, however, are similar to those of the translational
settling technique. Auxiliary hardware may be required to control
surface dip and propellant slosh during operation and to prevent
gas entrapment during boost. Continuous rotation of the Space
Station during resupply may also impose unacceptable constraints
on the operation .of experiments or other Space Station/logistics
vehicle systems. Venting of tanks must also be prevented.
c) Miscellaneous Systems - Dielectrophoretic, spray
impingement, and.acoustic systems are discussed very briefly below.
• Although these approaches may be potentially applicable to large
systems such as cryogenic tankers, they have been eliminated from
further consideration for resupply of the Space Station APS be-
'cause.of their early development status and unwarranted complexity
for relatively small propellant quantities.
Ullage
Power
Source
Transponder-
Propellant-
Fig. A-7 Ullage Control By
Acoustic Forces
phoresis. By using
differences between
accomplished (Ref A
Acoustic Forces - Propellant
location can be accomplished by installing
an acoustic source inside the transfer tank
opposite the outlet, Fig. A-7. Acoustic
forces are then used to exert a directed
force on the liquid mass, resulting in
settling of the propellants at the tank bot-
tom (Ref A-5).
Dielectrophoresis - Ullage
control is also possible using the forces
derived from electric fields and the dielec-
tric properties of the propellant and pres-
surant. This method is known as dielectro-
nonuniform electric fields and the dielectric
liquid and gas, separation of the two can be
-6).
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Injector
-Feedline
Spray Dtffuser-
Screen (Also
Capillary
Containment)
Perforated Baffle Pur(>
Spray Impingement -
Another method that may prove feasible
for controlling liquid position is
shown in Fig. A-8. In its simplest
form, it consists of a spray injector
in the tank-end opposite the outlet,
a diffuser, feedline, and a small
impeller-type pump. The theory of
operation is simply to provide a
driving force by impinging propel-
lant spray on the large propellant
mass, driving it toward the outlet
end of the tank.
2) Positive Expulsion -
In addition to the propellant posi-
tioning techniques identified above,
ullage control can be accomplished
by providing a physical barrier be-
tween the gas and' liquid (Ref A-7) .
These devices have been used exten-
sively for ullage control and repre-
sent a well-established and proven technique for assuring gas-
free liquids at the tank .outlet. This factor as well as their
independent operation, adaptability to a broad range of flow rates,
and insensitivity to the vehicle environment make them prime candi-
dates for satisfying the requirement for ullage control during
propellant transfer. Not withstanding, certain operational limi-
tations are associated with~ "the~ir~use — size~limitations and-re
cycle capability.
Because the entire propellant quantity is enclosed or
separated from the ullage, mechanical design complexity and system
weight increases rapidly with tank size. Although considerable
fabrication and development technology exist for small tank sizes,
little work has been done for large tank applications.-
Fig. A-8 Spray Impingement
System for Ullage Control
Many of the more promising lightweight designs^have
an extremely limited recycle capability. These two factors may
result in unacceptable costs for the large quantities of propel-
lant required during the program.
Although numerous positive expulsion devices are avail-
able for consideration, they can generally be categorized as de-
scribed in the following paragraphs.
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a) Nonmetallic Bladders and Diaphragms - Nonmetallic
bladders consist essentially of an enclosed membrane or bag, as
illustrated in Fig. A-9(a). These devices may be of either the ex-
panding type or of the collapsing type depending on whether pro-
pellant or pressurant is the internal fluid. As illustrated in
Fig. A-9(b), diaphragms are similar to bladders with the exception
that the barrier only partially contains the propellant with ex-
pulsion accomplished by reversing the barrier. Nonmetallic
bladders and diaphragms have, to date, been the generally accepted
method for achieving positive expulsion from small tanks in a
zero- or low-gravity environment. For this application, such de-
vices represent a minimum development risk approach. However,
for service with MMH and NTO, compatibility of the bladder mate-
rial may impose certain problems with respect to APS integration.
\ Ring Baffle•Pressunzation Bladder Outflow
(a)
(b)
Fig. A-9 Nonmetallic Bladder and Diaphragm
The only nonmetallic material successfully demon-
strated for application to this propellant combination is Teflon.
In operation this material is in direct contact with the propel-
lants, where it tends to swell and lose tensile strength, and is
subjected to flexing, creasing, and vibrational loads. These
factors, in conjunction with difficulties associated with cleaning
and inspection, may preclude economical reuse of the devices.
Permeability of the bladder or diaphragm material
allows pressurant gas to migrate into the liquid, and propellant
to permeate into the ullage. Although permeation of the propel-
lants can be expected to result in a negligible loss in usable
propellants, the pressurant lines and components are exposed to
cleaning, compatibility, and isolation requirements that otherwise
would not be necessary. Venting would also result in the contamina-
tion of the vehicle exterior. Pressurant gas that permeates into
the propellant can also severely affect engine performance and, at
worst, cause engine failure. This factor, since it may impose
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constraints on allowable operating conditions and on engine or
pressurant selection, has prompted considerable research and de-
velopment effort in the area of metallic devices.
b) Pistons - As illustrated in Fig. A-10, either
center-guided or peripheral-guided pistons can be used as a means
of mechanically separating the liquid and gas. Pistons have been
used as expulsion devices on several small diameter tactical mis-
sile systems. Their application, however, is limited to cylindri-
cal tankage with smooth inner walls. The major problem with
pistons is obtaining good seals between the piston and tank. This
problem is especially critical for larger diameters. Because ex-
tremely close tolerances and smooth rigid sealing surfaces are
required, the use of pistons will result in development risks and
expulsion system/tankage weights that are unacceptable for the
intended application.
Piston
Length of Guide Section
(a) Center-Guided Piston (b) Peripheral-Guided Piston
Fig. A-10 Piston Separation Techniques
c) Metal^BeHows Metal- bel-lows-may-also-be-used-as—
a means of providing a nonpermeable barrier between the ullage gas
and the propellant. These corrugated devices may be manufactured
by either forming or welding the bellows convolutions. Although
most bellows are designed to operate with the propellant on the
inside as shown in Fig. A-ll, the reverse approach may also be
used. The use of metal bellows offers a well-developed technique
for providing positive expulsion of liquids. Bellows systems
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Pressurization
Outflow
Bellows
Fig. A-11 Metal Bellows
effectively avoid the problems of permeation, propellant compati-
bility, and limited cycle life, factors which are common to the
nonmetallic devices. These characteristics, along with their
applicability to simple, point sensor gaging techniques, and inde-
pendence from external control or energy sources, will minimize
integration problems with the logistics vehicle as well as the
Space Station APS. Long life potential, simple checkout require-
ments , and ease of gaging may make these devices economically
attractive for the logistics vehicle transfer tanks.
The major disadvantages associated with bellows
are their high cost, weight, and lack of fabrication and develop-
ment experience for large systems (greater than approximately 1 ft),
Considering development risk and costs, bellows tanks no larger
than 18 to 24 in. in diameter should be anticipated for the re-
supply systems. Tankage weights for such systems can be expected
to be three to four times those of corresponding assemblies using
nonmetallic devices. Because of the many convolutions, cleaning
and inspection of these devices for reuse is also expected to be
difficult.
d) Metallic Diaphragms and Bladders - Several poten-
tially attractive metallic devices are currently being developed
to reduce the weight penalty and costs associated with bellows
designs, while retaining the advantages of their nonpermeability
and materials compatibility. Although in general principle these
devices are similar to the nonmetallic diaphragms and bladders,
structural characteristics of the metallic materials require con-
trol of the barrier motion during operation. Although the de-
velopment of these devices has shown substantial progress in re-
cent years, additional effort will be required before the service-
ability of many of these devices can be fully demonstrated. For
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the resupply function another basic limitation associated with
metallic bladders and devices is their limited cycle life, normally
one complete expulsion cycle. This factor may represent a serious
cost disadvantage unless production expense 'can be reduced to very
low values, allowing the development of expendable devices.
Several of the more attractive devices in this
category are briefly described below.
(1) Convoluted Diaphragms - The convoluted dia-
phragm is a surface of revolution consisting of circular convolu-
tions precisely formed from thin flat stainless steel or aluminum
sheet. It is positioned on a diametrical plane of a spherical
container with one side exposed to the propellant and the other
to the pressurant. The diaphragm deforms in favor of the imposed
pressure differential, expanding to conform to the container walls
during expulsion, thus displacing the consumed propellant with
ullage volume.
Pressurization
Outflow
(2) Ring Reinforced
Reversing Diaphragms - This type of dia-
phragm, Fig. A-12, is supported by addi-
tional structure to permit controlled
deformation of the diaphragm and recycle
capability. A thin metal shell is
stiffened by rings attached to the shell
surface, in planes parallel to a reference
base, usually the diaphragm-container
attach point. During expulsion, the
diaphragm inverts to-a mirror-image-of -
its initial shape at propellant depletion.
The reinforcing rings roll with the shell
in the process straining the diaphragm as
the ring inverts.
(3) Rolling Diaphragms -
A third class of metallic diaphragms used
for positive expulsion is the rolling
"diaphragm^A"rolling-draphragnr configura-
tion usually consists of a thin cylinder,
one-half of the length of the container
being expelled. One end of the cylinder
is attached to the container wall at the
midplane; the other to a movable end
plate. When the ullage space is pres-
surized, the end plate moves towards the tank outlet rolling the
thin cylinder inside itself during expulsion.
Fig. A-12 Ring Reinforced
Reversing Diaphragm
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Pressurization
Outflow
(4) Telescoping Diaphragms - This
approach, which applies to cylindrical tankage, is
similar to the simple rolling diaphragm except that
the diaphragm consists of a thin cylinder that tele-
scopes within itself to form three concentric con-
volutions as illustrated in Fig. A-13. The outer
convolution is attached to the container wall at one
end of the cylindrical tank. During expulsion, rim
rolling at the outer convolution occurs first, fol-
lowed by rim rolling of the inner sections. In the
fully expelled configuration, the diaphragm forms
a stepped cylinder where the diameter decreases with
each of the three steps.
A-13 Rolling
Diaphragm
(5) Transverse Collapsing Metal
Bladder (TCMB) - Another very promising expulsion
device for this application is the TCMB, which con-
sists of a cylindrical type diaphragm that inverts
itself transversely about the transverse diametrical
plane of a cylindrical-type tank when pressurant
gases are applied, to expell propellants. Aerojet-
General has manufactured sizes ranging from 15.2 in.3 to 2800 in.3.
Further scaling up of the design, if required, is not expected to
present any major problems. The devices have been used success-
fully on Aerojet's pulse engine program and for the Nike-Javelin
guidance system.
Although the TCMB is suitable for a single
expulsion cycle only, the most attractive characteristic of this
device to the Space Station resupply function is its relatively
low cost. These devices are expected to cost hundreds rather
than thousands of dollars each as expected for most of the other
devices being considered. Consequently an expendable device can
be considered, thus eliminating a major portion of the refurbish-
ment cost expected for the logistic vehicle transfer tanks, and
potentially reducing the shuttle operating costs and required
turnaround time. TCMBs in the 3000 cu in. range have been de-
signed and built for application to commercial aircraft auxiliary
hydraulic .power systems. Tankage/expulsion assemblies have also
been designed, which incorporate bolted connections for rapid and
efficient disposal of the bladders and refurbishment of the tanks
(Fig. A-14).
M
C
R
-70-150
A
-21
/1
ш
"
г
о
и
с
и
о
с
о
4->ис
и
с
о
сГ
С
1
—
с
о
S
т
э
 
о
с
 t
—
<
и
<
Ц
_J
шS
-
т
а
3•Dt
.
Г
С
14Jt-оCLCL2
С
О
"S1
Л
оC
L
Оt
-
0
-
о
•(->т
а
s
.
3enо
C
J
i
.
ш
•a•aП
З
ч
-
о
о<
о
'о
.
ш
е
е:о
.
/
о
U1О)
ос
о
оJ2
 
-
Г
С
•
О
СO
I
о
.
X
A-22 MCR-70-150
b. Propellent Transfer Forces - In addition to the ullage
control requirement discussed above, transfer of propellant through
fluid distribution lines will require the generation of a motivating
force. Transfer of 860 lb of propellant within a minimum time of
approximately 1/2 hr has been assumed as a baseline requirement
for evaluating the various propellant transfer techniques. Further
reduction in actual transfer times seems to be of little advantage
when it is recognized that preparation and checkout time are also
essential but time-consuming requirements in the overall transfer
operation. Three categories of energy sources were considered for
this function. These are: pressurization, pumps, and use of the
ullage control forces.
1) Pressurization - Propellants can be transferred from
the storage tanks of the logistics vehicle to the Space Station
receiver tanks using gas pressure forces as the primary energy
source. Several techniques are available for providing these
forces, e.g., high-pressure stored gas, blowdown pressurization,
heated liquids, evaporated propellants, and products of chemical
reactions.
a) High-Pressure Stored Gas - In this technique gas-
eous pressurant is stored at high pressure and ambient temperature
(supercritical) in a separate container and is transferred to the
propellant transfer tanks through a flow control device in the
distribution lines. Many variations of this basic approach can
be considered. Figure A-15 illustrates several potential concepts.
Pressurant flow can be regulated using a conventional pneumatic
pressure regulator or a discrete ("bang-bang") system as shown in
Fig. A-15(a) or a nonregulated system can be employed, Fig. A-15(b).
Heat can be added to minimize pressurant requirements and/or mul-
tiple flow levels can be employed to minimize the possibility of
damaging the Space Station receiver tanks when "topping."
Evaluation of stored gas techniques as energy
sources for propellant transfer also depends to a great extent on
pressurant resupply considerations as well as propellant transfer
requirements. If blowdown of high-pressure gas is the selected
means for resupplying pressurant, residuals left onboard the
logistics vehicle will provide more than enough energy to satisfy
propellant transfer demands. As illustrated in Fig. A-16, such a
system represents an extremely simple approach and uses well-devel-
oped techniques and hardware. As such, it should result in minimum
development risk as well as excellent cost, maintainability, and
reliability characteristics. This approach is also attractive from
the standpoint of weight, performance, and growth potential since
it reduces the residual penalty associated with the blowdown method
of pressurant resupply and is capable of rapidly transferring the
required propellant quantities.
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Pressurant
Tank
Isolation
Valve-Ordnance
Pressurent
Tank
Isolation
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, Control Valve
Pressure
Svn tch
Propellent Tank
a. Regulated Systems
Pressurant
Tank
Isolation Valve
-Ordnance
Flow limiter
Orifice
Pressurant
Tank
—Heating Element
Manual Control
Solenoid Valves
. Flow Limiters
~_ _ High and Low Flow
Levels
b. Nonregulated Systems
Fig. A-15 High-Pressure Stored Gas Pressurant Systems
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Logistics Vehicle
Propellantf
Transfer .
Pressurant
Transfer
Tank
Space Station
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•Propel!ant
Receiver
Tank
Pressurant
Receiver
Bottle
Fig. A-16 Residual Pressurant as an Energy Source for
Propellent Transfer
If, on the other hand, modular replacement of the
gas storage tanks is the selected pressurant resupply technique,
an additional source of pressurant must be available for propel-
lant transfer. An obvious approach is to simply provide an inde-
pendent high-pressure storage bottle and pressure control device
for pressurizing the transfer tanks, Fig. A-17. For the baseline
propellant quantities (860 Ib) a weight penalty of less than 20 Ib
is expected when compared to the system just discussed.
Logistics Vehicle
-Pressurant
Storage
Bottle
Space Station
1
1 1
\ ! ' U
 x • Propel 1 antReceiver
Tank
Propel 1 ant
Transfer Tank
Fig. A-17 Separate High-Pressure Source as an Energy
Source for Propel!ant Transfer
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Ъ) Slowdown Pressurization - Another approach is to
provide pressurization by means of a conventional blowdown system
illustrated in Fig. A-18. When compared to the previously dis-
cussed high-pressure systems, this approach has the advantage of
eliminating the requirements for a pressure regulator and for ex-
tremely high storage pressures. Because of its inherent simplicity,
the blowdown system provides maximum reliability and minimum main-
tenance requirements. Development, manufacturing, and operating
costs should also be a minimum. Because of the relatively small
pressurant requirement, development of a system which is competi-
tive , in terms of weight, with the regulated system is also an-
ticipated.
Pressurant
Logistics Vehicle j
I
Space Station
Propel!ant
Recei ver
Tank
Fig. A-18
Propellent
Transfer Tank
Blowdown Pressurization as an Energy Source
for Propellant Transfer
A similar technique is illustrated in Fig. A-19.
This approach is essentially a blowdown system that uses the
residual ullage from the expended propellant tanks as the pres-
surant- source.- Operation of this system involves transferring
the propellants by venting the first tank and allowing ullage
from the second tank to pressurize the propellant transfer tanks
of the logistics vehicle. This sequence is repeated until the
last tank, which can be filled by simple blowdown of the transfer
tanks. This system avoids the necessity of high-pressure gases
and should be easily capable of transferring the required pro-
pellant quantities within 1/2 hr.
Several-pressurant—sources-other— than-stored-gas-
were also considered, e.g., heated liquids, evaporated propellants,
and products of chemical reactions. Although each of these ap-
proaches is discussed in some detail in Ref A-7 and briefly de-
scribed below, they have been eliminated from further consideration
for a variety of reasons such as unwarranted complexity, excessive
weight, possible propellant contamination, limited development ex-
perience, and/or potential safety hazards. Such factors are
especially pronounced when these systems are compared to the sim-
pler pressurization techniques previously discussed and when the
relatively low pressurant requirements are considered.
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Logistics Vehicle Space Station
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Propel!ant
Transfer
Tank
Propellent
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Tank
Fig. A-19 Residual Ullage as an Energy Source for
Propel 1 ant Transfer
c) Heated Liquids - Pressurants can also be stored
in a liquid state under their own vapor pressure, (subcritical)
or under high pressure (supercritical). Using pressurants such
as ammonia and certain Freons, subcritical storage can be accom-
plished at ambient temperature without the requirement for thermal
conditioning. The conventional pressurants (nitrogen and helium)
can be stored as cryogens. Nitrogen or helium can also be used
in a supercritical cryogenic storage system. This system is sim-
ilar to the subcritical storage system except that the pressurant
is loaded as- a cryogenic liquid and the container is sealed so
that as heat is added, the pressure rises to a supercritical level.
As pressurant is withdrawn, additional heat is required to main-
tain the high-pressure supercritical state.
d) Evaporated Propellant - Another means for using
the liquid stored pressurant concept is to allow the vapor pres-
sure of the propellants themselves to act as the transfer force.
This can be done by conditioning the propellants to the tempera-
ture at which their vapor pressures are equal to the required
transfer pressure. When a temperature other than ambient is de-
sired, electric heaters or heat exchangers may be used. For
short-duration missions temperature conditioning can be accom-
plished before launch, otherwise thermal conditioning equipment
may be required by the logistics vehicle. For systems such as
the WACS which employ hydrazine fuels and nitrogen tetroxide,
secondary fluids such as N1*3 and NO may be mixed with the liquid
propellants to increase the vapor pressure and reduce the re-
quired thermal conditioning.
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e) Products of Chemical Reaction - Products of chem-
ical reaction may also be used as pressurants. Combustion products
may be generated inside the tank by injecting hypergolic liquids
directly into the tank. This technique is often referred to as
Main Tank Injection (MTI). Reaction products may also be generated
'outside the propellant tanks by gas generators employing liquid
bipropellants, liquid monopropellants, solid propellants, or hy-
brid systems.
2) Pump Transfer - In addition to the pressurized transfer
techniques outlined above, mechanical pumps were also considered
for transferring propellant from the logistics vehicle to the
Space Station. Although a variety of auxiliary power sources and
types of pumping units are available for this application, the
added complexity of a pumped transfer system is difficult to jus-
tify for the relatively low flow rates required for propellant
resupply. Addition of a pumping unit and an electric or a turbine
drive does not eliminate the requirement for ullage control or
pressurization of the transfer tanks, since even assuming a mini-
mum NPSH transfer pump, something on the order of 20 psia must be
maintained in the NTO transfer tank to avoid vaporization in the
lines.
3) Ullage Control Forces - In addition to pumping and
pressurization systems, certain of the ullage control techniques
such as capillary and acoustic pumps, dielectrophoresis, spray
impingement, and vehicle acceleration were recognized as poten-
tial energy sources for propellant transfer. These approaches
_w_ere eliminated from further considerations, however, based on
their development status, limited "perfоnriance capability, or ex
cessive weight.
c. Transfer Line Coupling - In addition to the requirements
for providing ullage control and fluid transfer energy, use of
transfer lines for resupply of propellants will require that a
suitable method of connecting the lines be developed.
_Two basic methods are available for joining the logistics
vehicle and Space Station. The first is docking of the two
hides to form a rigid, combined control unit. The second method
is to form the connection with a flexible line leaving each unit
independently controlled.
For the rigid docking system, the propellant transfer
line may be part of the docking structure and automatically
coupled during the closure maneuver as in Fig. A-20(a). Another
approach is for a separate umbilical to be used, as shown in
Fig. A-20(b). The umbilical connection may be made remotely
through use of a boom or similar mechanical device or by manual
coupling.
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Docking Mechanism
Receiver
Q-D
Coupling
•Transfer Line Q-D Coupling
Tanker
Umbilical
Receiver Tanker
Docking Mechanism
(a) Docking with Direct Coupling (b) Docking with External Umbilical
Fig. A-20 Transfer Line Coupling by Docking of Vehicles
The second concept involves proximity rendezvous of the
vehicles with mating using a flexible or semirigid umbilical
A schematic of such a possible system is shown in Fig. A-21. The
umbilical may be coupled by either remote control (extendable boom)
or EVA. Only the rigid docking approach is considered applicable
for the Space Station resupply function since transfer of person-
nel and packaged cargo already require this capability. It is
also possible that safety considerations will demand that coupling
of the transfer lines be made in an unpressurized area external
to the access tunnel. Detailed aspects of the coupling mechanism
must be considered as an integral part of the docking system,
however, and as such were not considered in detail during this
study.
Umbi1i cal
Q-D Coupling
2. Modular Replacement of
the Propel 1 ant Storage
Tanks
A second fundamental ap-
proach to propellant resupply
consists of a modular re-
placement of the propellant
storage tanks. Expended pro-
pellant tanks can be replaced
by loaded ones at each re-
supply cycle.
In general three require-
ments must be met if modular
replacement is to be used as
a resupply technique.
Fig. A-21 Transfer Line Coupling
by Proximity Rendezvous
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First of all a transporting mechanism must be provided, sec-
ondly a container design must be developed that will provide
adequate protection against mechanical damage during the transfer
process, and finally a means must be provided for isolating and
removing the expended tanks from the remainder of the system and
for recoupling the replacement tanks.
a. Transporting Mechanism - Propellant storage tanks as well
as other packaged cargo can feasibly be transferred from the
logistics vehicle to the Space Station by crew members using some
form of auxiliary handling equipment. EVA can be avoided by
transporting the packages through the docking port and access
tunnel to the unpressurized consumables storage area within the
Space Station structure. Judging from the results of Ref A-8,
the present baseline propellant tanks are too large for efficient
handling by one man without auxiliary handling equipment such as
guiding tracks, harnesses, or other mechanical handling aids.
However, since similar devices will surely be required for handling
other packaged cargo, they should probably not be considered a
serious penalty in the development of a modular propellant re-
supply technique.
b. Mechanical Protection - Another major factor in the de-
velopment of a resupply system requiring movement of loaded pro-
pellant containers will be the packaging of the containers to
preclude mechanical damage and subsequent propellant spillage.
Although a number of design variations are possible, the most
promising appear to be double walled designs of honeycomb or foam
construction. With-these devices^protective provisions are in-
corporated as an integral part of the container design. Another
approach might be to install removable protective shells during
the transfer process only.
c. Tank Replacement - Self-sealing disconnects can be used
to facilitate isolation, removal, and replacement of expended pro-
pellant tanks. As illustrated in Fig. A-22, disconnects can be
installed in both the pressurant and propellant distribution lines
to- provide-simul-taneous-isolation-and. disconnect of the rep lace -
able module. Crew safety becomes a major factor when considering
this approach, however. Since personnel will be in contact with
pressurized tanks containing unvented residual propellants, this
scheme relies heavily on foolproof operation of the disconnects
to prevent exposure of the crew and adjacent equipment to hazard-
ous propellants. Handling of damaged or malfunctioned tanks must
also be recognized as a potential requirement.
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Self-Venting* Disconnect
No-Spill Disconnect
Propel 1 ant Storage Tank
Fig. A-22 Modular Replacement of Tank Using No-Spill Disconnects
Handling hazards can be minimized by installing isolation
valves as shown in Fig. A-23 to isolate, depressurize, and vent
the tank modules. Purge and bleed-in is not anticipated since
the propellant side of the tanks will be vented to a hard vacuum,
and since entrapment of gases at the line connections will also
be impossible, again due to the vacuum environment. Some means
of capturing the vented vapor may be necessary, however, to pre-
vent damage to the Space Station exterior, such as radiators and
solar panels. Interconnects between tanks will also be required
to transfer propellants from one partially expended tank to another.
This is necessary to minimize handling hazards and residual pro-
pellant losses in the event that premature replacement of a tank
is required.
Three-Way Valve for Isolation
and Decontamination Connector
Дэ—i
Fig. A-23
Propellant
Storage
Tank
Modular Replacement of Tank Using Mechanical
or Brazed Connectors
In spite of the above provisions, however, several design
and system integration problems must be faced if this technique
is to be used. These problems may be especially difficult to an-
ticipate because of limited development experience in handling
hazardous cargo in the operational environment of the Space Station.
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Safety - Regardless of the design and procedural precau-
tions taken to assure safe handling of propellant storage tanks,
the requirement for routine and direct contact between personnel
and the system represents a significant safety consideration.
Performance - The time required for propellant resupply
is expected to be several times that required for the other tech-
niques considered. This results from the number and complexity
of operations involved in the resupply of a complete propellant
load. Each expended tank must be checked out, depressurized,
vented, and disconnected. It must also be transferred to the
logistics vehicle and stowed. New tanks must be checked out and
conditioned for transfer to the Space Station. They then must
be installed and again checked out before they are put on line.
Even assuming efficient and rapid handling techniques, the number
of tanks involved may require an excessive amount of time.
Integration Potential - Simultaneous use of the access
tunnel for transfer of personnel or other cargo will be prohibited.
This must be compared to the fluid transfer technique that can be
accomplished concurrently with bulk cargo transfer.
Cost - Since refurbishable or expendable tanks will be
required for each resupply cycle, fabrication and refurbishment
costs must be carefully controlled if this technique is to be
economically competitive for a long-duration program.
It is also significant, however, that some of the design
problems discussed above are probably unavoidable in that the
capability of replacing malfunctioned or damage d~t~anks will al- - —
most certainly be a maintenance requirement. Use of a modular
resupply technique will also have a significant impact on long-
duration mission reliability. The extreme long-life requirement
will be avoided.
Since empty weight of the propellant tanks (376 Ib) repre-
sents a severe weight penalty for the baseline design, the oppor-
tunity—for- using_a_lightweight ,_limited cycle expulsion technique
also represents an attractive design option. The~ ne~ces~si"ty~~for ~
such heavy tanks (47 Ib/tank) arises primarily from the require-
ment for a long-life recycle capability. Even allowing for
mechanical protection of the tank shell, tank weights could prob-
ably be reduced to less than one-half of their present weight if
a minimum weight single cycle expulsion design were employed.
Use of this technique might also reduce the logistics vehicle
weight, although probably not to such an extent.
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С. PRESSURANT RESUPPLY DISCUSSION
A number of approaches were evaluated for resupply of the
baseline pressurization system. In addition, the feasibility of
several modified systems was also evaluated to determine their
potential effect on resupply requirements.
1. Basel ine System
The baseline system uses high-pressure ambient temperature
nitrogen as a pressurant source. This system can be resupplied
by either of two basic methods: fluid transfer, or modular re-
placement of the gas storage spheres.
a. Fluid Transfer - Making use of fluid distribution lines,
the gaseous nitrogen storage bottles of the baseline system can
be resupplied by blowdown of high-pressure gas onboard the logis-
tics vehicle or by vaporization or thermal compression of cryo-
genic nitrogen.
1) Blowdown - Gas can be transferred through fluid dis-
tribution lines by allowing pressures to equalize between the ex-
pended storage bottle and the charged resupply bottle. High-
pressure blowdown represents a well-established, uncomplicated
technique for transferring pressurant from one storage bottle to
another, and as such should provide a highly reliable resupply
system requiring a minimum of maintenance or replacement.
However, a major disadvantage does exist in that large
pressurant residuals will be left in the logistics vehicle storage
bottles. These residuals represent a severe weight penalty not
only in terms of pressurant but more significantly in the volume
and pressure level required by the storage bottle itself. A
simplified analysis of this effect — based on an initial transfer
pressure of 6000 psi — indicates that to transfer 30 Ib of
m
usable N2 to the Space Station, from 80 to 120 Ib of initial pres-
surant and from 70 to 100 Ib of bottle weight must be carried by
the logistics vehicle. To achieve the lower values (80 and 70 Ib),
transfer rates must be_low enough to allow time for thermal equi-
librium to be achieved between the residual pressurant 'and the
ambient.
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Several other methods were also considered for reducing
or effectively using the residual pressurant. As discussed during
the evaluation of propellant resupply techniques, high-pressure
stored gas represents a most attractive energy source for propel-
lant transfer. Use of residuals from the pressurant resupply op-
eration would eliminate the requirement for a separate pressurant
source for propellant transfer. The quantity required (20 Ib
including the bottle and miscellaneous hardware) is small compared
to the available residual quantities, and consequently should not
be considered a major factor in the selection of a pressurant re-
supply technique.
Other methods of reducing residuals such as compressors
or heaters were also considered. A major disadvantage associated
with these techniques is that they greatly compound the problem
of compressive heating of the transferred pressurants* Rapid
loading of the Space Station receiver tanks will result in severe
compressive heating of the pressurant, with resultant temperatures
as high as 300 to 400°F. This condition can be accommodated by
oversizing the receiver tanks or by controlling the servicing rate
so that sufficient time is allowed "for thermal equilibrium to be
achieved. Reducing residuals using a compressor or by installa-
tion of heating elements in the logistics vehicle transfer tanks
will further add to the thermal problem by demanding either in-
creased transfer time or possibly thermal conditioning of the
transferred pressurant. Since free convection inside and outside
the receiver bottle will not occur because of the lack of atmos-
phere and buoyancy forces, heat transfer will be greatly reduced
in-the-environment of the_Space_Station. Close control and mon-
itoring of the resupply process will also be required to "top-off"
the receiver tanks without exceeding their design pressures or
temperatures. Nevertheless, use of such devices may be expected
to reduce the weight penalty associated with residual pressurant
by as much as 50 Ib .J
 m
2) Supercritical Cryogenic Nitrogen - The logistics ve-
Jiic^ e storage bottle can be loaded with liquid nitrogen and heat
added to raise the pressure^to a~~supercritical "conditions—As
fluid is removed, additional heat is then required to maintain
a supercritical state. Compared to storage at ambient tempera-
tures, the primary advantage of this technique is that the com-
bination of high pressure and cryogenic temperature results in a
pressurant density even greater than that of liquid nitrogen and
thus decreases the required storage volume and resultant bottle
weight. An overall system weight reduction can be expected when
compared to the blowdown system. Since the pressurant remains
at a supercritical state during withdrawal, liquid/vapor separa-
tion is not required as in the case of a subcritical storage
system.
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Opposed to the^expected weight advantage, however,
are several problem areas resulting from the sophisticated com-
ponents required for cryogenic storage and operational control
of the fluids. To accommodate anticipated standby requirements
without excessive venting of pressurant, an extremely effective
insulation system will be necessary, such as evacuated annular
jackets with multiple radiation shields. Effective methods of
suspending the pressure vessel, such as tensile wire supports,
insulation pads, or rods will also be required. Precise mon-
itoring of operating conditions and control of electric heaters
and heat exchangers is required to prevent overpressurization
and subsequent venting of pressurant or excessive pressure decay.
Design of components is also complicated by the wide range of
operating temperatures and pressures.
The above characteristics will have a major effect
on reliability, cost and maintenance requirements. These fac-
tors in conjunction with the required complekity of ground serv-
icing equipment and procedures will also be a significant handi-
cap in the development of a low-cost logistics system.
3) Subcritical Nitrogen - Nitrogen can also be stored
onboard the logistics vehicle as a cryogenic liquid and vaporized
by an electric heater or heat exchanger when transfer to the Space
Station is required. Although high-pressure transfer can be ac-
complished using a compressor instead of by heating the liquid
to supercritical conditions, the relatively small storage volume
required — approximately 1 cu ft — does not allow a significant
weight reduction by lowering of the bottle operating pressure.
Consequently, weight of the storage bottle as well as complexity
of the heat exchanger/vaporizer and associated control equipment
is comparable to that of the supercritical cryogenic storage sys-
tem discussed previously. Because liquid/vapor separation is re-
quired in the subcritical design and is not required for super-
critical storage, the latter approach is clearly preferable for
this application.
b. Modular Replacement of Pressurant Storage Bottles - As in
the case of propellants, a second fundamental approach to resup-
ply of pressurants is that of modular replacement of the storage
assembly. Although in both cases common requirements exist for
development of transportation, mechanical protection, and instal-
lation techniques, the reduced, number, size, and mass of the
pressurant spheres makes modular replacement much more feasible.
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1) Transporting Mechanism - Based on the empirical re-
sults of Ref A-8, the reduced dimensions and mass of the pressurant
bottles will allow simultaneous transfer of at least two modules.
This can be accomplished efficiently by one man using a minimum
of auxiliary handling equipment, probably a simple guide cable or
hand rail.
2) Mechanical Protection - Protection is of course ab-
solutely essential since rupture of a loaded storage bottle would
likely be catastrophic. This factor must be viewed from a realis-
tic perspective, however. One must consider the possibility of
failure of a pressurant bottle during handling as compared to the
same possibility resulting from alternative servicing techniques
and operational hazards. It seems probable that development of
a lightweight foolproof design for mechanical protection during
transfer will be easier than the development of corresponding
servicing and operational procedures.
3) Tank Replacement - Tanks can be replaced using conven-
tional disconnects and three-way valves to depressurize and remove
the expended bottle and to isolate and install the replacement
unit. Since hazardous vapors or bulk propellants are not in-
volved, provisions for vapor recovery or transfer of fluid from
one vessel to another will not be necessary.
4) Safety - Development of lightweight protective devices
to prevent mechanical damage during transfer seems entirely fea-
sible. The charged replacement bottles can be packaged, isolated,
and checked for overpressurization or damage before transfer;
thus minimizing the hazard during handling. ~ ~ ~ - - --
5) Performance - Although modular replacement affords a
potentially minimum weight design, current development experience
is limited. Efficient handling techniques must be developed if
this approach is to be competitive with fluid transfer techniques
in terms of resupply time.
Assuming timely^ development, however, modular replace-
ment can be expected to provide a very reliable^  "appTroactT.Since"
inspection and refurbishment of storage bottles should be rela-
tively simple, reuse of expended tanks will reduce operating and
maintenance costs to a minimum for both the Space Station and
logistics craft.
A-36 MCR-70-150
с. Recompression of Ullage - Routine resupply of pressurant
can be avoided by recompression of the ullage gas, thus reducing
resupply requirements significantly. Leakage makeup can be sup-
plied by the N2 source from the EC/LSS. The complexity of such
a system, as illustrated in Fig. A-24, represents a major handicap,
however. To be competitive with other resupply techniques the
compressor system would almost certainly be integrated with a
common coolant loop, radiator, and power source. In this event
resupply must be scheduled to avoid periods of peak power and
coolant demands. To maintain power requirements below'1 or 2 kw,
operating durations of at least 1 hr should be anticipated. The
number and complexity of mechanical components will also signifi-
cantly effect reliability and increase maintenance requirements.
Initial launch weight of the Space Station will be increased by
the weight of a coolant pump, partial coolant loop, heat exchanger,
and compressor. Safety considerations will also demand that pro-
vision be made to assure that mixing of propellant vapors cannot
occur. Assuming a low cost logistics supply capability (on the
order of $100/lb of payload) and a yearly resupply cycle, devel-
opment and operating costs for such a system would clearly exceed
the cost saving due to a reduced resupply requirement.
X
-t*.
Ullage
Propellent
Pump
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Pressurant
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Radiator |j compress^
il
H_ Power
Source
Fig. A-24 Recompression of Ullage as a Means of
Pressurant Resupply
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2. Modified Baseline Systems
The requirement for high-pressure gaseous storage of pressurant
also can be eliminated from the baseline design by incorporating
heated liquid, evaporated propellant, chemical reaction, or blow-
down systems. These systems, previously described under the Pres-
surization section of the Propellant Resupply discussion, represent
major modifications to the APS, however, and with the exception
of volatile liquids and blowdown pressurization none of them are
suitable for the Space Station APS.
Cryogenic systems are generally unsuited for APS-type duty
cycles that demand high periodic flow rates followed by prolonged
periods of relative inactivity. Such duty cycles require excessive
heat input during engine activity to maintain required operating
pressure and extremely effective insulation systems to avoid vent-
ing or overpressurization during standby.
Evaporated propellant systems are also unsuited for duty cycles
requiring multiple restarts and prolonged standby times because
thermal losses will result in condensation of the pressurant during
periods of engine inactivity.
Systems using products of chemical reactions are also con-
sidered inapplicable for pressurization of the Space Station APS
because efficiency of these systems depends heavily on elevated
temperatures to provide pressurant gases with a high specific
volume.
The foregoing thermal considerations are relatively "unimportant
when the mission duty cycle consists of a single firing because
the temperature remains at a relatively high constant value
throughout operation of the system. For APS applications, how-
ever, thermal effects become extremely significant — particularly
for systems using reaction products for the pressurant — because
condensation of the pressurant results in potential contamination
of the propellant and/or hardware.
Volatile liquid pressurization represents a potential improve-
ment over the baseline system for application to the Space Station
APS. As illustrated in Fig. A-25, pressurization results from
vaporization of a volatile liquid pressurant by controlled addi-
tion of heat. Operating characteristics of such a system are dis-
cussed in some detail in Ref A-9. The potential of this approach
results primarily from two fundamental characteristics, namely
the elimination of high-pressure gases and an inherent recycle
capability that avoids any requirement for resupply of expended
pressurant.
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Fig. A-25 Volatile Liquid Pressurization
The major disadvantages of this approach are associated with
integration requirements and an early development status.
To maintain propellant tank operating pressure during stand-
by, a waste heat source can probably be used to avoid unnecessary
use of electric power. During periods of high flow demand, the
penalty for power consumption will probably be unavoidable unless
a heat storage material is used.
Compression and condensation of the pressurant vapors during
propellant resupply may also require a coolant loop or heat sink
to 'minimize resupply time without overpressurizing the tanks.
Since these factors are extremely sensitive to duty cycle re-
quirements, a quantitative evaluation of their effects is diffi-
cult at this stage of Space Station development. They do repre-
sent a recognized limitation in flexibility and growth potential,
however.
Present estimates of cargo delivery costs also indicate that
development costs of such a system would exceed the savings in
logistics resupply expense.
The variations in propellant tank operating pressures inherent
with this approach will also degrade APS performance, since engines
of the baseline type are sensitive to these effects, particularly
any pressure difference between fuel and oxidizer tanks.
Use of a blowdown pressurization system, rather than high-
pressure regulated gas for the baseline APS, offers another tech-
nique for eliminating the requirement for scheduled resupply of
pressurant. As illustrated in Fig. A-26, this approach would
allow recompression of the ullage during propellant resupply and
would thus avoid the necessity of a separate pressurant resupply
system. The reliability and safety aspects of a resupply system
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Fig. A-26 Bipropellant Propulsion System Using
Slowdown Pressurization
of this type are also expected to be good, the major disadvantage
being the development risk associated with developing a blowdown
-bipropellant APS that will perform satisfactorily. A reasonable
development effort should be anticipated for a propellant and
pressurization system which, over the complete operating cycle,
will maintain suitable engine inlet condition, particularly during
the pulse mode of operation.
Nevertheless such development is considered entirely feasible
at this time.
Integrated nitrogen storage for the EC/LSS and the APS may
afford another means of reducing overall Space Station and re-
supply weights by common use of resupply and storage equipment
for both systems. The considerable nitrogen quantities required
by the EC/LSS will clearly dictate that cryogenic storage be used
by such a system. Although average EC/LSS nitrogen usage may be
an order of magnitude greater than that required by the APS, peak
_fIow_demandj3_w^l^_likely^be established by the APS rather than by
the EC/LSS. The question then becomes whether" or notf~the~~a~ddi^~"
tional heat exchange capability demanded by the APS outweighs the
advantages resulting from an integrated system. Resolution of
this question will require a rather detailed definition of system
duty cycles, and as a result, any quantitative evaluation of this
approach is premature at this time. Generally speaking, however,
the tradeoff will be primarily between integration problems and
potential weight savings.
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D. INTEGRATED RESUPPLY CONCEPTS
The requirement for replenishing expended propellents and pres-
surant can also be incorporated into an integrated consumables
resupply system. Three basic approaches have been identified.
These are replacement of the propulsion modules, continuous supply
from a docked logistics vehicle, or continuous supply from an
attached consumables module.
1. Replacement of Propulsion Modules
Replacement of the propulsion modules represents one fundamental
approach to the resupply of propellants and pressurant. As-illus-
trated in Fig. A-27, the propulsion modules may be replaced by ex-
ternal mounted booms, handling arms, or by docking and attachment
operations employing a tug or logistics vehicle.
(a) Docking Attachment (b) External Handling Equipment
Fig. A-27 Resupply by Replacement of Propulsion Modules
2. Docked Logistics Vehicle
As schematically illustrated in Fig. A-28 propellant and pres-
surant requirements can also be supplied by a logistics vehicle
that is continuously docked between resupply intervals. Although
such a system could be designed to supply propulsion commodities
only, maximum use would suggest an
integrated resupply system that provides
the complete consumables requirement
for the Space Station. In either case,
the propulsion resupply system can also
be integrated with the auxiliary propul-
sion requirements for the logistics ve-
hicle.
Fig. A-28 Resupply by
Docked Logistics Vehicle
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Fig. A-29 Resupply by
Attached Consumables
Module
3. Attached Consumable Module
The requirement for a continuously docked
logistics vehicle can be avoided by providing
a detachable consumables module as illustrated
in Fig. A-29. Such an approach would allow
immediate return of the logistics vehicle with
an expended module or standby as an emergency
return vehicle.
Several significant advantages can be real-
ized by the use of an integrated consumables
resupply system. Since major portions of the
APS and/or EC/LSS would be included as part of
the replaceable module rather than as an inte-
gral portion of the Space Station, requirements
for inflight maintenance would be significantly reduced. This will
allow design and development effort to be directed toward providing
operationally optimum systems and will avoid the possibility of com-
promises in design to provide the additional capability for inflight
servicing and repair. This effect should reduce subsystem develop-
ment costs by a significant amount. Ground servicing and mainte-
nance will also make Space Station personnel available for other
potentially more productive activities.* Safety and reliability
considerations should also be improved by minimizing the necessity
of handling and processing hazardous fluids as well as by reducing
crew/system contact. Growth potential will be improved in that
additional total impulse capability can be provided by modifying
or enlarging_the resupply_mpdule_rather than the Space Station
itself.
—The—value-of—this ef f ect._depends_,_of course, on program
jectives; for example whether the Space Station mission is directed
more toward scientific experimentation or toward training of per-
sonnel and development of techniques for prolonged space compati-
bility. Use of replaceable consumables modules would to a large
extent avoid the issue of inflight repair and resupply; when in
fact, development and demonstration of this capability may be a
major objective of the Space Station program.
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Although total resupply-weight is expected to be nearly equal
for the modular resupply approaches and the consumables transfer
techniques, a significant reduction in Space Station liftoff weight
could be realized by a modular system, since much of the system
hardware and all of the required consumables would be carried by
the logistics vehicle.*
The major disadvantage of integrated resupply approaches are
associated with potential program and vehicle integration problems.
Use of these techniques may place unacceptable operating and con-
figuration constraints on the design of the logistics craft and
Space Station. Since these factors affect major program elements,
integrated consumable resupply systems will require evaluation at
the program definition level.
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